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Abstract 
 The long freedom struggle in India culminated in a victory when in 1947 the country 
gained its independence from one hundred fifty years of British rule. The irony of this largely 
non-violent struggle led by Mahatma Gandhi was that it ended in the most violent and bloodiest 
partition of the country which claimed the lives of two million civilians and uprooted countless 
millions in what became the largest forced migration of people the world has ever witnessed. The 
vivisection of the country into Hindu-majority India and Muslim-majority Pakistan did not bring 
the hoped for peace between the two neighbors. The partition of the sub-continent created many 
new problems and solved none. In the last sixty years or so since partition, the two countries 
have gone to war with each other three times. When not in war, they have engaged in a non-
ending cycle of accusations and counter-accusations at the slightest provocation and opportunity. 
The two most fundamental questions about the partition - was it inevitable and who is 
responsible for it - have not been fully answered despite countless theories and arguments that 
have been put forward by historians. This thesis attempts to answer those questions by 
objectively examining and analyzing the major events of the decade preceding the partition, 
unquestionably the most critical period to understanding the causes of partition. 
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Introduction 
 The partition of India was the defining moment in the country’s history and perhaps its 
saddest chapter too. The events that accompanied partition were cataclysmically violent even for 
a land which had witnessed many tragic events in the past. The partition of India uprooted entire 
communities and left unspeakable violence in its trail. Communal massacres triggered a chaotic 
two-way flight, of Muslims from India to Pakistan, and of Hindus and Sikhs from Pakistan to 
India. An estimated 15 million people were displaced in what became the largest forced 
migration the world had ever known to that point. 1  The death-toll that accompanied the 
horrendous events surrounding the partition has been estimated as high as 2 million.2 The whys 
of partition have intrigued and fascinated historians since it took place and countless books, 
essays and memoirs have been written about it. The partition debate has raged on since 
independence and would continue to be a heated topic not only among academic historians but 
also among the general public, for centuries to come. Historians have been wrestling with some 
basic questions about the partition: Why did the partition occur? Could it have been avoided? 
Who was to blame for it? In answering these questions, they have propounded many theories. I 
have outlined below a select few from the available historiography on the topic. 
 Sucheta Mahajan, a nationalist historian from India, argues in his book Independence and 
Partition (2000) that Britain’s retreat from India was a triumph of Congress nationalism over 
British imperialism. She attributes the cause of India’s partition to two factors – Jinnah’s 
unwavering insistence on Pakistan and the British appeasement of communal elements in India. 
In her opinion the partition could have been avoided had the British been firm and suppressed the 
                                                 
1
 Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, The partition of India (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), 2. 
2
 Ibid, 2. 
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communal tendencies of the Muslim League forcefully. In her analysis, Mahajan completely 
absolves the Congress of any wrongdoing.3 
 Similarly, B. R. Nanda, a noted historian from India, in his book The Making of a Nation 
(1998) puts the blame for India’s partition squarely on Jinnah’s shoulder. He writes that Jinnah 
used the slogan of ‘Islam in danger’ and raised the specter of ‘Congress tyranny’ and ‘Hindu raj’ 
to arouse Muslim antipathy against the Hindus and widen the communal gulf between them. 
According to Nanda, Jinnah was able to create a climate in which the idea of partition thrived 
and ultimately became a reality. He argues that Jinnah was rigidly uncompromising and had little 
flexibility. Per Nanda, Jinnah did not meet the Congress halfway or even quarter way. Indeed, he 
did not even budge an inch from his demand of Pakistan. As we shall see in the course of this 
thesis that Nanda’s assertion is not entirely true. Jinnah did display the ability to compromise 
during the Cabinet Mission negotiations and it was the Congress which fell short of that very 
essential quality often needed to reach an agreement. Like Mahajan, Nanda sees India’s 
independence as a result of unrelenting nationalism of the Congress. He writes: ‘It was the aim 
of Indian National Congress to wear down the British reluctance to part with power…The brunt 
of the struggle for the liberation of India was borne by the Congress. The Muslim League had no 
part in it.’4   
 Anita Inder Singh in The Origins of the Partition of India (1990) argues that the social 
division between the Hindus and Muslims in religious terms was not the root cause of partition. 
She points to the fact that the two communities had lived side by side harmoniously for 
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centuries. According to her, it was the successful politicization of the religious differences by 
Jinnah that made partition inevitable. She writes that the importance of Jinnah’s address at 
Lahore, where the Pakistan Resolution was adopted, lay in his assertion that the Indian problem 
was not inter-communal but an international one as between two nations. Singh argues that the 
British deliberately propped up the Muslim League during the war years as a counterpoise to the 
Congress demand for independence. She writes ‘The prestige thus acquired from the British 
helped make Jinnah’s League the only plausible representative of Muslims at all India level.’5 
She points out that once the war was over the British were no longer interested in building up the 
League. They wanted to transfer power to a united India. She goes on to argue that Jinnah’s call 
for Direct Action in 1946 and the resulting worsening of the communal situation made it 
impossible for the British to hold India much longer. Per Singh, Mountbatten’s decision to quit 
India in record time was a direct consequence of the worsening communal situation. She is 
mostly correct in her analysis, except in one respect: she does not hold the Congress responsible 
for the partition of India, just like Nanda and Mahajan and other pro-Congress historians. 
 Not all historians, of course, hold a pro-Congress view. In The Sole Spokesman (1994), 
Ayesha Jalal propounds the theory that Jinnah did not want the partition of India. It was the 
Congress led by Nehru and Patel who pushed for it. She writes ‘Jinnah’s ultimate goal was to get 
a seat at the center…6 Jinnah’s Pakistan did not entail the partition of India, rather it meant a 
union between Pakistan and India which would stand tall against the common enemy. This was 
no clarion call for pan-Islam; this was not pitting the Muslim India against Hindustan; rather it 
was a secular vision of a polity where there was real political choice and safeguards, the India of 
                                                 
5
 Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of Partition of India, 1936-1947 (New Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 1990), 241-242.  
6
 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1994), 84. 
4 
 
Jinnah’s dream, a vision unfulfilled but noble nonetheless.’7 Jalal’s argument is partially correct. 
She is right when she says Congress pushed for the partition. However, her statement that Jinnah 
really didn’t want Pakistan is stretching one’s imagination a bit too far in the name of arguing 
something new. There is overwhelming historical evidence that Jinnah demanded a separate 
homeland for Muslims of India from 1940 onwards and to brush aside that is to look askance at 
the proof that is plain as daylight. In support of her thesis, Jalal argues that Jinnah did not want to 
come out openly in favor of the union scheme in the Cabinet Mission Plan fearing that it would 
expose his Pakistan demand as phony in the eyes of his supporters. Jalal adds that Jinnah did not 
want to seem too eager for the union scheme because he feared that he would then loose his 
bargaining lever with the Congress. 
 Others place blame for partition on earlier historical events. Uma Kaura in Muslims and 
Indian Nationalism (1977) traces Muslim alienation from the Congress Party to 1928 when the 
Nehru Report rejected several of their demands for safeguarding Muslim interests. She writes 
that in 1928 a majority of top Muslim leaders were prepared to give up having a separate 
electorate provided their other demands were met.8 These demands included separation of Sind 
from Bombay province, one-third Muslim representation in the Central legislature, constitutional 
reforms in North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, and statutory Muslim majority in 
Punjab and Bengal. She points out that none of these demands were a threat to the unity of India. 
Yet, Motilal Nehru, in order to placate the Hindu Mahasabha, rejected the demands of the 
Muslims. Kaura asserts that the failure of the Nehru Report to satisfy Muslim demands 
embittered the Muslim leaders. According to Kaura, the Muslim dissatisfaction that started in 
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1928 intensified in 1937 when the Congress refused to establish coalition ministries in the 
provinces. She adds that the pro-Hindu policies of the Congress Ministries further alienated the 
Muslims of India. Kaura’s main thesis is that the events between 1928 and 1940 were primarily 
responsible for Muslim alienation from the nationalist cause and the emergence of the demand 
for Pakistan. 
 According to Kaura, the Congress leaders did very little to address the Muslim 
grievances. Nehru maintained a complacent attitude towards the whole situation. For him, the 
problems of unemployment and poverty, and the international situation were more real and 
urgent than the communal problem. Like Gandhi, he believed that once the British left India, the 
communal situation would resolve by itself. Kaura adds that Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy of 
India, played the game of divide and rule by taking advantage of the Muslim dissatisfaction and 
encouraging them to move further on the road of separatist politics.9 She writes that Linlithgow 
was jubilant at the adoption of the Pakistan Resolution in 1940 at Lahore. Obviously he thought 
that he could use it as a handy tool against the Congress. Kaura’s analysis is right on the mark. 
Her main argument that it was the Congress’s attitude towards the Muslims that was primarily 
responsible for their alienation from nationalist cause and which drove them towards separatist 
tendencies is correct. However, her analysis is incomplete as it stops at the year 1940 and does 
not dive into the crucial years leading up to the partition in 1947. 
 In The Making of Pakistan (1967), K. K. Aziz, an eminent historian from Pakistan, traces 
the beginning of Hindu-Muslim rift back even further to the years 1906 through 1911. In 1905, 
Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India, partitioned the province of Bengal into two parts, a Muslim-
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majority East Bengal and a Hindu-majority West Bengal. According to Aziz, the Bengali Hindus 
feared that as a result of partition they would lose their monopoly over trade, business, and 
governmental positions. So, they launched anti-British agitation. Azad comments that the 
Muslims interpreted the Hindu agitation against the Bengal partition as an attempt by the Hindus 
to maintain their superiority over the Muslims.10 Per Aziz, the orthodox religious views and 
belligerent political actions by some Congress leaders such as Bal Gangadhar Tilak alienated the 
Muslims from the mainstream of Indian nationalism.11 The Morley-Minto Act of 1909 granted 
the Muslims separate electorate which angered the Hindus. The repeal of the partition of Bengal 
in 1911 was received by the Muslims with shock and bitterness.12 
 Aziz points out that the years 1911 to 1922 saw cooperation between the Congress and 
the Muslim League against the common enemy, the British. The Lucknow Pact of 1916 was a 
result of this entente in which the Congress accepted in principle the separate electorate 
provision for the Muslims. The Montagu-Chelmsford Report of 1918 culminated in the India Act 
of 1919. The 1919 Act erected a system of Dyarchy i.e. a division of power between the 
popularly elected representatives and the British Governors in the provinces. Some subjects 
became the responsibility of elected representatives and the rest remained with the Governors. 
Aziz mentions that the Congress support for the Khilafat movement brought the two 
communities closer. The Khilafat movement was a pan-Islamic campaign launched by the 
Muslims of India after World War I to protest the dismemberment of Ottoman Empire and the 
harsh treatment meted out to Caliph, the Sultan of Turkey. The Hindus, led by Gandhi, made 
common cause with the Muslims in the Khilafat movement and participated in the extremist 
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agitations of 1919-1921. But this unity did not last long. The 1920s witnessed the worsening in 
the Hindu-Muslim relations manifested through communal clashes in places like Malabar. 
 The Simon Commission came to India in 1927 to look into advancing constitutional 
progress in the country. The Indians protested the all-white composition of the Commission and 
boycotted it. Like Kaura, Aziz argues that the Nehru Report of 1928 made the Hindu-Muslim rift 
final and irrevocable. 13  The Report recommended the immediate abolishment of a separate 
electorate for the Muslims. Aziz asserts that from 1928 onwards the Congress became all but in 
name a Hindu body.14 Aziz goes into great details in outlining the Congress atrocities perpetrated 
in the provinces against the Muslims during the period from 1937 to 1939. According to Aziz, 
the Congress’s behavior during these two and half years further alienated the Muslims.15 He 
writes: ‘The Congress might have treated the Muslims on an equal footing, tolerated their 
existence, acknowledged their separate status and honestly tried to meet their wishes. This is how 
Britain and, to some extent, the United States have dealt with their minorities. But the Congress 
refused to adopt this method.’16   
 Aziz’s line of argument follows from what Jinnah had said in his Presidential address to 
the Muslim League at Lahore in 1940 i.e. India was composed of two nations and Hindus and 
Muslims were fundamentally different and hence could not be forced to live together. Aziz 
writes that the Muslims are closer to the Christians than the idol-worshipping Hindus. He adds 
‘With the Hindus one was always on one’s guard against breaking some caste restriction or 
polluting a Brahmin household.’ Aziz argues that the Muslims in India feared that once the 
                                                 
13
 Aziz, The Making of Pakistan: A Study in Nationalism, 42. 
14
 Ibid, 43. 
15
 Ibid, 51. 
16
 Ibid, 84. 
8 
 
British left, they would be subjected to discrimination and oppression in a Hindu raj, and that 
was the main reason behind the demand for Pakistan. Aziz argues that it is a myth to suggest that 
the Hindus and the Muslims had lived in complete harmony and peace in India for a thousand 
year. According to Aziz, that assertion overlooks the fact that the Muslims came as conquerors to 
India and as long as they occupied that position the Hindus dared not show their enmity.17 Aziz 
rejects the notion that the Hindu-Muslim rift was a product of British divide and rule policy. He 
says that the Muslims were not put in India by the British and hence the British could hardly be 
blamed for the minority problem. Aziz adds that a separate electorate was not imposed upon the 
Muslims against their wishes. He writes ‘The Muslims rarely made a nuisance of themselves. On 
the whole they were ‘good’ subjects – cooperative, loyal, law-abiding. On the contrary, the 
Congress thrived on non-cooperation and agitation. If, in these circumstances, the Government 
tended to lean a little towards those whom it could trust, this could hardly be called a calculated 
satanic scheme to divide the Indians.’18 Aziz’s analysis is very partisan and anti-Hindu and anti-
Congress in tone.   
Like Aziz, most of the Pakistani historians subscribe to the two-nation theory and argue 
that partition was inevitable as Hindus and Muslims would have never lived together in peace 
after the British departed. For example, Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, a respected historian in 
Pakistan, has argued that Islam was a distinctive social order that was fundamentally at odds with 
Hindu society. The demand for a separate state was thus a natural expression of this reality. 
Khalid bin Sayeed in Pakistan: The Formative Phase (1968) has advanced the two-nation theory 
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and stated the inevitability of Pakistan as being a natural consequence of irreconcilable 
differences between Islam and Hinduism.19 
In contrast to these Pakistani historians, R. J. Moore in Crisis of Indian Unity (1974) 
argues that the British policy of divide and rule was one of the primary causes of India’s 
partition. According to him, the 1935 India Act widened the gulf between the Congress and the 
Muslim League. Moore writes that by giving constitutional guarantees to the Muslims as a 
separate community and the Princes as a separate estate, the 1935 Act hindered the emergence of 
unity based on a sense of common nationality.20 He adds that the 1935 Act was an inducement to 
the Muslims to organize on communal lines for political ends. Moore points out that the 1940 
August Offer, drafted by Churchill, gave a pledge to the Muslims that they would have a veto on 
any future political settlement that they disliked. This alienated the Congress, says Moore. Moore 
asserts that it was the British policy that enhanced the stature of Jinnah as the sole spokesman for 
the Muslims of India. Moore suggests that the British right, especially Churchill, tolerated Jinnah 
but viewed Gandhi as a wicked and malignant old man. Moore’s thesis tells the story only 
partially as it does not take into account the Congress’s role in the partition of the country i.e. the 
desire to remove Jinnah out of the way by giving him a moth-eaten Pakistan so that the Congress 
could proceed with the task of nation building. According to some Congress leaders, the post-
Independence economic and social developments required a strong center, which would only be 
possible with Jinnah out of the way. 
Reginald Coupland’s take on the partition issue is completely opposite to R. J. Moore’s. 
Coupland argues that the British had no role in promoting antagonism between the Hindus and 
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the Muslims. In fact, he suggests that the continuance of British rule in India had a neutralizing 
effect on the two warring communities.21 The moment the British announced their intention to 
leave India, the antagonism between them intensified.22  According to Coupland, it was the 
Congress’s impatience for independence that complicated the issue. The Congress was unwilling 
to wait until the war was over and did not trust the British promise of independence after the war. 
Coupland writes that the British could not have just handed over power to the Congress Party 
abnegating their responsibility towards the Princes and the minorities. 
H. V. Hodson in The Great Divide (1971) argues that Britain did not promote the divide 
and rule tactic as suggested by many. According to Hodson, Britain’s primary goal was to 
maintain peace and order in India and encouraging Hindu-Muslim rivalry was contrary to that 
goal. He writes that it is not possible to divide and rule unless the ruled are ready to be divided. 
Hodson says that the British might have used the Hindu-Muslim rivalry to their advantage, but 
they certainly did not invent it. He points out that the Hindu mode of life is quite different from 
the Muslim way of life. He adds that despite living together in India for centuries, the two 
communities had not integrated in any real sense. Each followed their own culture, custom and 
rituals with intermarriage a very rare phenomenon. Hodson’s arguments are very similar to those 
by Pakistani historians as mentioned above.   
Hodson points out that Jinnah was a nationalist who started his career as the private 
secretary to Dadabhai Naoroji. He was also a devoted disciple of another great Hindu nationalist, 
Gopal Krishna Gokhale. In 1916, Jinnah engineered the Lucknow Pact between the Congress 
and the Muslim League. Hodson suggests that by 1939, thanks to Gandhi’s iron grip on the Party 
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and the Party’s anti-Muslim policies, Jinnah had been thoroughly marginalized and alienated. 
Jinnah was not a person who would accept defeat easily and run away from the battle field. He 
took up the challenge and set out to build Muslim solidarity behind the demand for a separate 
homeland and rest became history. 
Hodson gives high marks to Linlithgow for holding the country together during the time 
of war and getting the provincial self-government working. He rejects the notion that Linlithgow 
was responsible for leaving the country divided politically more than when he started his 
Viceroyalty. Hodson writes ‘Linlithgow had the power neither to create nor prevent the 
underlying causes that brought the failures for a political settlement. India was divided not by the 
want of self-government but by the prospect of it.’ 23  Hodson also writes that it was not 
Mountbatten but the Indians who were ultimately responsible for the partition of the country. 
They were the ones who failed to reach an agreement among themselves. Hodson argues that 
Mountbatten strove for unity along the same lines as the Cabinet Mission but the Indian leaders 
were unable to rise to the occasion and forget their petty bickering in the interests of a united 
India. He comments that ‘Pride, jealousy, and suspicion crowded out statesmanship and calm 
consideration.’24 
Stanley Wolpert’s analysis on the partition issue is quite different from Hodson’s. In 
Shameful Flight (2006), Wolpert argues that the British share of blame for partition of India is 
significant. Churchill and Linlithgow distrusted the Indians and thought very lowly of them. 
Churchill hated Gandhi very much and thought of him as a perfidious man and a perpetual 
trouble-maker. In fact, he favored Jinnah over Gandhi and supported the idea of Pakistan, even 
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‘Princestan’.25 Wolpert points out that Churchill forbade any correspondence between Gandhi 
and Jinnah when the former was incarcerated for calling the Quit-India Movement. Wolpert 
writes ‘His arrogance in doggedly refusing India’s two most popular leaders to meet served only 
to widen the gulf between the respective parties and exacerbated an already impossible 
situation.’26 Churchill noted in his diary that he hated India and everything to do with it. 
Wolpert argues that Mountbatten did not make an honest effort to avoid the partition of 
India. According to him, Mountbatten was in a hurry to get the partition done as quickly as 
possible so that he could go back to his naval career in England. Per Wolpert, Mountbatten 
ignored Gandhi’s proposal to invite Jinnah to form a government. He asserts that it was the only 
plan that could have avoided partition. Mountbatten disliked Jinnah and went so far as to 
describe him as a psychopath. In contrast, he liked Nehru very much and thought him as the best 
person to lead India. Wolpert argues that by 1947, India had become a burden on the British 
Empire. Hence the British Cabinet was eager to extricate Britain from the Indian albatross. The 
growing burden of Britain’s sterling debt had swiftly eroded British support for retaining their 
erstwhile ‘Jewel on the Crown’. Wolpert blames Mountbatten for rushing through the daunting 
task of partitioning a country of 400 million in a matter of few months and without adequate 
planning. The consequence of the hasty partition was death, destruction and mayhem of 
indescribable scale and magnitude. 
The above discussion demonstrates that there are three very contrasting interpretations of 
the partition. Nationalist historians from India conclude that without Jinnah there would have 
been no Pakistan. They contend that it is the British who encouraged Muslim separatism in India 
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and that the partition of India is a direct result of Britain’s divide and rule policy. In contrast, 
nationalist historians from Pakistan argue that the partition was inevitable given the unbridgeable 
gulf that existed between the Hindus and Muslims in terms of religion, custom, and way of life. 
They reject the notion that Muslim separatism was a product of British machinations. Some 
British historians have argued that the blame for the partition of India should not be attributed to 
British policies. They say that Britain wanted to transfer power to a united India but could not do 
so because the Congress and the League were too distrustful and suspicious of each other. The 
parties were unable to reach any agreement that would have facilitated the transfer of power to a 
united country. There is also a fourth interpretation advanced by Ayesha Jalal in recent times. 
She suggests that Jinnah’s adoption of Pakistan cause was simply a bargaining tactic to get more 
power for the Muslim minority. He really did not want a separate state, she concludes. Her 
argument has not gone well among the scholars who find the notion that Jinnah said things on 
numerous occasions that he really did not mean, as downright perverse. 
None of the above approaches taken on its own explain the partition puzzle in a 
satisfactory way. Each looks at the issue through narrow lenses and takes a very parochial view 
of the subject. They are very partisan in tone, colored by the biases of their respective authors. 
The causes of the partition have been explained by these historians in diametrically opposite 
ways. Sometimes political considerations and fear of backlash have prevented some from 
venturing outside what is acceptable in their respective communities. Taken individually, these 
approaches inhibit a broader appreciation of the complexities of the partition issue. This thesis 
takes a new approach, looking at the issue holistically in an objective and impartial way based on 
the available evidence. In doing so, it has tried to assimilate the various interpretations to craft a 
14 
 
plausible and more complete account that tries to answer two basic questions – Why did the 
partition happen?, and, Who is to blame for it? 
            As the research for this thesis progressed, it soon became apparent that the decade 
preceding the partition was the most important period and an objective analysis of the major 
events of that period is critical to understanding the dynamics that led to partition. Some of the 
major events in those ten critical years are the Congress rule in the provinces from 1937 to 1939, 
the Pakistan Resolution and the August Offer in 1940, the Cripps Mission and the Quit India 
movement in 1942, the Simla Conference in 1945, the Cabinet Mission and the Interim 
Government in 1946, and the Mountbatten Viceroyalty and the partition in 1947. Each of the 
following chapters goes into great detail describing one of the above events. Each chapter 
concludes with an analysis that explains how the particular event contributed towards partition of 
India and who were the bad actors in it. For example, the chapter on the Cabinet Mission goes 
into rather painstaking detail including all the negotiations that took place between the three 
sides involved in the process, the various proposals and schemes that resulted from those 
discussions, and how it all failed and who was responsible for the failure. The main argument of 
this thesis is that the three major players - the British, the Congress, and the League - are equally 
culpable for partition of the country. This thesis asserts that the complex issue of partition can’t 
be explained away by a single theory such as the British policy of divide and rule, or Jinnah’s 
intransigence, or the power-hungry Congress party rushing into partition. Rather, it is a 
combination of all these factors and much more.         
         
                         
15 
 
Chapter One 
Congress Rule in the Provinces, Lahore Resolution, and August Offer 
 Elections to the provincial legislatures under the 1935 India Act were held early in 1937. 
The Congress did extremely well in the elections. It won 711 out of 1585 Provincial Assembly 
seats with absolute majorities in five (Madras, United Provinces, Bihar, Central Province, and 
Orissa) out of eleven provinces.27 In Bombay, it won nearly half of the seats.28 In Assam and 
North-West Frontier Province, it was the single largest party. Only in Bengal, Punjab, and Sind, 
was it in the minority. In Bengal, the Krishak Praja Party, led by Fazlul Huq, won a large number 
of seats and in Punjab, the Unionist Party, led by Sikander Hyat Khan, captured the majority of 
seats. Nehru began his election tour in May 1936, and during the eight months preceding the 
elections, he travelled the length and breadth of the country, covering some 50,000 miles and 
addressing some ten million people.29 His labors were richly rewarded as the election results 
showed. In contrast, the performance of the Muslim League in the elections was far from 
impressive. It won only 108 seats out of the total of 485 Muslim seats it contested.30 
 The Congress demanded that the British give assurance that the Provincial Governors 
would not use their special powers and let the ministries govern independently before it could 
agree to form governments in the provinces. 31  Gandhi said ‘there should be gentlemanly 
understanding between the Governors and their Congress Ministers that they would not exercise 
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their special powers of interference as long as the Ministers acted within the Constitution.’32 On 
3 April, 1937, the Secretary of State, Lord Zetland, responded to the Congress demand: ‘I must 
repeat that the reserve powers are an integral part of the Constitution that they cannot be 
abrogated except by Parliament itself, and that the Governors therefore cannot treat the Congress 
as a privileged body which is exempt from the provisions of the Constitution by which the other 
parties are bound.’33 The Congress Working Committee met on 28 April, 1937, and passed a 
resolution which said that it didn’t want an amendment to the Constitution as being 
misunderstood by Lord Zetland; it just wanted an assurance that the Governors’ veto powers 
would not be used unless under the most extreme conditions.34 Finally, on 22 June, the Viceroy, 
Lord Linlithgow, gave the assurance which the Congress was seeking: ‘There is no foundation 
for any suggestion that a Governor is free, or is entitled, or would have the power, to interfere 
with the day-to-day administration of a province outside the limited range of the responsibilities 
confined to him.’35 The Viceroy added that if under any circumstance a Governor was compelled 
to use his special power, then he would have to first clearly explain his decision to the Ministers 
why he thought it was the right one. In view of the Viceroy’s assurance, the Congress Working 
Committee gave its permission on 8 July to the Provincial leaders to accept office                            
 The expectation was that in the United Provinces a Congress-League coalition would be 
formed. Azad held out the hope that the two prominent League leaders of that province, 
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Khaliquzzaman and Nawab Ismail khan, would be appointed as Ministers.36 But Azad’s efforts 
were frustrated by Nehru, who was President of the Congress at that time.37 Nehru said that only 
one of the two leaders could be allowed in the Congress Ministry. The Congress stipulated the 
following condition as the price for a coalition with the Muslim League: 
The Muslim League group in the United Provinces would cease to function as a 
separate group. The existing members of the Muslim League Party in the United 
Provinces Assembly shall become part of the Congress Party, and will fully share 
with other members of the Party their privileges and obligations as members of 
the Congress Party. They will be subject to control and discipline of the Congress 
Party…38 
This was tantamount to asking the League to sign its own death warrant as a separate 
political party. As expected, the League rejected the conditions for a coalition government. Azad 
writes that on many other occasions, the Congress failed in the test of its claim to be a national 
organization representing all ethnic groups in India. For example, in Bombay Provincial 
Assembly, Mr. Nariman, a Parsee, was the acknowledged leader. But he was bypassed, and in 
his place a Hindu was appointed as the Chief Minister of the province.39 Sardar Patel felt that it 
would be unfair to appoint a Parsee as the Chief Minister of a Hindu majority province.40 A 
similar incident took place in Bihar. Dr. Syed Mahmud, a Muslim, was the top leader in Bihar 
and when the Congress won the elections there, it was expected that he would become the Chief 
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Minister. However, he was sidelined in favor of Krishna Sinha, a Hindu. Dr. Rajendra Prasad 
played the same role in Bihar as Sardar Patel did in Bombay.41 
The election results were a great disappointment to Jinnah and the Muslim League. 
Jinnah had pinned all his hopes on a separate electorate to see his party win the elections in 
Muslim-majority provinces and come to power there. Despite the safeguards of a separate 
electorate, the Muslim League met with an electoral disaster of the first magnitude.42 In Sind, it 
won only three seats, in Punjab only one seat, and in North-West Frontier Province none at all.43 
The results of the 1937 elections came as a great shock to the Muslims. It showed that they were 
weak, divided and disorganized.44 It showed that there were only two foci of power in India, the 
British and the Congress.45 Jinnah deliberately set out to rectify the situation by building a third 
force, the Muslim League.46 At the Lucknow session of the League in October 1937, he said: 
‘No settlement with the majority is possible…An honorable settlement can only be achieved 
between equals, and unless the two parties learn to respect and fear each other, there is no solid 
ground for any settlement.’47 Following the Congress example, Jinnah reduced the membership 
fee of the League to two annas. The members of the All-India Muslim League Council were 
selected from local Leaguers instead of handpicked from the intelligentsia.48 Within 3 months of 
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the Lucknow session, 170 new branches of the League were opened and it was claimed that 
100,000 new members were recruited in the United Provinces alone.49 
Jinnah, the ‘superb tactician’, launched an anti-Congress propaganda drive. Muslims 
were told that they could not expect fair play and justice under a Congress raj. Pro-Hindu 
measures of the Congress ministries played right into Jinnah’s anti-Congress propaganda. In his 
Presidential address to the League at Calcutta on 17 April, 1938, Jinnah described the Congress 
as a purely Hindu body masquerading under the name of nationalism.50 In support of his claim 
he cited the use of the ‘Bande Mataram’ song in the legislatures by the Congress, the effort to 
make Hindi a compulsory language, the hoisting of a tricolor flag on top of government 
buildings, and the implementation of Vidya Mandir Scheme of education and so on.51 Jinnah 
accused the Congress of sheer arrogance and for its brutal, oppressive, and inimical attitude 
towards the Muslim community. In another Presidential address to the League at Karachi on 8 
October, 1938, he said: ‘It is common knowledge that the average Congressman, whether he is a 
member by conviction or convenience, arrogates to himself the role of a ruler of this country and 
although he does not possess educational qualifications, training and culture and traditions of the 
British bureaucrats, he behaves and acts towards the Mussalmans in a much worse manner than 
the British did towards the Indians.’52 
Gandhi’s scheme of ‘Basic education’ called the Wardha Scheme was introduced in the 
Congress provinces in October 1937. The basic principle of the scheme was to associate book 
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learning with some kind of productive and manual work. It embodied Gandhi’s favorite idea of 
village uplift through constructive work. Hand-spinning was included as part of the curriculum. 
The teaching of religion was completely ignored in the scheme. Muslim children were obliged to 
honor the Congress flag, to sing ‘Bande Mataram’, to wear home-spun cloth (Khadi), and to 
worship Gandhi’s portrait. Hindi was encouraged as a medium of instruction. All these measures 
embodied in the Wardha Scheme were seen by the Muslims as attempts by the Congress to 
destroy their culture by inculcating Hindu ideals in the minds of the Muslim children. A report 
produced by the Muslim League detailed the anti-Muslim bias inherent in the Wardha Scheme. 
The All-India Muslim League passed a resolution listing its objections to the Wardha Scheme: 
‘(1) The Scheme is calculated to destroy Muslim culture gradually but surely and to secure the 
domination of Hindu culture. (2) It imposes the Congress ideology and aims at inculcating the 
doctrine of ahimsa. (3) Its objective is to infuse the political creed, policy and programme of one 
party, namely, the Congress, into the minds of the children. (4) It has neglected the question of 
providing facilities for religious education. (5) Under the guise of the name Hindustani the 
scheme is meant to spread what is highly Sanskritised Hindi and to suppress Urdu which is really 
the lingua franca of India at present. (6) The text books prescribed and provisionally sanctioned 
by some Provincial Governments are highly objectionable from the Muslim point of view.’53 
Throughout the 27 months of Congress rule in the provinces, the League kept up an 
intense propaganda barrage, climaxing in the Pirpur Report, the Shareef Report on Bihar, and 
Fazlul Huq’s Muslim Sufferings Under Congress Rule.54 The broad impression created in the 
minds of the Muslims of the Congress rule was well summed up in the Pirpur Report published 
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by a committee appointed by the All-India Muslim League to inquire into Muslim grievances in 
Congress provinces.55  The charges included failure to prevent communal riots, encouraging 
Hindi at the expense of Urdu, singing of the ‘Bande Mataram’ song, prevention of cow slaughter, 
hoisting of the tricolor flag on top of office buildings, closing of Muslim burial grounds, 
suppression of the Urdu Press, and discrimination against Muslim candidates for official 
positions and many more. The Report accused the Congress Governments of not giving 
protections to the Muslims from Hindu atrocities during the communal riots. 
On 3 September, 1939, Viceroy Linlithgow declared India’s entry into the War without 
consulting any Indian leaders. The Congress Working Committee passed a lengthy resolution on 
15 September, 1939, expressing its sympathy with democracies and condemning German 
aggression. However, the resolution declared that India could not associate herself in a war said 
to be fought for democratic freedom so long as that freedom was denied to her.56 The resolution 
added that the Congress was prepared to cooperate with the British to end Fascism and Nazism, 
but it needed to know Britain’s war aims as regards to imperialism. The Muslim League passed a 
resolution on 18 September, 1939, promising support to the British in the war efforts on 
condition that no constitutional advance should be made without consulting the Muslim League, 
the sole representative of Muslims of India. 
The Viceroy issued a statement on 17 October, 1939, declaring that India would be 
granted Dominion Status at the end of the war. He added that for the present, the Act of 1935 
was the best the Indians could hope for. The Congress Working Committee met at Wardha on 
22nd and 23rd October. The resulting resolution condemned the Viceroy’s statement as an 
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unequivocal reiteration of the same old imperialistic policy. It resolved to not give any support to 
Great Britain in her war efforts and called upon the Congress ministries in the provinces to 
resign. 57  All the Congress Ministries accordingly resigned between 27 October and 15 
November, 1939. In early December, Jinnah called upon the Muslims all over India to celebrate 
22 December as the ‘Day of Deliverance’. He said: 
I wish Mussalmans all over India to observe Friday, 22 December as the day of 
deliverance and thanksgiving as a mark of relief that the Congress Governments 
have at last ceased to function…This meeting therefore expresses its deep sense 
of relief at the termination of the Congress regime in various provinces and 
rejoices in observing this day as the day of deliverance from tyranny, oppression 
and injustice during the last two and a half years and prays to God to grant  such 
strength, discipline and organization to Muslim India as to successfully prevent 
the advent of such a Ministry again…58 
On 23 March, 1940, at the Lahore session, the League adopted its famous resolution 
known as the Pakistan Resolution. In this session, the League formally adopted the idea that 
India must be divided into two parts, one for the Hindus and the other for the Muslims. In his 
Presidential address, Jinnah elaborated in great detail the case for a separate homeland for the 
Muslims of India. He said ‘Islam and Hinduism are not religions in the strict sense of the word, 
but are, in fact, different and distinct social orders. It is a dream that the Hindus and the Muslims 
can ever evolve a common nationality…’59 He added: ‘The Hindus and the Muslims belong to 
two different religions, philosophies, social customs and literatures. They neither intermarry, nor 
interdine together and indeed they belong to two different civilizations which are based on 
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conflicting ideas and conceptions’60. Continuing the theme, he said: ‘It is quite clear that Hindus 
and Muslims derive their inspirations from different sources of history. They have different 
epics, their heroes are different, and they have different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a 
foe of the other, and likewise, their victories and defeats overlap. To yoke together two such 
nations under a single State, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to 
growing discontent and the final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the 
government of such a State.’61 
Gandhi’s first reaction to the two-nation theory and the demand for Pakistan was one of 
bafflement and bewilderment bordering on incredulity. In response, Gandhi said: ‘Religion binds 
man to God and man to man. Does Islam bind Muslim only to Muslim and antagonize the 
Hindu? Was the message of the Prophet peace only for and between Muslims and war against 
Hindus or non-Muslims? Are eight crores of Muslims to be fed with this which I can only 
describe as poison?’62 In Harijan on 6 April, 1940, he wrote: 
The two-nation theory is an untruth. The vast majority of Muslims in India are 
converts to Islam or descendants of converts. They did not become a separate 
nation as soon as they become converts. A Bengali Muslim speaks the same 
tongue as a Bengali Hindu does, eats the same food, and has the same 
amusements as his Hindu neighbor. They dress alike. I have often found it 
difficult to distinguish by outward sign between a Bengali Hindu and a Bengali 
Muslim. When I first met Quaid-e-Azam, I did not know that he was a Muslim. I 
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came to know his religion when I had his full name given to me. His nationality 
was written in his face and manner.63 
Nehru’s reaction to the Lahore Resolution was one of anger and deep resentment. He did 
not mince words in expressing his sentiments:  
There have been complaints in the Press that the Congress leaders had not 
successfully negotiated with the League. The Lahore resolution has shown clearly 
the mentality of the League leaders and is an answer to such complaints. The 
whole problem has taken a new complexion and there is no question of settlement 
or negotiation now. The knot that is before us is incapable of being united by 
settlement; it needs cutting open. I want to say that we will have nothing to do 
with this mad scheme.64 
A change of Government took place in Britain in May 1940, and Winston Churchill 
became the Prime Minister. The Fall of France temporarily softened the attitude of the 
Congress.65 Britain was in immediate danger of Nazi occupation.66 On 2 June, Gandhi wrote ‘We 
don’t seek our independence out of British ruin’. On 29 June, Linlithgow and Gandhi met at 
Simla, but the talks didn’t yield anything concrete. The Congress Working Committee met from 
3 to 7 July at Delhi and passed a resolution that demanded an immediate declaration by Britain 
granting India complete independence and a construction of a ‘National Government’ without 
further delay.67 
The British Cabinet’s reply to the Congress demand was the August Offer. On 8 August, 
1940, Linlithgow made an announcement that stated His Majesty’s Government’s new offer. It 
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assured India ‘Dominion Status’ immediately after the end of the war. For the immediate future, 
the offer included expansion to the Viceroy’s Council that would include a certain number of 
Indians from political parties and also the establishment of a War Advisory Council which would 
also contain Indians.68 The August Offer also made clear that His Majesty’s Government would 
not contemplate the transfer of their present responsibilities to any system of Government in 
India whose authority would be directly denied by large and powerful elements in India’s 
national life.69 The offer also added that the British Government would not be a party to any 
arrangement that coerced the minority to submission, by the majority.70 
‘Deeply distressed’ was Gandhi’s reaction to the August Offer. The Congress Working 
Committee met at Wardha from 18 to 22 August and expressed its deep disappointment at the 
August Offer. The offer was rejected by the All-India Congress Committee at Bombay on 15 
September, 1940. The main ground of rejection was that its demand for a national government 
was not conceded in the offer, as was the ultimate demand of complete freedom for India. On 13 
October at Wardha, Gandhi unfolded his plan for individual Satyagraha. Gandhi selected Vinoba 
Bhave to be the first satyagrahi. Bhave began to deliver anti-war speeches and was subsequently 
arrested and jailed. The next person to court arrest was Nehru followed by Patel and Azad. 
Nearly 30,000 Congressmen courted arrest as part of Gandhi’s individual Satyagraha during the 
year 1940-41.71 
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The 1937 elections were the first occasion that gave the Congress the responsibility of 
administration. According to Azad, it was a test for the Congress to prove its national character 
and everyone watched how it would live up to that standard.72 Azad wrote that the Congress 
failed in that test in Bombay and in Bihar. Communal considerations trumped merit in the 
selection of Premiers to the two provinces. Also, the Congress’s decision to form one party 
Cabinets in the provinces was a serious error in judgment. Drunk with success at the polls, the 
Congress set very stiff conditions for allowing the League members into the Cabinet in the 
United Provinces. The Congress was basically asking the Muslim League to self-liquidate itself 
as a precondition for coalition. Naturally, the League rejected the outrageous conditions set forth 
by the Congress. Jaswant Singh writes ‘all such attitudinizing on the part of the Congress gave 
the Muslim League a new lease of life and set in motion a process that culminated in the partition 
of India.’73 Menon writes ‘this was the beginning of a serious rift between the Congress and the 
League and was a factor which induced neutral Muslim opinion to turn in the support of 
Jinnah.’74 Azad commented that if the league’s offer of cooperation had been accepted, the 
Muslim League party for all practical purposes would have merged with the Congress. 
Another legitimate complaint against Congress policy was that it spurned offers of 
coalition at provinces where it had the majority, whereas it did not hesitate to join coalitions in 
provinces where it was in the minority. So, some historians have raised the question ‘if coalition 
was bad, how it could be good in one place and bad in another?’ Uma Kaura very correctly 
concludes that the Congress’s refusal to form a coalition had a major impact on the evolution of 
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Muslim attitude towards it.75 Jinnah was determined not succumb to the dictates of the Congress. 
He saw it as an attempt by the Congress to annihilate the Muslim League. According to Nanda, 
the reason why the Congress did not opt for a coalition in the United Provinces was because 
some of the Congress leaders feared that the League, with its feudal and landlord support, would 
oppose the Congress agenda of agrarian reforms, particularly the abolition of landlordism.76 
Another consideration for the Congress was whether a coalition government between the two 
parties would be able to maintain cohesion given the fact that they represented two contradictory 
urges.77 The Congress stood for democracy, socialism, and Indian national unity whereas the 
League was primarily interested in the promotion of Muslim interests.78 
The Congress attitude made Jinnah realize that the only way to counter the Congress 
challenge was to build a first class organization. In order to unite the Muslims behind his 
organization, Jinnah raised the slogan of ‘Islam in danger’ and created an atmosphere of hatred 
against the Congress. At the Lucknow Session of the Muslim League, he called for solidarity and 
unity among the Muslims. It was in Lucknow that he launched a programme to make the Muslim 
League a truly mass organization. The greatest achievement at Lucknow was the recognition of 
the League by powerful provincial leaders such as Fazlul Huq and Sikander Hyat Khan as the 
sole organization representing the Muslims of India. 
The Congress leaders failed to realize the seriousness of the growing ill-will among the 
Muslims on the pro-Hindu measures being taken by the Congress Ministries. The Congress 
turned a blind eye to the growing uneasiness, bitterness, and distrust among the Muslims of its 
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policies. The Muslim League did its best to fan the flames of discontent by publicizing the 
alleged insolent behavior of the Congress Ministries.79 As has been mentioned earlier in this 
discussion, the All-India Muslim League instituted a commission to look into the Congress 
atrocities in the provinces and its findings were published in a report called the Pirpur Report. 
The report confirmed the charges against the Congress. A sub-committee was also appointed by 
the League to look into the alleged grievances and hardships of Muslims in Bihar under the 
Congress rule. The resulting report, called the Shareef Report, reached the conclusion that the 
Muslims in Bihar were living in a state of constant fear of attack upon their life and property.80 
According to Sumit Sarkar, the Congress totalitarianism was a bit of overstatement. Other 
historians have opined that the allegations against the Congress by the Muslim League were 
exaggerated. Even if the allegations were overblown, the fact remained that it created deep 
suspicion and mistrust among the Muslim community regarding the ability of the Congress to 
govern in a fair and just manner. The Congress did almost nothing to assuage the Muslim fears. 
Rajendra Prasad’s response to the Muslim League’s accusations was one of complete 
indifference.81 He wrote ‘so far as I am concerned, the Congress Ministry has done nothing to 
prejudice the Mussalmans.” By the end of 1938, the Muslim League leaders were united in their 
determination to not let the Muslims be dominated by the Hindus in a future Central 
Government.82 They felt that the Congress demand for complete independence with a centralized 
government would place the Muslim minority perpetually at the mercy of a Hindu majority. 
Hence, they began to look for alternate schemes, partition being one of possibilities. 
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Another accusation against the Congress Provincial Governments was that they were 
being ruled from the Center. They were not accountable to the electorate that had elected them, 
rather to the Congress High Command. Strict control was exercised over the Provincial 
Governments by the Congress High Command, even on minor matters. Hodson writes ‘The main 
effect of ‘dictatorship’ by the High Command was to heighten Muslim fear.’83 The value of 
Provincial autonomy was debased. Despite strict control from Center, the Provincial 
Governments were mired in corruption and nepotism. Tomilson comments: ‘Congressmen were 
suddenly seized with a desire to capture power at all cost. So long it was a fighting machine, it 
was functioning on a high moral plane and followed strict moral discipline. Once they won the 
elections, they felt that it was time for reward for their past sacrifices.’84 Tomilson adds: ‘Khadi, 
which was the symbol of truth and non-violence, now, became a qualification for its wearers to 
secure jobs for themselves and for their friends and families.’85 
Nehru dismissed the communal problem as a ‘nonsense’ that needed no attention. For 
him the most vital factor was the problem of poverty and unemployment and everything else was 
subsidiary to it. Nehru had no idea about the power and potentialities of the Muslim League.86 
He dismissed it as a small upper class organization controlled by feudal elements which had no 
influence on the masses.87 According to Majumdar, Nehru committed the same type of mistake 
as the British with respect to the Congress when they belittled it as an organization of English 
educated men constituting a microscopic minority.88 Instead of conciliating with the Muslim 
                                                 
83
 Hodson, The Great Divide: Britain – India – Pakistan, 74. 
84
 B. R. Tomlinson, The Indian National Congress and the Raj, 1929-1942: the Penultimate 
Phase (London: Macmillan, 1976), 106. 
85
 Ibid. 
86
 Majumdar, History of the Freedom Movement in India, vol. 3, 466. 
87
 Ibid. 
88
 Ibid, 466-467. 
30 
 
League, the Congress leaders set out to destroy it. Accordingly, Nehru announced the Muslim 
Mass Contact Programme to win away Muslims from the League. The strategy completely 
backfired. Jinnah took up the challenge thrown by Nehru and his brilliance as a leader never 
shone forth higher.89 He completely turned the table on the Congress by playing the communal 
card adroitly. According to Majumdar, he turned Indian Politics into a battle between the Hindu-
majority versus the Muslim-minority.90 
The Congress argument that since it was secular it represented all sections of India was 
spurious. It did not win enough Muslim seats to justify its claim. Moreover, the Congress ideal of 
a Westminster model of majoritarian democracy was unsuitable to the Indian condition, given 
her complex social arithmetic.91 Nehru and the Congress leaders were blind to the fact that under 
the system of separate electorate, which they had agreed to according to the 1935 Act (and a few 
times in the past such as Lucknow Pact of 1916), a government entirely majoritarian and not 
reasonably inclusive of minorities would be seen as an unrepresentative government.92 
The British saw the growing rift between the Congress and the Muslim League as their 
trump card.93 During the early stages of the war, the British policy was to win Indian support 
without conceding anything grand. They viewed the communal approach taken by Jinnah as their 
most effective weapon to counter the Congress’s demands. They saw the communal divide as the 
most useful trap for the forces of nationalism. Linlithgow tried halfheartedly to bring the two 
parties to an agreement, but he was chastised by Churchill as following a suicidal policy. For 
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Churchill, the Hindu-Muslim tension was the bulwark of British rule in India.94 The Congress 
committed a serious blunder by resigning en masse from the Provincial Ministries. As a result, it 
lost the power to bargain. The resignation of the Congress Ministries allowed the League to 
occupy the political center stage. Linlithgow’s attitude towards the Congress changed as there 
was no need to placate it anymore. The Congress’s insistence that Britain declare her war aims 
made the Viceroy suspect that the Congress was maneuvering to take advantage of Britain’s 
difficulties. Hence the Viceroy sought support elsewhere and the obvious choice was Jinnah and 
the Muslim League.95 He found it expedient to encourage the Muslim league to become a rival to 
the Congress at an all India level. In March 1940, the Muslim League passed its famous Pakistan 
Resolution and it never looked back on its demand for Pakistan from that point on. 
The promise of Dominion Status at the end of war by the August Offer did not satisfy the 
Congress; first, it was unknown how long the war would last and second, the Congress was not 
very enthusiastic about Dominion Status. In Nehru’s words: ‘The conception of Dominion Status 
developed as between England and her own people spread out in various colonies. There was and 
is much in common between them. The common bonding is lacking here and it is difficult to see 
how Dominion Status fits in with India.’96 Britain’s obligations to the minorities were spelled out 
as a pledge in the August Offer. This was seen by the Congress as the old British policy of divide 
and rule. The Congress concluded that the British had no real interest to recognize India’s 
independence and would do anything to keep her in perpetual bondage. However, the Congress’s 
rejection of the August Offer hurt it politically. The acceptance of the August Offer would have 
meant a return of the Congress Governments in the provinces. Then it would have been in a 
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position to counter the growing influence of the Muslim League instead of handing the center 
stage to Jinnah on a platter. With the Congress in the wilderness and Jinnah’s hands considerably 
strengthened, waverers among the Muslims began trickling into the League.97 For all practical 
purposes, Jinnah was given a veto on further constitutional progress.98 The balance of power 
altered in favor of Jinnah and the Muslim League.       
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Chapter Two 
Cripps Mission 
 Prime Minister Churchill, Secretary of State for India Leo Amery, and Viceroy 
Linlithgow were all opposed to giving India more self-governance while the war lasted. 
Churchill wrote: ‘The idea that we shall ‘get more out of India’ by putting the Congress in 
charge at this juncture seems ill-founded.’ 99   Amery thought that any settlement with the 
Congress Party would alienate the Muslims in India and it could hurt Britain’s war efforts as 
most of the military recruits came from the Muslim race.100 Like Churchill, Linlithgow was an 
ardent imperialist who believed that the imperial interests would be best served by yielding 
nothing to India. He thought that any real transfer of power would exacerbate the racial and 
religious divisions in the country.101 Moreover, Linlithgow hated the Congress politicians and 
had a very low opinion of them. He wrote the following: 
…there is no possibility of giving satisfaction to Congress or securing their real 
and wholehearted support. In my experience they are entirely ruthless politicians; 
will take all they can get; will do their utmost to maneuver us into a position in 
which we make  sacrifices that are substantial and that will increase the prestige 
and power of Congress in the country.102 
Clement Attlee, who was the Lord Privy Seal in Churchill’s Cabinet, opposed the policy 
of “do nothing” being advocated by the Secretary of State and the Viceroy. He proposed that a 
representative from London be sent to India to find a settlement with the Indian leaders to 
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devolve more power into their hands. He thought that the hand-to-mouth policy being followed 
by His Majesty’s Government was not statesmanship; rather it was short-sighted and suicidal.103 
Meanwhile the war situation in Asia changed rapidly. Singapore fell to the Japanese army 
on 15 February 1942, Rangoon on 8 March, and the Andaman Islands on 23 March. Despite the 
popular resentment against the British Raj, Indian participation in the Allied campaign was 
strong. As many as 2.5 million Indian troops were fighting the Axis forces in Africa, Middle 
East, South Asia, and Italy. But, as the war approached India’s doorsteps, the Churchill Cabinet 
felt compelled to make some gestures to India to win her greater support for the war efforts.104 
During this time, President Roosevelt was pressuring the Churchill Government for a settlement 
of the Indian question.105 After Pearl Harbor, American opinion became more vocal and urged 
Britain to make greater efforts to seek India’s cooperation in the war. 106  In the newly 
reconstituted War Cabinet of Churchill, Attlee was appointed the deputy Prime Minister and Sir 
Stafford Cripps as the leader of the House of Commons and also the Lord Privy Seal. It was their 
influence that finally persuaded Churchill to agree to an offer that Cripps made to go himself to 
India as the representative of His Majesty’s Government to negotiate fresh with the Indian 
leaders for a political settlement and in return get India’s cooperation in the war. Another reason 
why Churchill agreed to send Cripps was that even if the Mission failed, it would at least show 
the world that the British were serious about giving India self-governance. 
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After protracted negotiations, the War Cabinet finally approved a Draft Proposal in early 
March to be carried by Cripps to India. The salient features of the proposal were as follows: 
a) Immediately after the cessation of the war, steps would be taken to set up a 
Constituent Assembly which would frame a new constitution for India.107 
 
b) The Indian States would be able to participate in the Constitution making 
process by sending their representative to the body.108 
 
c)  The right of any province to opt-out of the constitution. These non-acceding 
provinces would be allowed to frame their own Constitution.109  
 
d) During the critical period of the war, His Majesty’s Government must 
inevitably bear the responsibility for and retain control and direction of the 
defense of India as part of their world war effort.110 
 
In the days following his arrival in India, Cripps conducted interviews with leaders of the 
Congress Party, the Muslim League, the Sikh Community, the Depressed Classes, and so on. 
Some of the features of the Cripps Proposal were unpalatable to the Congress such as the 
provinces being given the option to stay out and the inclusion of States’ representatives (not 
elected by the popular vote) in the Constitution making body.111 The Congress wanted the British 
Paramountcy in relation to the Princes to be transferred to the Indian Government when the 
British left India. Cripps said that it was not possible under the treaty obligations of His 
Majesty’s Government with the Princes. Gandhi objected to autocratic Princely States persisting 
under British protection under the Cripps Proposal.112 He said that the document was a virtual 
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invitation to the Muslims to create a Pakistan.113 He described the declaration as a ‘post-dated 
check’. The Hindu Mahasabha rejected the plan on the ground that the option given to the 
provinces to stay out of the Union would destroy the unity of the country.114 The Depressed 
Classes denounced the scheme for its failure to provide adequate safeguards for them.115 The 
Sikhs also protested vowing to resist any attempt to separate Punjab from India.116 However, 
when Cripps showed Jinnah the draft proposal, he was surprised at the distance it went to meet 
his Pakistan demand and of course he did not oppose it. Once again, it appeared that British 
overtures were favoring the Muslim League above all else.   
 The Congress Working Committee met during the first week of April and deliberated on 
the Cripps Proposal. The resulting resolution raised objections to some provisions in the 
proposal. According to the resolution, although the Cripps Proposal accepted India’s right to 
self-determination in future, certain provisions in it fettered, circumscribed, and imperiled the 
development of a free and united India.117 The rights of the peoples in the States were vitiated by 
introduction of non-representative elements in the constitution-making body.118 The resolution 
said: ‘Complete ignoring of 90 million of people of Indian States and treatment as commodities 
at the disposal of their rulers is complete negation of democracy and self-determination.’119 
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 The CWC resolution criticized the prior acceptance of the principle of non-accession for 
provinces as a severe blow to their conception of Indian unity. The resolution expressed 
Congress’s concern that the Cripps Proposal would encourage and would lead to attempts by the 
provinces to break away from the Union at the very inception of it and just when utmost 
goodwill and cooperation were needed.120 It accused the British Government of giving in to 
communal demands by a certain section of the Indian population, which could have grave 
repercussions by encouraging other minority communities to make similar demands. The 
resolution objected strongly to the provision in Proposal that stipulated that the defense of India 
would remain under British control until the war was over. It said that at any time defense was a 
vital subject, but at the time of war, defense was all important and covered almost every sphere 
of life and administration.121 By taking away that responsibility, the British Government had 
reduced the power to be given to the Indians to an absolute farce and nullity.122 The Working 
Committee argued that in order to rouse the Indian masses and get their enthusiastic support for 
the war, they must be made to believe that they were free and were in charge of maintaining and 
defending their own freedom.123 Similarly, C. R. Rajagopalachari, one of the major leaders of the 
Congress, told Cripps that it was essential that the Indian leaders should be able to give some 
clarion call to the Indians which would stimulate them from their defeatist attitude. The proposal 
should explicitly make it clear that the Indian people were being asked to defend their own 
country and that it was not merely the obligation of the British Government.124 He recommended 
that an Indian Defense Minister should be put in the charge of managing the war in the Indian 
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theater of operation. This would essentially put the Indian Army under Indian control while the 
British troops would continue to be under the control of British Commander-in-Chief.  
 Amery’s negative reaction to the Congress Working Committee resolution is well-
captured in the extracts below from a letter he wrote to Linlithgow in early April: 
I have just seen Stafford Cripps’ summary of CWC Resolution. It is certainly 
difficult to imagine a more purely negative document and I am afraid it looks as if 
Gandhi had once again persuaded that wrecking is the best policy. I am not sure 
that these people really want responsibility, and if we offered them the moon they 
would probably reject it because of the wrinkles in its surface…They must know 
equally well that they are quite incapable of taking on the whole defense problem 
or of ‘galvanizing the people of India to rise to the height of the occasion’…I 
must say that the more I look at the Resolution the more doubtful I am whether 
people of that type would ever run straight, even if they could be brought for the 
moment to agree. They would be quite capable, not only of making endless 
difficulties for Wavell, but even of trying to negotiate a separate peace with 
Japan.125      
 Cripps wrote a letter to Churchill suggesting that it might be a good idea to hand over the 
Defense Ministry to an Indian, subject to a convention in writing that the Defense Minister 
would not in any matter affect the prosecution of the war act contrary to the policy laid down by 
His Majesty’s Government.126 He also suggested as an alternative that if it was impracticable 
during the time of war to hand over the full responsibility of Defense to a Minister, then perhaps 
some non-critical functions could be delegated subject to the Commander-in-Chief’s approval.127 
Essentially, Cripps’s alternative proposal envisioned designating the Commander-in-Chief as the 
War Member, converting the Defense Department into the War Department, and creating a 
Defense Coordination Department to take over the transferred functions.128 Cripps’s Proposal to 
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transfer the Defense Department entirely to Indian hands was voted down by Churchill, Amery, 
Linlithgow and Wavell. Amery argued that India was the key to the defense of the British 
Empire and putting that key in unskilled Indian hands might prove fatal for the conduct of the 
war. 129  Cripps’s alternative proposal was, however, approved by the War Cabinet with the 
consent of the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief.  
 The negotiations were further complicated by the intervention of Colonel Louis Johnson, 
a personal representative of President Roosevelt. He took an active part in the negotiations on the 
defense formula. The resulting proposal, called the Johnson-Cripps formula, inverted the original 
proposal approved by the War Cabinet.130 The original proposal was that an Indian representative 
member should be added to the Executive Council who would be in charge of a new department 
called the Defense Coordination Department and it would be responsible for specified defense 
matters which would be separated from the Commander-in-Chief’s War Department. The 
specified defense matters were an unexciting semi-civilian list which included items such as 
public relations, demobilization and post-war construction, stationary, printing, and forms for the 
Army, reception, accommodation, and social arrangements for all foreign missions, and 
dignitaries and so on. 131 The Johnson-Cripps formula stipulated that the Defense Department 
would be placed in the charge of a representative Indian member, but certain functions relating to 
the conduct of the war would be exercised by the Commander-in-Chief, who would be in control 
of the armed forces in India, and who would be the member of the Executive Council in charge 
of the War Department. 132  The Johnson-Cripps formula met strong disapprovals from the 
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Viceroy who complained to London that Cripps was negotiating behind his back. The War 
Cabinet wrote the following letter chastising Cripps for going beyond his mandate: 
War Cabinet deeply sympathizes with difficulties of your task, but is greatly 
concerned to find that latest formula was propounded to Nehru and to Working 
Committee without previous knowledge and approval of Viceroy and Wavell. 
There is also grave danger that Johnson’s public intervention may be 
misunderstood as representing action on behalf of U.S. Government, which of 
course is not the case.133  
 When Cripps was conducting interviews with the Indian Political leaders and giving press 
briefings, he had used language which implied that under his Proposal a wholly Indian National 
Cabinet would be formed in which the position of the Viceroy to the Indian Government would 
be similar to the position of the King to the British Government, a largely symbolic position with 
no real authority.134 He subsequently pointed out that no major amendment to the Constitution 
was possible during the time of war, but he told the Congress leaders that the Governor-General 
could allow a National Government by means of a convention.135 The War Cabinet was harshly 
critical of Cripps. It objected to his promised Indianization of the executive, which would 
severely curtail the Viceroy’s powers and put him in an impossible situation.136 On 9 April, 
1942, when Azad and Nehru talked to him about the prospects of setting up a National 
Government, Cripps made it clear that there would be no change to the Constitution while the 
war lasted and any such changes to the workings of the government were matters for discussions 
with the Viceroy after a settlement had been reached.137 It was in these circumstances that Azad 
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decided to place before Cripps a detailed statement of the position of the Congress towards the 
Cripps Proposal. Some extracts from Azad’s letter to Cripps sent on 10 April are given below: 
These proposals in effect asked for participation in the tasks of today with a view 
to ensure the future freedom of India. Freedom was for an uncertain future, not for 
the present…In our talks you gave us to understand that you envisaged a National 
Government which would deal with all matters except Defense. Defense at any 
time, and more particularly in war time is of essential importance; and without it a 
National Government functions in a very limited field. Apart from this 
consideration, it was obvious that the whole purpose of your proposals and our 
talks centered round the urgency of the problems created by the threat of invasion. 
The chief functions of a National Government must necessarily be to organize 
defense, both intensively and on the widest popular basis, and to create mass 
psychology of resistance to an invader. Only a National Government could do 
that, and only a Government on whom this responsibility was laid. Popular 
resistance must have a national background and both the soldier and the civilian 
must feel that they are fighting for their country’s freedom under National 
leadership…The formula for Defense that you sent us gave a list of subjects or 
departments which were to be transferred to the Defense Department. This list 
was a revealing one as it proved that the Defense Minister would deal with 
relatively unimportant matters. We are unable to accept this…you had referred 
both privately and in the course of public statements to a National Government 
and a Cabinet consisting of Ministers. These words have a certain significance 
and we had imagined that the new government would function with full powers as 
a Cabinet with the Viceroy acting as a constitutional head; but the new picture 
that you placed before us was really not very different from the old…The new 
Government could neither be called, except vaguely and inaccurately, nor could it 
function as a National Government…138 
 The Congress Working Committee rejected Cripps Proposal on 11 April. As soon as the 
Congress rejected the Proposal, the Muslim League Working Committee followed suit. The 
Muslim League resolution was very disingenuous in its reasons for rejecting the offer. It viewed 
the Cripps Mission as trying to create a new Indian Union and compelling the Muslims into a 
constitution-making body. Here is an extract from Muslim League’s resolution: 
In the Draft Declaration a constitution-making body has been proposed with the 
primary object of creating one India Union. So far as the Muslim League is 
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concerned, it has finally decided that the only solution of India’s constitutional 
problem is the partition of India into independent zones…”139    
The arrangement for defense proved to be the most vexed problem that was principally 
responsible for the breakdown of Cripps Mission. 140  The British wanted Wavell, the 
Commander-in-Chief, to continue being responsible for all major functions of the army but this 
was unacceptable to the Congress. The Congress’s argument was that Indians should not be 
expected to fight a war unless they were given the responsibility for defending their own country. 
Another thorny issue that contributed to the failure of the Cripps Mission was the Congress’s 
demand for the establishment of a truly National Government in the immediate future, with the 
Viceroy acting as the Constitutional head of such a Government. The British Government was 
not ready to concede such a demand as it would have entailed changes to the Constitution at a 
time of war. The truth of the matter was, Churchill had no intention of giving India freedom 
anytime soon. The main purpose behind sending Cripps to India was to show the world that 
Britain was making efforts to give India self-governance. The conservatives like Churchill, 
Amery, and Linlithgow didn’t want Cripps, a labor leader, to succeed and they constantly 
opposed and sabotaged his efforts to accommodate Indian opinions.141 Churchill never trusted 
the Congress leaders and thought that Cripps was conceding too much of their demands. Louis 
Johnson, Roosevelt’s personal envoy, commented that London wanted a Congress refusal.142 
Roosevelt was highly critical of London’s handling of the situation and he said that the deadlock 
was caused by the unwillingness of the British Government to concede to India the right of self-
government. 
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 While the responsibility for the failure of Cripps Mission rests largely with the British, 
the Congress’s intransigence and its all-or-nothing attitude also hindered reaching a settlement. 
Cripps’s Proposal was a significant step towards granting India its freedom. In the long term, it 
promised India a post-war Dominion Status with a right to secede, and a constitution-making 
body elected from provincial legislatures.. In the short term, Cripps assured the Congress leaders 
that the new executive would approximate a National Government, not formally but in practice 
through conventions just as the Governors’ special powers had not really hindered the Congress 
ministries from effectively ruling the provinces from 1937 to 1939.143 The Congress should have 
taken the offer, which would have established a semi-National Government at the center and it 
could have hastened the attainment of India’s freedom instead of another five long years that it 
took for India to get her freedom and that to after paying the heavy price of division of the 
country.  
The War Cabinet had misjudged the mood of India.144 For them, the crisis in the war 
called for immediate action to break the deadlock in the face of Japanese invasion. Churchill 
believed that by dangling the prospects of independence and self-determination after the war, he 
could get the support of Indian leaders in the war effort. But many Indians were doubtful of the 
victory of Britain and her allies; most of them were apathetic towards the war and did not believe 
that Japan would invade India.145 The country was in no mood to sacrifice its political ambitions; 
instead, it wanted to take advantage of Britain’s weakening position.146 
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Perhaps the biggest reason for Congress’s rejection of the Cripps Proposal was the opt-
out clause for the provinces. By giving the provinces that option, the Cripps formula conceded 
the partition of India. In one stroke, the British Government overturned the 1935 Act as a basis 
for a post-war constitutional settlement.147 For the first time the British Government recognized 
the League’s demand for Pakistan by incorporating the non-acceding clause for the provinces in 
the Cripps formula. It advanced the idea of Pakistan one stage further.148 It led to an increase in 
estrangement between the two major communities in India. Jinnah now came to believe that the 
Pakistan idea was achievable. It would not be a stretch to say that Cripps Mission opened the 
doors to Pakistan for Jinnah and his followers. 
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Chapter Three 
Quit India Movement, Gandhi-Jinnah talks, and I. N. A. Campaign  
 The failure of the Cripps Mission caused profound disappointment in India. The 
Congress leaders realized that Britain was unwilling to concede to India real constitutional 
advance while the war lasted. Apart from that, popular discontent was on the rise against the 
soaring prices and war-time shortages. 149  People resented high-handed actions by the 
Government such as the commandeering of boats in Bengal and Orissa to prevent those being 
captured by the Japanese army in case Japan decided to invade India.150 There was a growing 
feeling of an imminent British collapse because of the Allied reverses in South-East Asia. The 
manner in which the British evacuated from Malaya and Burma further angered the people of 
India. It was common knowledge that the British had evacuated the white residents and generally 
had left the subject people to their fate.151 Letters from Indians in South-East Asia to their 
relatives in India were full of graphic accounts of British betrayal and their being left at the 
mercy of the dreaded Japanese. Against this backdrop, Gandhi started a series of articles in 
Harijan in which he urged the British to leave India.152 He was convinced that the time was now 
ripe for putting the maximum pressure on the British to quit India.  
 On 19 April, 1942, Gandhi wrote: ‘If the British left India to her fate, non-violent India 
would not lose anything. Probably Japan would leave India alone.’153 In that article he suggested 
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that the safety and interest of both Britain and India lay in an orderly and timely British 
withdrawal from India.154 On 3 May, Gandhi wrote in Harijan: ‘I feel convinced that British 
presence is incentive for Japanese attack. If British wisely decided to withdraw and leave India to 
manage her own affairs, Japan would be bound to reconsider their plans. The very novelty of 
British stroke would confound the Japanese, dissolve subdued hatred against British.’ 155 
Continuing his theme in Harijan, Gandhi wrote on 10 May: 
I feel British cannot suddenly change their traditional nature; racial superiority is 
treated not as vice but as virtue not only in India but in Africa, Burma and Ceylon. 
This drastic disease requires drastic remedy – complete and immediate orderly 
withdrawal from India, and from all non-European possessions. It will be bravest 
and cleanest act of British people. Clean end of imperialism is likely to be end of 
Fascism and Nazism; suggested action will certainly blunt edge of Fascism and 
Nazism which are offshoot of Imperialism.156        
 On 16 May, during a press interview, Gandhi said: ‘I am convinced that we are living 
today in a state of ordered anarchy. It is a misnomer to call such rule as established in India a 
rule which promotes the welfare of India. Therefore, this ordered disciplined anarchy should go. 
And if there is complete lawlessness in India as a result, I would risk it.’157 Gandhi believed that 
only an immediate declaration of Indian Independence by the British Government would give the 
people of India a stake in the defense of their own country.158 He pushed for the acceptance of a 
draft by the Congress Working Committee that he had authored. The main points of the draft 
were: ‘(i) A demand to the British Government to clear out (ii) India a zone of war as a result of 
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British Imperialism (iii) No foreign assistance needed for the freedom of the country (iv) India 
has no quarrel with any country (v) If Japan invaded India it shall meet with non-violent 
resistance’.159 Nehru and Azad were opposed to a demand for British withdrawal at a time when 
the enemy was knocking at the gate. Nehru said: ‘The whole background of the draft is one 
which will inevitably make the world think that we are passively lining up with the Axis 
powers.’ 160  But there were staunch supporters of Gandhi such as Sardar Patel, Acharya 
Kripalani, and Rajendra Prasad, who favored the proposals. 
 Meanwhile, the Viceroy Linlithgow and the War Cabinet of Churchill were getting 
increasingly nervous about Gandhi’s call for British withdrawal from India at a time of war. The 
Secretary of State, Leo Amery, suggested to the Viceroy that if Gandhi continued to be a trouble-
maker, then the best thing to do was to put him in a plane and fly him to Uganda.161 Perhaps, the 
British Government decided not to take the extreme measure of deporting Gandhi to Africa 
fearing that it could lead to violent reaction from Indian people and generate adverse opinion 
from Britain’s allies. Amery continued to advise the Viceroy to take strong measures against the 
Congress leaders if they remained defiant and challenged the British authority.162 If push came to 
shove, they should all be put in jail, Amery added.163 
 Despite sympathy for the Allied cause and the fight against Fascism, a sympathy which 
prompted Nehru to take a soft line in not embarrassing the government at a time of crisis, the 
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Congress Working Committee, at Gandhi’s urging, passed a long resolution which came to be 
known as the ‘Quit India Resolution’. It renewed the demand that ‘British rule in India must end 
immediately’164 and that ‘the freedom of India is necessary not only in the interests of India, but 
also for the safety of the world and for ending of Nazism, Fascism, militarism, and other forms 
of imperialism, and aggression of one nation over the other.’165 The resolution was confirmed by 
the All India Congress Committee in Bombay on 8 August. The historic Quit India Resolution at 
Bombay was followed by Gandhi’s memorable utterance: ‘I am not going to be satisfied with 
anything sort of complete freedom. We shall do or die. We shall either free India or die in the 
attempt.’166 It was a clarion call for an unarmed non-violent revolt on a mass scale.167 In contrast, 
Jinnah viewed the Quit India Resolution as a clever move by the Congress to coerce the British 
to transfer power to a Hindu raj, leaving the minority Muslim community at the mercy of the 
majority Hindu community. Jinnah and the Muslim League decided not to join hands with the 
Congress in any future movement unless the Congress accepted the Pakistan demand. The 
attitude of Jinnah and the Muslim League underscored how little chance there was now of unity 
between the League and the Congress.    
Gandhi had made a serious miscalculation in thinking that because of the war the British 
Government would come to terms with the Congress as soon as he launched his movement. He 
thought that the Viceroy would at least give him time to negotiate with the Government as his 
predecessors had done during 1921 and 1930. Linlithgow, however, had no intention of playing 
the game according to the Mahatma’s rules.168 Faced with an impending foreign invasion, the 
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Government was in no mood to tolerate an open rebellion.169 In the early hours of 9 August, the 
Government struck hard. Gandhi and all other eminent leaders of the Congress Working 
Committee were arrested and put in jail. Before long, all the important leaders of the Congress 
throughout the country had been taken into custody including Nehru. 170  The Government 
declared all Congress organizations, both at the center and the provinces, unlawful and they were 
barred from operating.  
 The sudden removal of the leaders of the Congress from all levels left no responsible men 
to guide the movement. If the Government had thought that by removing the leaders from the 
scene the movement would die, they were in for a rude shock. The sudden attack by the 
Government produced an instantaneous reaction among the people. The pre-emptive strike 
provoked the people to come out in large numbers to protest the arrest of their leaders. Initially, 
the protests were peaceful and non-violent in the form of hartals and demonstrations. However, 
when the Government started taking stern measures such as lathi-charge (use of sticks or batons 
by police to discharge crowds) and firing on the crowds, the protests turned violent. There were 
clashes with the police in Bombay, Delhi, Allahabad, Kanpur, Pune, and many other cities and 
towns. There were strikes by millworkers in Bombay, Ahmedabad, Jamshedpur, and other 
places. The textiles strikes in Ahmedabad lasted three and half months and the city was described 
as the ‘Stalingrad’ of India.171 Students boycotted schools and colleges throughout India. The 
Government responded by gagging the press. 172  The National Herald and Harijan ceased 
publication for the entire duration of the movement, and others for shorter durations. This was 
the first stage of the Quit-India movement.  
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 In the second stage of the Quit-India movement, the scene of action shifted to the 
countryside. Government properties became the targets of people. Railway lines were sabotaged, 
post offices were attacked and destroyed, and telephone and telegraph lines were cut. In some 
places, police stations were attacked. Trains, buses and trams were set on fire. Parallel 
governments were set up in places like Midnapore in Bengal, Satara in Maharashtra, and other 
places in Bihar and the United Provinces. Linlithgow sent a telegram to Amery on 20 August 
describing the situation: 
It now appears that in murders of policemen at Ashti reported yesterday two of 
the murdered constables were burnt alive in kerosene…Considerable damage at 
Kodarna, station raided by a mob of 500 with Congress flag…Attacks on 
communication continues. Real storm center is still Bihar where situation clearly 
remains a grave one…173 
The situation became so grave in some areas that Linlithgow ordered the machine 
gunning of saboteurs from the air.174 Linlithgow struck hard to crush the revolt. The Whipping 
Act was revived and thousands of people were detained without trial.175 Considered as the most 
serious threat to the Raj since the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857, the Government acted with utmost 
severity. 57 battalions were employed to crush the disturbances. By end of 1943, approximately 
91,000 people had been arrested, 1,000 people had been killed in police firings, and 2,000 had 
been seriously injured.176 Official estimates put the figures for sabotages as 250 railway stations 
damaged, 500 post offices attacked, telegraph and telephone lines cut in 3,500 places, 70 police 
stations burnt, and more than 85 government buildings damaged.177  
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The brutal and all-out repression succeeded in crushing the mass phase of the struggle 
within a period of six or seven weeks. But underground activities of some sort or other continued 
for another two years. It was led by Congress Socialists, Forward Bloc members, revolutionary 
terrorists, and even some Gandhians, who instigated strikes, cut telegraph and telephone wires 
and damaged railway tracks. 178  Bipin Chandra writes ‘Their success in disrupting 
communications may not have been more than a nuisance value, but they did succeed in keeping 
up the spirit of the people in a situation in which open mass activity was not possible because of 
superior armed might of the State.’179  
The Muslim League Working Committee met on 20 August, 1942, and passed a 
resolution condemning the Quit India movement. It described the movement as an attempt by the 
Congress to coerce the British Government to hand over power to a Hindu Oligarchy abandoning 
their obligations to the Muslims of India.180 It went on to add: 
The Working Committee are fully convinced that Pakistan is the only solution of 
India’s constitutional problem and is in complete consonance with justice and fair 
play to the two great nations – Muslims and Hindus – inhabiting this vast sub-
continent whereas if the Congress demand is accepted it would bring the 100 
millions of Muslims under the yoke of the Hindu Raj…In these circumstances the 
Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League, call upon the Muslims to 
abstain from any participation in the movement initiated by the Congress and to 
continue to pursue their normal peaceful life.181 
Jinnah appealed to the Muslims to keep away from the Quit India movement. The 
Muslims in general remained aloof from the movement. However, there was a total absence of 
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communal clashes, a sure sign that although the movement did not arouse enthusiasm among the 
Muslims, it did not arouse their hostility either.182 
The decision of Jinnah to keep the League away from the Quit India movement kept the 
leaders of the League out of jail. This enabled the Muslim League party to gain in strength. In 
contrast, the Congress suffered severe setback by its absence from the political scene during 
crucial years. In addition, a violent agitation launched by the Congress Socialists, sharpened 
official animosities towards the Congress. The countrywide agitation that followed the adoption 
of the Quit India movement was interpreted by the British Government as a deliberate attempt to 
interfere with the war efforts. The principal concern of the British then was the proper conduct of 
war. The Congress party’s stand about India’s participation in the war had greatly exasperated 
the Conservative coalition government in Britain and also the bureaucracy headed by Lord 
Linlithgow.183 Consequently, they did everything possible to help and strengthen the Muslim 
League and offset the Congress.184     
Gandhi was detained at the Aga Khan Palace in Poona after his arrest in Bombay on 9 
August, 1942. The massive repression unleashed by the Government to counter Quit India 
movement distressed him. What pained him more was the Government’s insistence that he and 
the Congress were responsible for the violence. 185  At the close of the year 1942, Gandhi 
embarked on a correspondence with Linlithgow to convince the Viceroy of his own commitment 
to non-violence and that of the Congress’s innocence in relation to the violence that had taken 
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place.186 The Viceroy replied that he was ‘profoundly depressed’ by the policy adopted by the 
Congress and even more so by the silence of Gandhi and the Congress Working Committee 
members over acts of destructive violence.187  Gandhi replied to the viceroy that it was the 
Government that goaded the people to the point of madness.188 He added: ‘If then I cannot get 
soothing balm for my pain, I must resort to the law prescribed for satyagrahis, namely, a fast 
according to capacity.’ 189  The fast commenced on 9 February, 1943, for 21 days. The 
Government offered to release Gandhi for the duration of the fast. Gandhi refused by saying 
“Despite your description of it as ‘a form of blackmail’, it is on my part meant to be an appeal to 
the Highest Tribunal for justice which I have failed to secure from you. If I do not survive the 
ordeal, I shall go to the Judgment Seat with the fullest faith in my innocence. Posterity will judge 
between you as representative of an all-powerful Government and me as a humble man who has 
tried to serve his country and humanity through it.’190 
The British Government was put in a profoundly embarrassing situation. There was 
enormous pressure both in India and abroad for the release of Gandhi. The Daily Worker in 
London wrote: ‘If Gandhi dies during his fast, irreparable harm will be done to Britain in the 
eyes of the freedom-loving peoples.’191 The Government of India knew the risk of disturbances 
that would ensue should Gandhi died in jail. But Churchill remained adamant and refused to 
succumb to Gandhi’s pressures. The Viceroy contemptuously dismissed the consequences of 
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Gandhi’s death: ‘India would be far more reliable as a base for operations. Moreover, the 
prospect of a settlement will be greatly enhanced by the disappearance of Gandhi who had for 
years torpedoed every attempt at a settlement.’192 The popular response to the news of his fast 
was immediate and overwhelming. All over the country, there were demonstrations, hartals, and 
strikes. The Daily Worker reported on 12 February, 1943: ‘Following the beginning of Gandhi’s 
fast, Indian students left schools and colleges at Karachi and Lahore…All textile mills at 
Ahmedabad were closed yesterday as on the previous day. Bombay markets are still shut…’193 
Prisoners in jails went on sympathetic fasts. Public meetings were held demanding Gandhi’s 
release and the Government was bombarded with thousands of letters and telegrams from people 
from all walks of life. 
Meanwhile, Gandhi’s condition deteriorated as the fast progressed. On 22 February, the 
Daily Worker reported ‘If the fast is not ended without delay, it may be too late to save Gandhi’s 
life.’194 The next day the Daily Worker reported, ‘Mr. Gandhi entered a crisis at 4 P.M. He was 
seized with severe nausea and almost fainted and the pulse became nearly imperceptible.’195 
While the anxious nation appealed for his life, the Government went ahead with finalizing his 
funeral arrangement. Military troops were put in alert in case riots broke out if Gandhi died. But 
Gandhi, as always, got the better of his opponents, by refusing to die. The 21-day fast ended on 3 
March, 1943. The courage with which Gandhi faced the Government and his unshaken resolve 
raised him to the height of glory among the millions of his countrymen. The depth of the national 
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will symbolized by Gandhi’s fast convinced the British that their days of dominance in India 
were numbered.   
Lord Linlithgow retired from his viceroyalty on 20 October, 1943. He served for seven 
and half years, longer than any other Viceroy. He was foremost in forcefully pursuing the policy 
of helping the League to consolidate its power. Whereas, at the beginning of the war there was 
not a single Muslim League ministry in any of the provinces, by the time Linlithgow left office 
in 1943, the League was in power in four provinces. The person who succeeded Linlithgow was 
Lord Wavell. Wavell had served India as Commander-in-Chief since January 1941. He realized 
that in order to retain India as a willing member of the British Commonwealth, a change of 
attitude in British policy was needed. He started his viceroyalty with a genuine sense of purpose 
and sincerity to find a solution to India’s political problem and to transfer power to a united India 
when the time came. Imbued with that desire, Wavell released Gandhi in May 1944 on grounds 
of ill-health. 
At the Karachi session of All-India Muslim League in December 1943, Jinnah coined the 
phrase ‘Divide and Quit’.196 In his speech at the session, Jinnah said: ‘…the only honest way for 
Great Britain is to divide and quit. Unity can only be realized on the basis of division of property 
and possessions between the two respective nations, the Hindus and the Mussalmans.’197 He 
added: ‘It is a question of defense against the attitude the Congress has taken up since 1937, to 
dominate Mussalmans and to establish, by hook or by crook, Hindu Raj and Hindu Government. 
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We are defending ourselves against that monstrosity, those machinations and those designs.’198 
In that session, Choudhry Khaliquzzaman expressed the determination of the Muslims of India to 
attain the objective of Pakistan at all costs.199 He said “if any effort is made to keep us under the 
eternal yoke of slavery, we will resist it to our utmost’.200 In contrast, the All-India Hindu 
Mahasabha, meeting in Amritsar, demanded the preservation of unity of India, the introduction 
of federation with a strong center, and the refusal to any province the right to secede.201 
On 26 July, 1944, Gandhi wrote a letter to Wavell proposing that he was prepared to 
advise the Congress Working Committee to withdraw mass civil disobedience and to extend full 
cooperation in the war efforts in return for a declaration of immediate Indian Independence by 
the British and the establishment of a National Government responsible to the Central 
Assembly.202 Gandhi added that no further burden should be placed upon India to bear the cost 
of the war.203 The British Government rejected Gandhi’s offer as a non-starter. After this rebuff, 
Gandhi realized that his only hope lay in an agreement with the Muslim League.204 
Meanwhile, Rajagopalachari had been working on a formula for a settlement between the 
Congress and the Muslim League. He had shown it to Gandhi while he was still in jail and had 
obtained his approval to negotiate with Jinnah. The Rajagopalachari Formula conceded partition 
of India but under certain conditions. It required that the Muslim League endorse the demand for 
independence and cooperate with the Congress for the formation of an Interim Government 
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during the transitional period.205  After the termination of the war, a commission would be 
appointed to demarcate those contiguous districts in north-west and the north-east of India where 
the Muslims were in absolute majority, and in those areas, a plebiscite of all inhabitants would be 
held to decide whether they wanted to join Pakistan or not.206 In the event of separation, a mutual 
agreement would be entered into for defense, foreign affairs, communications, customs, and 
commerce.207 Any transfer of population should be on an absolute voluntary basis.208 On 17 July, 
1944, Gandhi wrote a letter to Jinnah suggesting that the two of them meet: ‘Let us meet when 
you wish to. Please do not regard me as an enemy of Islam and the Muslims here. I have always 
been a friend and servant of yours and the whole world. Do not disappoint me.’209 Meanwhile, 
Jinnah rejected Rajagopalachari proposal as offering ‘a shadow and a husk, a maimed, mutilated, 
and moth-eaten Pakistan, but he agreed to discuss the matter with Gandhi.210 
The Gandhi-Jinnah meeting took place on 9 September at Jinnah’s residence in Bombay 
and continued till 26 September, with brief intervals. Gandhi visited Jinnah’s residence as many 
as fourteen times and several letters exchanged between the two leaders during that period. The 
fact that the talks continued for so long and in addition, the photographs of the two leaders 
smiling and cordially greeting each other, which the newspapers carried from day to day, created 
new hopes among the public that perhaps, at last, a settlement was around the corner.211 On 24 
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September Gandhi wrote a letter to Jinnah in which he said he could recommend to the Congress 
the acceptance of the claim of separation on the following basis: 
I proceed on the assumption that India is not be regarded as two or more nations, 
but as one family consisting of members of whom the Muslims living in the 
north-west zones i.e. Baluchistan, Sind, NWFP, and that part of the Punjab where 
they are in absolute majority and in parts of Bengal and Assam where they are in 
absolute majority…The areas should be demarcated by a commission, approved 
by the Congress and the League. The wishes of the inhabitants of the area 
demarcated should be ascertained through the votes of the adult population…if 
the vote is in favor of separation, it shall be agreed that these areas shall form a 
separate State as soon as possible after India is free from foreign 
domination…There shall be a treaty of separation, which should also provide for 
the efficient and satisfactory administration of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Internal 
Communications, customs, commerce, and the like…212        
 Jinnah replied the next day to the effect that Gandhi had already rejected the fundamental 
principle of the Lahore Resolution by not accepting the two-nation theory.213 Gandhi wanted 
independence to come first and then the partition to follow and Jinnah wanted exactly the 
opposite. Jinnah wanted the two parties to come to a settlement on the partition issue first and 
then unite their efforts to secure freedom on the basis of Pakistan and Hindustan.214 Gandhi’s 
proposal included a treaty of separation to provide for the efficient and satisfactory 
administration of defense, foreign affairs, communications, customs and commerce, but Jinnah 
made clear that all these matters, which were the life-blood of any State, could not be delegated 
to any common central authority. The two leaders could not bridge their differences on the above 
mentioned points and thus the Gandhi-Jinnah talks ended in failure. 
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 While the Cripps Mission, Quit India movement, and Gandhi-Jinnah talks were going on, 
the struggle for India’s independence was being fought on another front. In January 1941, 
Subhas Chandra Bose215 slipped out of his house in Calcutta eluding police surveillance.216 After 
a perilous journey through Afghanistan and Russia, he reached Berlin in April, 1941. Bose was 
well-received by Ribbentrop, the right-hand man of Hitler. He was allowed to broadcast anti-
British propaganda from Berlin and frequently exhorted his countrymen to rise in arms against 
the British.217 Bose proposed that a ‘Free India Government’ be set up in Berlin, recognized by 
Germany. Germans were skeptical of Bose’s plan. Bose waited for two years for a German 
declaration of free India, and realized that it would not be coming any time soon. He decided to 
go to Japan next. After a hazardous sea journey, he reached Tokyo on 13 June, 1943. He was 
received by Tojo, the Prime Minister of Japan, who promised him full support for Indian 
independence.218 In the beginning of July 1943, Bose went to Singapore and based himself there. 
He announced the formation of a Provisional Government of Free India on 21 October, 1943. He 
formed the Indian National Army (Azad Hind Fauj) and succeeded in recruiting 20,000 soldiers 
from Indian prisoners of war taken by the Japanese.219 Another 18,000 Indian civilians from the 
immigrant communities in South-East Asia volunteered to join Bose’s army. 
                                                 
215
 Subhas Chandra Bose was a left-wing Congress leader from Bengal who became president of 
the Indian National Congress for two terms. He resigned from his position as president of the 
Congress party due to ideological differences with Gandhi. Bose believed that Gandhi’s non-
violence tactics were not sufficient to secure India’s independence. He was in favor of violent 
resistance to British rule in India. He established his own party called the All India Forward 
Block. He was put in jail many times by the British authorities due to his radical views and his 
repeated calls for India’s immediate independence from the British rule.    
216
 Nanda, The Making of a Nation: India’s Road to Independence, 289. 
217
 Sen, History of the Freedom Movement in India, 143. 
218
 Nanda, The Making of a Nation: India’s Road to Independence, 290. 
219
 Ibid. 
60 
 
 The I.N.A. brigades, assisted by the Japanese army, advanced up to the Indian border. In 
March 1944, the Indian National Flag was hoisted in Kohima. But with the change of fortune in 
the war, the launching of a counter-offensive by the British in the winter of 1944, and the final 
defeat of Japan, the I.N.A. movement collapsed. In May 1945, the I.N.A. surrendered in Burma 
except for Bose and a few companions, who escaped capture. On August 17, 1945, three days 
after the Allied victory over Japan, Bose took a plane from Formosa to Manchuria, which 
crashed while taking off. Bose died shortly afterwards in a Japanese military hospital. The 
British Indian Army captured 23,000 I.N.A. soldiers out of which 6,000 were marked for trial. 
The first public trial of four officers - Shah Nawaz, Shegal, Dhillon, and Rashid Khan - was held 
at the Red Fort in Delhi. It did not take long for the British to realize that they had made a 
blunder. In September 1945, the All-India Congress Committee called for the release of these 
officers and declared that it would be a tragedy if they were punished for having labored for 
India’s Freedom, no matter by what means. The Muslim League too joined hands with the 
Congress in protesting the trial of I.N.A. men. The Congress and the League lined up their best 
lawyers to defend the accused. The Indian Press lauded the accused as patriots. There were 
demonstrations all over the country demanding the immediate release of the I.N.A. soldiers. The 
Government was taken aback by the strength of Indian reactions to the trials. Eventually, the 
Government dropped the charges against the officers and they were released. The Congress and 
the Muslim League showed remarkable solidarity in opposing the trial of I.N.A. men. If they had 
displayed the same unity of purpose in opposing the British rule, the story of India’s freedom 
struggle would have ended in a much happier note.              
 The Quit India movement of 1942 is a landmark in the history of India’s freedom 
struggle. In the words of Lord Linlithgow it was ‘by far the most serious rebellion since that of 
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1857’. The Indian revolution reached its climax in the Quit India movement. The people of India 
rose in defiance of the British Government and finding no leaders to guide them resorted to 
violence. Trains were derailed, police stations were set on fire, government building were 
attacked and destroyed, and telegraph and telephone lines were cut. The machinery of 
government was paralyzed for a brief period in certain parts of the country. The movement 
marked a new high in terms of popular participation in the national movement and sympathy 
with the national cause.220 It was this struggle which convinced Churchill that Britain would not 
be able to hold India indefinitely. Bipin Chandra writes ‘The great significance of this historic 
movement was that it placed the demand for independence on the immediate agenda of the 
national movement. After ‘Quit India’ there could be no retreat. Any future negotiations with the 
British Government could only be in the manner of the transfer of power. Independence was no 
longer a matter of bargain. And this became amply clear after the war.’221 In the opinion of 
Francis Hutchins, ‘Gandhi’s demand that the British should unilaterally Quit India was in fact 
the demand on which the British Government acted in 1947. And the basis for their withdrawal 
was, to a considerable extent, an acceptance of Gandhi’s demand that India be left to anarchy.’222   
While the Congress leaders were languishing in prison and the Congress organizations all 
over the country were outlawed, Jinnah was consolidating his position and that of the Muslim 
League. The reorganization of the Muslim League that had commenced in 1937 was expedited 
during the war. Imitating the Congress, the League inaugurated a two-anna membership and 
soon had considerable numbers in its roll. 223  It began to build bases in the villages. Its 
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missionaries went out canvassing support for Pakistan. They promised not only an Islamic state 
but also an economic utopia where Muslims would be prosperous in a way not possible under a 
Hindu Raj.224 In the process of consolidating its position, the League also made the demand for 
Pakistan seem realistic. In 1940, this had not been the case, but, by 1944, Pakistan seemed 
attainable. Hence more and more Muslims flocked to the League’s banner. 
At the provincial level too, the League made considerable advances. The Muslim Premier 
of Sind, Allah Baksh, was dismissed in September 1942 for his anti-British and pro-Congress 
attitude.225 The Muslim League was allowed to form a Government in Sind. The League was 
likewise encouraged by the Governor of Assam to form a ministry there.226 The fall of Huq 
ministry in Bengal was brought about by a union of League members and the European members 
of the legislature.227 In May 1943, a League ministry was formed in NWFP. The Congress 
Party’s stand on the war had greatly exasperated Lord Linlithgow. 228  With Congress in 
opposition, Linlithgow looked to the League for its support and cooperation in the war. 
Consequently he did everything in his power to help and strengthen the League.229 So, the 
League gained power in all the Muslim provinces except the Punjab where the Unionist Party 
maintained its power until 1945. However, with the untimely death of Chief Minister of the 
province, Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, the League started to gain ground in Punjab. Sikander’s 
successor, Khizar Hyat Khan Tiwana, lacked his political skills and was no match for Jinnah. It 
did not take long for Jinnah to undermine Khizar. Patrick French writes: 
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It is not an exaggeration to say that the untimely death of Sir Sikander Hyat Khan 
was one of the most important factors in the creation of Pakistan. He had been a 
highly influential political figure, and he might easily have swung against Jinnah 
and the league had he lived longer. His influence had kept the Punjab 
comparatively calm during the war, and his support for the British had been 
essential in the supply of troops. His death represented a crucial moment in 
Jinnah’s career, for without it he would have had great trouble in tightening the 
League’s grip on the Muslims of India.230           
The Congress suffered severe setback because of its absence from the political scene 
during the crucial years of 1942 to 1945. Jinnah got the time and the vacant space he needed to 
dominate the political scene. 231  He was able to exploit the official exasperation with the 
Congress. The countrywide disturbances that followed the Quit India movement were interpreted 
by the British Government as a deliberate attempt by the Congress to interfere with the war 
efforts.232 To maintain power in India, the British encouraged the League’s separatism as a 
counter-balance against Congress’s nationalism. 
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Chapter Four 
Simla Conference 
Wavell’s main motive behind calling the Simla Conference was to enter into negotiations 
with the Indian political leaders to ease the communal deadlock and to advance India towards her 
goal of self-government. His aim was to replace the members of his present Executive Council 
by Indians chosen from lists put forward by leaders of major political parties as a result of 
negotiations at the conference.233 He hoped that the leaders of political parties would set aside 
their communal differences and learn to work together in his council to solve the difficult 
problems facing India.234 The new council would be entirely composed of Indians except the 
Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief. The Home, the Finance, and the External Affairs 
portfolios would for the first time be held by Indians. Although his powers as Viceroy would 
remain unchanged, he would give firm assurance to the political parties that he would not use his 
veto powers unreasonably.  
 Wavell’s proposal faced stiff opposition from the members of the British Cabinet and the 
India Committee. For example, Clement Attlee, who was the deputy PM in Churchill’s cabinet, 
said that he was horrified at the thought of a brown oligarchy replacing the present government, 
which would be responsible to neither the parliament nor the electorate. 235  Lord Wavell 
countered by saying that at least the new council would be more representative with a wider 
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backing of the electorate than the present council. 236  John Anderson, the Chancellor of 
Exchequer, thought that Wavell’s scheme would further weaken an already weak administration 
and undermine the position of the Viceroy, the Secretary of State, and the Parliament.237 The 
India Committee suggested a Grand Council elected by members of the provincial legislatures 
and the Viceroy would select the members of his council from that pool.238 Wavell countered by 
arguing that the committee’s proposal would be very time consuming to implement and it could 
turn into a white elephant or a nuisance.239 
Atlee warned the Viceroy that the members of his new council would be politicians 
representing their own party interests and the Viceroy would find himself pushed into a corner 
by those individuals and he could end up being a constitutional monarch with no real power.240 
Lord Wavell acknowledged that the experiment of replacing the present council by leaders of the 
political parties was not without possible dangers but he strongly believed that it was the right 
step to take in order to break the communal deadlock and to make the parties more responsible 
and to get them working together. The Viceroy said he knew that the easiest course of action was 
to do nothing at the present until the end of the war, but he believed that it would be most 
fatal.241 It would keep India quiet for the time being, but it would damage British-India relations 
in the long run, and there could be great danger of serious political unrest once the pressure of 
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the war was removed.242  After weeks of meetings, Wavell finally obtained the go ahead from 
London to proceed with his Simla Scheme. On 14 June 1945 the viceroy announced his plan for 
the Simla Conference in New Delhi. Some extracts from his speech are given below. 
I have been authorized by His Majesty’s Government to place before the Indian 
political leaders proposals designed to ease the present political situation and to 
advance India towards her goal of full self-government…This is not an attempt to 
obtain or impose a constitutional settlement…I propose to invite Indian leaders 
both of Central and Provincial politics to take counsel with me with a view to the 
formation of new Executive Council more representative of organized political 
opinion. The proposed new council would represent the main communities and 
would include equal proportions of Caste Hindus and Muslims… It would be 
entirely an Indian Council, except for the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief, 
who would retain his position as War Member…The Council will work within the 
framework of the present constitution; and there can be no question of the 
Governor-General agreeing not to exercise his constitutional power of control; but 
it will of course not be exercised unreasonably.243   
Wavell sent out the invitation to the Premiers of the Provincial Governments including 
the ex-Premiers of the Provinces under section 93, to Gandhi and Jinnah as the two recognized 
leaders of the two main political parties, to the leader of the Congress Party and the Deputy 
Leader of the Muslim League in the Central Assembly, to the leader of the Congress Party and 
the Muslim League in the Council of State, to the leaders of the Nationalist Party and the 
European Group in the Assembly, to Rao Bahadur N. Siva Raj as the representative of Scheduled 
Classes, and to Master Tara Singh as the representative of Sikhs.244 Almost immediately after 
Wavell’s broadcast speech many Indian leaders and national newspapers were sharply critical of 
various aspects of the plan. An editorial in the Bombay Chronicle said the following:  
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Wavell’s proposals are in fact, worse than the Cripps proposals which were 
rejected by almost all the responsible parties in the country…The new 
announcement doubtless refers to the full self-government as the goal. But there is 
neither a time limit nor an assurance of independence outside the Empire if 
Indians so desired…Under the Cripps scheme, an Indian representative member 
was to be added to the Viceroy’s Executive who would take over those sections of 
the Department of Defense which can organizationally be separated from the 
Commander-in-Chief’s War Department. Under the proposed scheme however 
there is to be no Indian Defense Member at all.245 
In a similar note, the editorial of the Hindustan Times on 15 June, 1945 denounced the 
Wavell’s proposal as follows: 
The Indian demand for an interim solution has always been the establishment of a 
National Government in the center fully responsible to the Indian people in every 
way. The British reply has been that this was not possible under present 
constitution which cannot be changed during the war, and without an agreement 
of all the major elements of the Indian population. During the Cripps negotiations 
in 1942, an attempt was made to combine the two parties and evolve the structure 
of a de facto National Government without any major changes in the existing 
constitution. The negotiations broke down on the question of Defense and 
Governor General’s veto. It must be confessed that the present scheme does not 
show any marked improvement in respect of either. The Commander-in-Chief 
will continue to be War Member and Lord Wavell has explicitly stated that ‘there 
can be no question of the Governor-General agreeing not to exercise his 
constitutional power of control’. He has, however, been careful to add that ‘it will, 
of course, not be exercised unreasonable’.246   
The editorial of the Amrit Bazar Patrika described Wavell’s plan as more retrograde than 
Cripps’ Proposal because the Cripps offer at least had the merit of presenting a blue-print for the 
future constitution whereas the Wavell Plan left out the future altogether. It also pointed out that 
Wavell Plan’s proposed parity between the Caste Hindus and the Muslims in the Executive 
Council. The newspaper questioned the soundness of such a proposal which would provide 
equality of proportion between Caste Hindus who numbered 250 million and the Muslims who 
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numbered only 80 million.247 The Hindu Mahasabha leader Shyam Prasad Mookherjee took 
exception to the fact that the Viceroy had not invited any member of his organization to the 
Conference. He was sharply critical of the idea of parity between the two communities and wrote 
the following in the same newspaper. 
There can be no doubt that the main purpose of the scheme is to further placate 
the   Muslim League and to crush the legitimate political rights of Hinduism. The 
Hindu Mahasabha which is acknowledged to be the only organization that can 
rightfully represent the Hindu cause has been excluded even from 
consultation…The only object of excluding the Mahasabha at this stage is that the 
British Government and Lord Wavell know that it will ruthlessly oppose any 
scheme which is intended to sacrifice the Hindus and the national cause at the 
altar of intransigent communalism…By no standard of logic or fair play, equity of 
justice, can any honest government justify the allocation of equal seats to two 
communities in India, one numbering about 250 million and the other about 90. 
How, again, can 90 million of Muslims be given five seats and 60 million 
Scheduled Castes one seat? Indeed a cursory glance at the list of invitees and the 
general structure of the scheme goes to show that while it is a dishonest device to 
disrupt and disunite the Hindus and to ignore their legitimate rights…A sordid 
and unabashed Anglo-Muslim League conspiracy has been the real hindrance to 
India’s freedom. Hindus have been penalized mainly for their ardent patriotism 
and their anxiety to throw off the foreign yoke.248 
All of the above points raised by the various newspapers in India about Wavell’s plan 
were valid in the sense that the proposal fell short of meeting India’s aspirations for self-
government on many fronts. Wavell’s plan didn’t recognize the state of India as a dominion. 
Defense was to continue being a reserved subject, the sole responsibility of the British 
Government. The Viceroy’s veto was to remain. The parity between the Caste Hindus and the 
Muslims doomed a majority to parity with a minority, and so on. However, Wavell’s plan had 
many positive features and it was a step in the right direction in fulfilling India’s demand for 
self-government. For the first time it offered the Home, the Finance, and the External Affairs 
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portfolios to be held by Indians. Regarding the offer of parity to the Muslims, without such a 
gesture toward the Muslim community there was no hope of forming a coalition interim 
government at the center. It was the price that the nationalist India had to pay to secure Muslim 
cooperation. Wavell understood that very well and hence included parity in his proposal. 
The Congress Party was willing to accept parity between the Caste Hindus and the 
Muslims in the Executive Council in the name of compromise but they were unwilling to 
compromise on the method of selection. 249  They objected strongly to the Muslim League 
insisting on having a monopoly on the selection of Muslims to the Executive Council.250 The 
Congress Party didn’t want to be maneuvered into a position in which it would be regarded as a 
purely Hindu body.251 The Congress Party wanted a voice in the selection of non-Hindus and it 
was vital to the party as the interim arrangement would be precedent for the future composition 
of a new Council and would affect long term settlement.252 Gandhi wrote to the Viceroy voicing 
his strong opposition to the restriction being put on the Congress to nominate only Caste Hindus. 
He said that for the Congress to justify its existence for winning the independence of India it 
must remain a nationalist party representing all communities and free to choose best men and 
women from all classes.253       
Jinnah was unyielding in his demand that the Muslim League be given the exclusive right 
to nominate all the Muslim members to the Viceroy’s Council. He told the Viceroy that the 
Muslims would always be a minority in the new Council because the other communities e.g. the 
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Sikhs and the Scheduled Castes would always vote with the Hindus and the Viceroy would be 
most reluctant to exercise his veto.254 Wavell tried to reassure Jinnah that in such cases he and 
the Commander-in-Chief would see fair play for the Muslims. But Jinnah’s fear of a Hindu 
dominance over Muslims was such that he was not willing to listen to any reasonable suggestion. 
He asserted that the Muslim League had the backing of 99% of Muslims in India and the party 
had won all the by-elections in the last two years.255 It is true that the Muslim League had the 
support of the majority of Muslim India but it is also true that a significant proportion of the 
Muslim community in India was nationalist in outlook and backed the Congress Party. 
Moreover, the president of the Congress Party was Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, a highly 
respected Muslim scholar whom Jinnah described as a traitor to the Muslim community and a 
hired stooge of the Congress Party, and refused to talk to him during the Conference.  Jinnah was 
not even willing to consider a Muslim nominated by Khizar Hyat Khan, the leader of the 
Unionist Party in Punjab and a fellow leader of the Muslim community. He stuck intransigently 
to his position that only the Muslim League had the sole right to nominate the Muslim Members 
of the Council and no one else. He was willing to wreck the Conference on that point only. He 
refused to submit a panel of names to the Viceroy unless his demand was conceded.   
The Governors of many provinces advised the Viceroy to go ahead and form his Council 
without the Muslim League if Jinnah continued to be obstinate. For example, Sir A. Hope, the 
Governor of the Madras province, wrote that if the Viceroy didn’t go ahead and form the Council 
then the Congress Party and the world would blame the British Government for succumbing to 
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Jinnah’s blackmail.256 Sir G. Cunningham, the Governor of North-West Frontier Province, a 
predominantly Muslim area wrote the following: 
My impression is that in this Province  at least half educated opinion does not 
admit right of Jinnah or Muslim League to nominate all Muslims to Executive 
Council and would be satisfied with Muslims (provided they are well known 
public figures) nominated by Your Excellency even if they included no Muslim 
Leaguers…I am hardly in position to judge how complete Jinnah’s discipline over 
Muslim League is, but I have been told here there are leading men in his party, 
even Liaquat Ali himself, who might desert him if he insisted on bringing to 
impasse at this stage, but conclusion therefore is that from Provincial point of 
view there is no great danger if Your Excellency challenges Jinnah on this 
point…257 
The Governor of Punjab, Sir B. Glancy, wrote to the Viceroy that Jinnah’s claim to 
nominate all Muslims appeared to him in the light of League’s meager hold on Muslim majority 
provinces to be outrageously unreasonable.258 In a similar note, Sir J. Colville, the Governor of 
Bombay, wrote that Jinnah should be faced with the alternatives of either come in or the scheme 
to proceed without him.259 Sir H. Dow, the Governor of Sind, another Muslim majority province, 
also advised the Viceroy to proceed without the Muslim League. Here is an extract from the 
telegram he sent to the viceroy: 
In my opinion if Jinnah is intransigent, attempts should be made to form 
Executive Council without Muslim League. Much of Jinnah’s influence depends 
on feeling that he is going to be successful, and will disappear if you make it clear 
that he is not going to get away with it. Incidentally, his hold on Sind is very 
tenuous and I believe my Premier would require little persuasion to break away 
from League…Jinnah’s reference to successes in by-elections does not apply to 
Sind, where in one recent election Muslim League candidate withdrew to avoid 
certain defeat and in another election could put up no candidate, while in both 
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elections candidate who had unofficial support of Muslim Leaguers was 
defeated.260     
 Wavell made many attempts at the Conference to get Jinnah to budge from his position a 
little by allowing one non-League Muslim member to be nominated by the Unionist Party. When 
all his efforts failed, and Jinnah continued to refuse to submit a list of names, Wavell made a 
provisional list for the Council which included four League Muslims and one non-League 
Muslim from Punjab. He met with Jinnah again and told him about his provisional selections for 
the Executive Council, which included five Muslims of whom four were members of Muslim 
League and one a non-League Muslim from Punjab and also revealed the names of the Muslims 
in his list.261 Wavell also told Jinnah the communal and party composition of the Council and 
asked him if he would be ready to cooperate on that basis. Jinnah replied that it was impossible 
for him to co-operate unless all Muslim members were drawn from the Muslim League and the 
Governor-General’s veto were reinforced by special safeguard that no decision opposed by the 
Muslims should be taken in the Council except by a clear two-third majority, or something of 
that nature. These conditions were fundamental and he could not cooperate without those being 
met.262   
 On 13 July 1945, Wavell made a speech at Simla announcing the failure of the plan. He 
took responsibility for the failure of the conference without placing the blame on Jinnah because 
he feared that it might exacerbate the already tense communal situation in the country. Here is an 
extract from that speech: 
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The Conference has failed. Nobody can regret this more than I do myself. I wish 
to make it clear that the responsibility for the failure is mine. The main idea 
underlying the conference was mine. If it had succeeded, its success would have 
been attributed to me, and I cannot place the blame for its failure upon any of the 
parties.263   
 Jinnah stuck to his position that the League represented all Indian Muslims and hence 
should have the right to nominate all Muslim members to the proposed Council. On this issue, 
the Congress could not compromise.264 It claimed to be a secular body representing all sections 
of the society. To concede to Jinnah meant giving up this status and becoming a communal party 
representing the Hindus only.265 In addition, the President of the Congress, Maulana Azad, was a 
Muslim and not to be able to nominate him to the Executive Council was out of the question for 
the party.266 Wavell’s compromise formula of ‘4 Plus 1’, i.e. four Muslim League members and a 
non-Congress Muslim member from the Unionist Party, was a virtual refusal to regard the 
Congress as a secular party. It implicitly conceded Jinnah’s assertion that the Congress was a 
Hindu party.  
 Wavell chose to ignore the advice of his Provincial Governors who overwhelmingly 
counseled him to proceed with his plan without the Muslim League, arguing that Jinnah would 
cave in eventually. At this time, the fortunes of the League in the provinces were at a low ebb.267 
In the Punjab, the Muslim members of the Unionist Party had definitely broken away from the 
League. In NWFP, the Congress Party under Dr. Khan Sahib had taken control.268 In Bengal, the 
Muslim League leader Nazimuddin had been defeated and the province was under Section 93.269 
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Many Muslim leaders of India had publicly proclaimed that they didn’t subscribe to Jinnah’s 
two-nation theory and his claim to be the sole spokesperson for the entire Muslim community of 
India.      
Lord Wavell’s justification for not going ahead with the plan without the Muslim League 
might have been driven by the concern that the war with Japan was still to be won, and the 
Churchill’s Cabinet in London might not support the formation of an Executive Council which 
didn’t include the Muslim League. Britain was in the midst of parliamentary elections and results 
were expected on 25 July. Churchill, Amery, and the British Cabinet were reluctant to give 
definite instructions to Wavell and advised him to maintain the status quo. This might be the 
reason for the failure of the Conference, for the Viceroy could scarcely take major decisions with 
London just standing by.270 Whatever might have been his motive, the abrupt abandonment of 
the plan undoubtedly strengthened the position of Jinnah and the League at a time when their 
fortunes were not so good.271 It weakened the position of those Muslims who had been opposing 
the League, particularly the Unionist Party in Punjab.272 The moderate Muslim leaders began to 
gravitate towards the Muslim League from that point on. By allowing Jinnah to torpedo the 
Simla Conference, the British Government revealed that it was Jinnah who matter the most. The 
war was still going on when Wavell called the Conference and for the British the martial 
Muslims of India were more useful for the war purpose than the pacifist Hindus. Sucheta 
Mahajan’s characterization of British attitude as a blatant display of patronage to the forces of 
communalism is not way off the mark. 273 It was a pity that once again an attempt to reach an 
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agreement should have foundered upon the old rocks of prejudice. The net result of the 
Conference was to introduce the formula of ‘caste-Hindus – Muslim parity’ into body politics 
and to stereotype officially the principle of religious division. 274   The two-nation theory 
constantly propounded by Jinnah had succeeded in almost totally polarizing the political 
situation in India, thus adding ballast to existing British stereotype. I believe that Wavell’s 
sudden abandonment of his plan was one of the causes that made the partition of India 
inevitable.275 
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Chapter Five 
Cabinet Mission 
 Fresh elections were held in India at the end of 1945. Congress sought a mandate for a 
united India and the Muslim League ran on the platform of Pakistan.276  Paradoxically, the 
election results confirmed the claims of both parties.277 The Congress won most of the general 
seats to the Central Legislative Assembly and secured 91.3% of votes cast. The Muslim League 
secured all the Muslim seats and won 86.6% of total votes cast in Muslim constituencies.278 The 
pattern was similar in the elections to the Provincial Assemblies. The League secured 90% of all 
Muslim seats and 75% of votes cast in the Muslim Constituencies in the provinces, a marked 
improvement from the meager 4.4% of votes it had won in the provincial elections of 1936-7.279 
The Congress secured an overwhelming majority in six out of the eleven provinces, and enough 
majorities in Assam and NWFP to form governments in eight out of the eleven provinces. The 
election results proved beyond doubt that the Congress was the single-largest nationalist party in 
India. The results also supported Jinnah’s claim to be the sole spokesman for the Indian 
Muslims.280 
 Britain and her allies inflicted a crushing defeat on Germany and Japan, but this victory 
came with a heavy price. The fight to finish exhausted Britain’s man-power and economic 
resources to such an extent that she could never hope to recover her old power and prestige.281 
Britain lost her status as a first-rate power. That position was shifted to U.S.A and Russia. 
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Everyone thought that the party led by Churchill would sweep the polls in Britain because of his 
magnificent contributions to the Allied victory and his world-wide reputations earned by that. 
But this hope was dashed to the ground by the resounding victory of the Labor Party in the 
general election. For the first time in its history the Labor Party secured a clear majority over all 
other parties combined in the British House of Commons. 282  Accordingly Churchill’s 
Government was replaced by the Labor Government with Clement Attlee as Prime Minister and 
Lord Pethick-Lawrence as Secretary of State for India. Meanwhile, the public opinion in Britain 
had changed in favor of granting India independence. The Labor Party had pledged itself to 
Indian independence more than once, and the task of the Labor Government was made easier by 
the solid support of public opinion behind it.283 Hence, the Labor Government decided to take 
steps to break the political stalemate in India which would facilitate the eventual transfer power 
to India. In March 1946, a Cabinet Delegation was sent to India by the Labor Government. The 
delegation included Lord Pethick Lawrence, the Secretary of State for India, Sir Stafford Cripps, 
the President of the Board of Trade, and Sir A. V. Alexander, the First Lord of Admiralty. Its 
mission was to confer with the Viceroy and the Indian leaders to find ways to resolve the 
political deadlock and to help India set up a constitutional framework in which the Indians would 
have full control over their destiny. 
Arriving in Delhi on 24 March, 1946 the Cabinet Mission held a series of discussions 
with the leaders of the Congress and the League and soon discovered the irreconcilable 
differences between the two parties. The Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy met Maulana Azad, 
the President of the Congress Party, on 3 April to find out the Congress position on how the 
transfer of power should come about. Azad told them that the picture Congress had of the future 
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of India was a federation with fully autonomous provinces.284 The center would be responsible 
for such essential subjects as Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Communications, and a few others 
absolutely necessary for the administration of India as a whole. The residuary powers would be 
vested in the provinces themselves.285 On the same day, the Cabinet Mission met with Gandhi 
and sought his opinion. Gandhi told them that the two-nation theory being propounded by Jinnah 
was most dangerous. The Muslim population, but for a small percentage, was a body of 
converts.286 They were all descendants of Indian born people. Gandhi said that Jinnah’s Pakistan 
was a sin to which he would never consent. He even proposed that during the interim period 
when the Constitution-making Body would be deliberating let Jinnah form the first Government 
and choose his ministers from elected representatives in the country. 287         
Jinnah was interviewed by the Mission on 4 April. He said that from the ancient times, 
India was never a single country. The country was held by the British as one. Even under British 
rule, the country had been only partly united. The Indian States had been separate and 
sovereign.288 The differences in India were far greater than those between European countries; 
even Ireland was no parallel. Jinnah argued that those differences were fundamental in nature to 
Indian society. The Muslims had a different conception of life from the Hindus.289 The social 
customs were different. Hindu society and philosophy were the most exclusive in the world. 
Hindus and Muslims had lived together in India for a thousand years and yet they had never 
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integrated. If one went to any Indian city, one would see separate Hindu and Muslim quarters, 
not mixed neighborhoods. It was not possible to make a nation unless there were essential 
uniting factors.290 He then asked the delegation how were they to put 100 million Muslims 
together with 250 million Hindus whose way of life was so different.291 He said no government 
would work on such a basis and if forced upon it disaster would follow. He asserted that there 
was no solution but the division of India.  
 The Sikhs wanted a united India like the Congress. Master Tara Singh said that he stood 
for a united India and he thought that to divide India would be a very troublesome course and a 
risky game.292 In his opinion, if division was forced upon them, then the Sikhs would want their 
separate homeland. Sardar Baldev Singh gave his view that a single India with safeguards for the 
minorities was the best solution.293 Dr. Ambedkar, the leader of the Scheduled Classes, said that 
he did not want a Constituent Assembly at all. It would be dominated by the Caste Hindus and 
the Scheduled Classes would be no more than a small minority.294 Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, the 
leader of the Liberal Party, had the same position as the Congress Party i.e. a federation of 
strongly autonomous provinces. Shyam Prasad Mukherjee who represented the Hindu 
Mahasabha stressed that his Party would never agree to a division of India. He was against any 
parity between the Hindus and Muslims in the Central Government. 
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 On 9 April, Jinnah called a convention in Delhi of over four hundred members of various 
legislatures recently elected on the League ticket. The convention passed a resolution which 
demanded a sovereign and independent State of Pakistan, comprising of six provinces i.e. Bengal 
in the north-east, and the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province, Sind, and Baluchistan in the 
north-west of India.295 It demanded the setting up of two separate Constitution-making bodies, 
one for Pakistan and the other for Hindustan. The acceptance of the Muslim League demand for 
Pakistan and its immediate implementation were declared to be the sine qua non for the Muslim 
League cooperation and participation in the formation of an Interim Government at the center.296 
The resolution emphasized that any attempt to impose a Constitution or a Government on them 
would be resisted by the League with all possible means at its disposal.297   
On 11 April, the Cabinet Mission sent a telegram to London outlining two possible 
schemes. Scheme A envisioned a unitary India with a loose federation charged primarily with the 
control of Defense and Foreign Affairs.298 Scheme B would be based upon a divided India with 
only the Muslim-majority districts - Baluchistan, Sind, NWFP, Western Punjab, and Eastern 
Bengal without Calcutta, and Sylhet district of Assam - going to Pakistan. The Cabinet Mission 
pointed out that under Scheme B, the Defense would not be very effective as the small Pakistan 
would be very weak and it could only be strengthened by treaty with India. On 13 April, Attlee 
replied to the Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy that London preferred Scheme A as Scheme B 
would destroy the homogeneity of the Indian Army, which was now strong and well-equipped 
and was charged with the defense of India. However, London would agree reluctantly to Scheme 
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B if that was the only basis upon which a settlement could be agreed among the various players 
in the Indian scene.299 
The Viceroy met Jinnah on 16 April and presented him the two alternatives i.e. a 
mutilated Pakistan with full sovereignty or a larger Pakistan federated with India in a union. He 
was told that he could not reasonably hope to receive both the whole of the territory which he 
claimed, and also the full measure of sovereignty.300 Wavell said that the full claim for Pakistan 
had no chance of being accepted by the Congress or the British Government. If the full territories 
were insisted upon then some element of sovereignty must be relinquished. If, however, full 
sovereignty was desired, then the claim to the non-Muslim territories could not be conceded.301 
The mission believed that progress might be possible in one of the two ways. One way would be 
the creation of a separate state of Pakistan which would include Sind, Baluchistan, NWFP, and 
the Muslim-majority districts of Bengal, Punjab, and Assam. The inclusion of Calcutta in this 
Pakistan could not be justified on any principle of self-determination.302 Under this scheme the 
Indian States would be at liberty to join Hindustan or Pakistan or to remain outside. 
Alternatively, the Congress and the League could sit together and try to agree to an India Union. 
If the League agreed to such a union then it would be possible to include the six provinces that 
Jinnah was demanding in one of the federations.303 
The Cabinet Delegation interviewed Jinnah on 16 April, and Pethick Lawrence 
emphasized that the essence of the Union Scheme was the equality of the two component parts. 
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Jinnah said that no amount of equality provided on paper was going to work.304 Equality could 
not exist between the majority and the minority within the same Governmental system. He did 
not think that domination of Muslims by Hindus could be prevented under any scheme that kept 
them together.305 Jinnah seemed to like the alternative scheme since it conceded the principle of 
Pakistan. He said that he could not accept in any event the exclusion of Calcutta.306 Jinnah 
argued that even if the whole of his claims were granted, the Congress would still get three-
quarters of India. At the worst they would lose Calcutta, some part of Western Bengal, and the 
Ambala division in the Punjab. The Secretary of State said that the Congress would lose much 
more than that. They would lose the unity of India, which alone would make the country a strong 
entity in the outside world.307 Further, if Pakistan were conceded the difficulty of getting the 
States to join India would be greatly increased.308 Jinnah retorted that the unity of India was a 
myth. 
The Cabinet Mission then examined the question of a fully sovereign State of Pakistan as 
demanded by Jinnah. The Mission found that the size of the non-Muslim minorities in the areas 
claimed by the League for Pakistan would be very considerable. For example, Punjab had a non-
Muslim population of 12 million out of a total population of 28 million, and Bengal’s non-
Muslim population was 27 million out of a total population of 60 million.309  The Mission 
concluded that there was no justification for including within Pakistan large areas of Punjab, 
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Bengal, and Assam in which the population was predominantly non-Muslim. The Mission 
realized that every argument that could be used in favor of Pakistan could equally be used in 
favor of the exclusion of the non-Muslim areas from Pakistan.310 
 The Mission then considered the question of a smaller Pakistan by excluding non-Muslim 
areas. Apart from the fact that Jinnah regarded it as quite impracticable, the Mission was also 
aware that any radical partition of Punjab and Bengal would be contrary to the wishes of a very 
large portion of inhabitants of these provinces.311 Punjab was the homeland of the Sikhs and any 
partition of it would be bitterly resented by them. The Mission also argued that any partition of 
the country would disintegrate the whole transportation, postal and telegraph system and the 
irrigation network as they were built with a view to a united India.312 To break the Indian army 
into two would be a deadly blow to its long tradition and high degree of efficiency. The small 
Indian Navy and the newly formed Air Force would be rendered practically impotent. A further 
consideration was the geographic fact that the two halves of the proposed Pakistan would be 
separated by some seven hundred miles and the communication between them would be 
dependent on the goodwill of Hindustan. Another important consideration was the greater 
difficulty of securing adhesion of Indian States to a partitioned British India than to one having a 
common federal center.313 Considering all these factors, the Mission arrived at the conclusion 
that it was inadvisable to recommend partition of India. 
 The Mission then considered the Congress Scheme of Federation of India under which 
the provinces would have full autonomy subject only to a minimum of central subjects such as 
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Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Communications. The Mission saw the following difficulties in 
the Congress Scheme: 
Such a scheme if it stood alone would present grave constitutional difficulties and 
anomalies. Certain Ministers of the Central Government whose portfolios were 
concerned with the compulsory subjects would be responsible to the whole of 
British India while other Ministers of the same Government whose portfolios 
related to the optional subjects would be responsible only to the Provinces which 
elected to federate for those subjects. This dichotomy would be reflected in the 
Central legislature where it would be necessary to exclude from speaking and 
voting certain members when subjects which their Provinces were not concerned 
with were under discussion.314 
  In view of the wide divergence of views between the Congress and the League, the 
Cabinet Mission invited four leaders from each of the two parties to a conference to meet with 
the three members of the Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy to hammer out a settlement.315 The 
conference met at Simla from 5 to 12 May and came to be known as the Second Simla 
Conference.316 The basis for discussion was set out in identical letters of invitation sent on 27 
April by Lord Pethick Lawrence to Azad and Jinnah, the presidents of the two organizations. The 
plan envisioned a three-tier structure for the future Constitution of India. At the center there 
would be a union Government dealing with only Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Communications. 
In the middle tier there would be two groupings of provinces; one group comprising of 
predominantly Hindu majority provinces and the other group consisting of predominantly 
Muslim majority provinces.317  The group constitutions for these provinces would deal with 
subjects which the provinces in the respective group desired to be dealt with in common. At the 
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bottom tier, the provinces would have their own constitutions to deal with residuary subjects not 
dealt in the two upper tiers. 
 Discussions continued through seven sessions in all, but the Congress and the League 
remained poles apart. In the first session the Congress representatives and their League 
counterparts clashed over the power of the center to raise revenue. The Congress representatives 
wanted certain ancillary subjects such as Customs, Currency, and Tariff to be central subjects to 
make the center self-sufficient. Jinnah countered by saying that the center should not have the 
power to raise money through taxation. Instead, the power should be vested in group legislatures 
who should decide how much money to contribute to the center. Nehru said that such a center 
would be a vague and airy center with no effective power.318 He argued that in case of war or 
other emergency when money would be needed quickly, it was inconceivable that the decision 
could be made in a timely manner by two or three forums. He asserted that there should be a 
legislative forum at the center and the necessary financial apparatus.  
 In the second session, Jinnah voiced his opposition to the union having a legislature and 
also to Nehru’s proposal for establishing a Supreme Court at the center. In the third session, 
Nehru said that the grouping scheme seemed to him an unnecessary intermediate body, placed 
between the center and the provincial Governments, which would not be very efficient.319 
Wavell said that the scheme was designed to get over a psychological hurdle. It was not claimed 
to be ideal from the administrative point of view. The main reason for the formation of groups 
was to get over the communal difficulty and to make it possible to call together a constitution-
making body. Basically, Jinnah was prepared to accept a union executive formed on the basis of 
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parity between the Hindus and the Muslims, functioning without a legislature and without the 
power to raise taxes. The Congress, in contrast, wanted a union executive without parity, and 
with a full-fledged legislature having the power to raise taxes.320 In short, Jinnah wanted a weak 
center and the Congress desire was to have a strong center. 
 In the fourth session, Nehru objected to the provision that would allow compulsory 
grouping of provinces. He gave the example of Sikhs and Hindus, a large minority in Punjab, 
who would be averse to the idea of Punjab being forced into a group with North-West Frontier 
Province. Jinnah retorted that the only way to avoid partition was to allow the grouping of the 
provinces.321 The Congress was deeply suspicious of Jinnah’s real motives behind insisting on a 
weak center and the compulsory grouping of provinces. They thought that Jinnah was preparing 
the ground for the eventual creation of an expanded Pakistan after entrenching itself in the 
groups of Muslim provinces.322 Sardar Patel remarked that Jinnah’s suggestion about limiting the 
union to a period of only five years clearly exposed his real intentions. 
 The Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy realized that the parties would not be able to 
reach an agreement if left to their own devices. Consequently, on 8 May, the Secretary of State 
sent to the Presidents of the Congress and the Muslim League a list of suggested points of 
agreement between the two parties: “(1) There shall be an All-India Union Government and 
Legislature dealing with Foreign Affairs, Defense, Communications, fundamental rights and 
having the necessary powers to obtain for itself the finances it requires for these subjects. (2) All 
the remaining powers shall vest in the provinces. (3) Groups of provinces may be formed and 
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such groups may determine the provincial subjects that they desire to take in common. (4) The 
groups may set up their own executives and legislatures. (5) The legislature of the union shall be 
composed of equal proportions from the Muslim-majority provinces and from the Hindu-
majority provinces. (6) The constitutions of the Union and the groups (if any) shall contain a 
provision whereby any Province can by a majority vote of its Legislative Assembly call for a 
reconsideration of the terms of the Constitution after an initial period of 10 years and at 10 years 
intervals thereafter.”323       
Jinnah protested several provisions in the suggested points of agreement, particularly the 
addition of “fundamental rights” to the union subjects and union legislature having the power to 
raise revenues. He also said that the Muslim League would never agree to a single Constitution-
making body. Gandhi wrote to Cripps voicing his opposition to the idea of parity between the 
five Muslim majority provinces with a population of nine crores and the six Hindu majority 
provinces with a population of nineteen crores.324 Azad, the president of the Congress Party, 
wrote to the Secretary of State voicing his party’s objection to the compulsory grouping of 
provinces and parity.325  
The Conference met again on 9 May to take up the suggested points of agreement. Nehru 
suggested that in order to break the gridlock, one or more representative from each side should 
sit together and discuss the points again to reach an agreement, and an umpire should be 
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appointed to give a decision if the two sides were not able to agree on one or more points.326 It 
seemed that Jinnah was initially open to the idea of meeting with Nehru and the appointment of 
an umpire. However, when the Conference next met on 11 May, Jinnah had changed his mind 
and ruled out any arbitration by an umpire.327 On the next day Jinnah submitted a memorandum 
that included the minimum conditions on which the Muslim League would be prepared to come 
to an agreement. 328 The final position of the Congress was conveyed by Azad on the same day as 
a basis for an agreement. 329 
. The lists submitted by the two parties contained a wide divergence of views. The starting 
point for the League was to set up first the two group Constitutions, one for Pakistan and the 
other for Hindustan, to be followed by the Constitution for the Center. The League wanted an 
extremely limited center without a legislature of its own and without the power to levy taxes. It 
also wanted parity at the center with an equal number of representatives from the Muslim 
majority provinces and the Hindu majority provinces. The starting point for the Congress, in 
contrast, was the framing of a constitution for India as a whole to set up a powerful Federal 
Government responsible not only for Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Communications but also the 
power to raise revenue through taxation, and responsible for matters such as Currency, Customs, 
and Tariff.330 The Mission realized that the gap between the two parties was so wide that there 
seemed no possible hope of reaching a settlement. It thus proceeded to announce its formula for 
bringing about an agreement between the two parties. Accordingly, the Mission issued a 
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statement in New Delhi on 16 May. The Statement of May 16 was central to the whole Cabinet 
Mission and hence it is necessary to describe it in some detail. 
 The Statement of 16 May said that the Mission had examined closely and impartially the 
possibility of a partition of India.331 They believed that internal peace in India could not be 
achieved unless the Muslims in India felt secure and given control in all matters vital to their 
culture, religion, and economic interests. 332  The Mission had considered the option of an 
independent Pakistan that would include the whole of the six Muslim majority provinces and had 
come to the conclusion that it would not solve the communal minority problem because it would 
force a very large population of unwilling non-Muslims into the new State of Pakistan. The 
Mission had also evaluated the alternate option of a truncated Pakistan and believed that it would 
be an unviable State which would be unable to sustain itself. Moreover, any division of Bengal 
and Punjab would be contrary to the wishes of the people in those two provinces. After 
considering all these factors, the Mission was unable to advise the British Government to transfer 
power in India to two entirely separate sovereign States. The decision did not, however, blind 
them to the very real apprehensions of the Muslims that their culture and political and social life 
might get submerged in a purely unitary India in which the Hindus would be a dominating 
element. The Mission also didn’t consider the Congress proposal of having compulsory and 
optional subjects in the Center, in order for the provinces to pick and choose the optional 
subjects, as practical and adequate. It, therefore, proceeded to offer its own solution to the 
problem, which, in its view, would be fair and just to all parties involved. Keeping all those 
factors in mind, the Cabinet Mission recommended the following as the basis for a new 
constitution: 
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1. There should be a Union of India, embracing both British India and the States, 
which would deal with the following subjects: Foreign Affairs, Defense, and 
Communications; and should have the powers necessary to raise the finances 
required for the above subjects. 
 
2. The Union should have an Executive and a Legislature constituted from British 
Indian and States representatives. Any question raising a major communal issue in 
the Legislature should require for its decision a majority of the representatives 
present and voting of each of the two major communities as well as a majority of 
all the members present and voting. 
 
3. All subjects other than the Union subjects and all residuary powers should vest 
in the Provinces. 
 
4. The States will retain all subjects and powers other than those ceded to the 
Union. 
 
5. Provinces should be free to form Groups with executives and legislatures, and 
each Group could determine the Provincial subjects to be taken in common. 
 
6. The constitutions of the Union and of the Groups should contain a provision 
whereby any Province could, by a majority vote of its Legislative Assembly, call 
for a reconsideration of the terms of the constitution after an initial period of 10 
years and at 10 yearly intervals thereafter.333 
 
After laying down the broad basis of the future Constitution, the Mission’s statement 
proceeded to propose the Constitution-making machinery. 334  The statement observed that 
although the most satisfactory and ideal solution to pick members of the Constitution-making 
body would be through elections based on adult franchise, it would be a time-consuming process 
which would cause unacceptable delay.335 The alternative was to utilize the recently elected 
Provincial Legislative Assemblies. The members of the Constitution-making body would come 
from the Provincial Assemblies and each member would represent roughly one million people in 
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a province. That would allot to each province a total number of seats proportional to its 
population. 
The Mission’s statement also suggested the procedure to be followed by the Constitution-
making body. The elected members would assemble in New Delhi as soon as possible for a 
preliminary meeting. At this meeting they would decide the general order of business and elect a 
Chairman and other officers. Thereafter the representatives would separate into three sections: 
Section A (consisting of Madras, Bombay, United Provinces, Bihar, Central Provinces, and 
Orissa), Section B (consisting of Punjab, NWFP, and Sind), and Section C (consisting of Bengal 
and Assam).336 The sections would decide the provincial Constitutions for the provinces included 
in their section and whether any group Constitution would be set up and if so, with what 
provincial subjects it would deal.337 Provinces would have the power to opt out of the groups 
after the first elections were held under the new constitution.338           
 After the group Constitutions had been settled, the three sections would reassemble for 
the purpose of writing the union Constitution. 339  In the Union Constituent Assembly, any 
resolution varying the recommendations made by the Cabinet Mission as to the basic form of the 
Constitution or the raising of any major communal issue would require a majority of the 
representatives of the two major communities present and voting. The Chairman of the Assembly 
would decide which resolution raised a major communal issue. However, if so requested by a 
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majority of the members of either of the two major communities, he would consult the Federal 
Court before giving his decision.340  
 The Mission’s statement emphasized the importance of setting up at once an Interim 
Government to carry on the administration of the country while the task of Constitution making 
proceeded. The Interim Government had to have the support of all major political parties in India 
and all the portfolios in the Interim Government, including that of the War Member, would be 
held by Indians. Finally, the statement expressed the Cabinet Mission’s hope that the newly 
independent India would choose to be a member of British Commonwealth. Even if it did not do 
so, the Mission looked forward to close and friendly relations between the peoples of Great 
Britain and India. 
 Neither the Congress nor the League was fully satisfied with the Cabinet Mission’s 
statement. There followed a series of correspondence and interviews between the Cabinet 
Delegation and the Viceroy on the one hand, and the leaders of the two parties on the other. The 
League attached the greatest importance to the early formation of groups of Provinces based on 
the basis of communal majorities. The Congress, in contrast, laid stress on the freedom of a 
province to decide whether to belong to a group right from the beginning. The Congress 
Working Committee passed a resolution on 24 May objecting to a marked discrepancy in 
Mission’s statement of 16 May. The resolution pointed out that the statement stressed the 
principle of provincial autonomy but did not give them the choice whether or not to belong to the 
group.341 Azad also wrote a letter to Pethick-Lawrence pointing out the contradiction in the 
Mission’s statement. He wrote: ‘The basic provision gives full autonomy to a province to do 
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what it likes and subsequently there appears to be certain compulsion in the matter which clearly 
infringes that autonomy.’342 In answer to the Congress resolution, the Cabinet Mission issued a 
statement on 25 May which clarified the intent of the May 16 statement as regards to grouping of 
the provinces. It pointed out that the formation of groups was an essential feature of the scheme 
and could only be altered through agreement between the parties. The right to opt out of a group 
could be exercised by a province only after the formation of the groups and the holding of the 
first elections under the new constitution.343  
 The Congress also raised objections to several provisions in the Mission’s statement. It 
raised the question of the representation of the peoples of the States in the Constituent Assembly. 
It disagreed with the voting rights of European members in Provincial Assemblies, particularly in 
Assam and Bengal, given the very small European population in those areas which contradicted 
the ‘one representative per million people’ principle. The Congress pointed out that it would be 
improper for any representative from Baluchistan to be included in the constitution-making body 
since there was no elected assembly in that province. While the Congress was still not sure about 
accepting the 16 May statement, the all India Muslim League Council met on June 6 and passed 
a resolution accepting the 16 May statement with some reservations. 
Meanwhile, the Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy were engaged in the task of 
formulating a plan, acceptable to both the Congress and the League for the formation of an 
Interim Government. This task became more and more difficult as the days passed by. The 
Congress was firmly opposed to any kind of parity between the Hindus and Muslims or between 
the Congress and the League in the Interim Government. It also insisted on including a 
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nationalist Muslim within the quota of seats allocated to it. The League, in contrast, was equally 
determined about getting parity between itself and the Congress, and also stubbornly insisted that 
it would not agree to the inclusion of a non-League Muslim in the Interim Government. After all 
the efforts to bring the two parties to an agreement failed, the Cabinet Delegation and the 
Viceroy came out with their own plan for the formation of an Interim Government.344 The plan 
was announced on June 16 and it proposed to set up an Interim Government comprising of 
fourteen people345 - six from the Congress, five from the Muslim League, one Sikh, one Indian 
Christian, and one Parsi. 
The Congress and the League were both disappointed by the list proposed in the 16 June 
scheme. After prolonged discussions, the Congress Working Committee on 25 June rejected the 
16 June plan for the formation of the Interim Government. The Congress was not prepared to 
give up its claim to being a nationalist organization representing all sections of the Indian people. 
However, largely for tactical reasons, it decided to accept the long-term plan i.e. the Statement of 
May 16, of course with reservations and its own interpretations.346 After learning about the 
Congress’s decision to reject the short-term plan on 25 June from the Viceroy, the Muslim 
League immediately let the Viceroy know that it had accepted the 16 June statement. 
 The mission then proposed to set up a coalition Government since both the Congress and 
the League had accepted the 16 May plan.347 Jinnah had obtained an assurance from the Viceroy 
that if one Party accepted the plan and the other didn’t, the Party which had accepted the plan 
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would be invited to form the Interim Government. This was affirmed by paragraph 8 of the 16 
June statement, which stated that: 
In the event of the two major parties or either of them proving unwilling to join 
the setting up of a coalition Government on the above lines, it is the intention of 
the Viceroy to proceed with the formation of an Interim Government which will 
be as representative as possible of those willing to accept the statement of 16 
May.348       
 The interpretation of paragraph 8 of 16 June statement became a bone of contention 
between the League on the one hand, and the Viceroy and the Cabinet Mission, on the other.349 
Jinnah contended that since the Congress had rejected the Mission’s scheme for Interim 
Government, which was integral to the overall plan, it should be taken that the Congress had 
rejected the plan as a whole. Jinnah argued that since the League had accepted the plan in its 
entirety i.e. both the Statements of 16 May and 16 June, it should be invited to form the Interim 
Government. Contrary to this view, the Mission and the Viceroy held that since the Congress and 
the League had both accepted the 16 May plan, they both should be invited to participate in a 
coalition Government.350 Unable to reach an agreement, the Cabinet Mission left India on 29 
June, after a stay of more than three months. There was still a chance of an agreement between 
the parties. But an event took place that according to many brought about the League’s rejection 
of the Cabinet Mission Plan.351 
 On July 10, Nehru held a press conference in Bombay in which he made the most 
injudicious statement, which Azad describes in his book India Wins Freedom as one of the most 
unfortunate events that changed the course of Indian history. In replying to a question from the 
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press, Nehru stated that ‘the Congress would enter the Constituent Assembly completely 
unfettered by agreements and free to meet all situations as they might arise.’352 On being further 
pressed to clarify his answer, Nehru replied emphatically that ‘the Congress had agreed only to 
participate in the Constituent Assembly and regarded itself free to change or modify the Cabinet 
Mission Plan as it thought best’.353 Nehru’s statement came as a shock to Jinnah. Azad sums up 
Jinnah’s reaction as follows: 
Mr. Jinnah was thus not at all happy about the outcome of the negotiations with 
the Cabinet Mission. Jawaharlal’s statement came to him as a bombshell. He 
immediately issued a statement that this declaration by the Congress President 
demanded a review of the whole situation. The Muslim League Council had 
accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan in Delhi as it was assured that the Congress 
also had accepted the scheme and the Plan would be the basis of future 
constitution of India. Now that the Congress President had declared that the 
Congress could change the scheme through its majority in the constituent 
Assembly, this would mean that the minority would be placed at the mercy of the 
majority. His view was that Jawaharlal’s declaration meant that the Congress had 
rejected the Cabinet Mission Plan and as such the Viceroy should call upon the 
Muslim League, which had accepted the Plan, to form the Government.354          
 The Muslim League Council met in Bombay on 27 July and passed a resolution rejecting 
the Cabinet Mission Plan. It also decided to resort to Direct Action for the achievement of 
Pakistan. To recover from Nehru’s blunder the All India Congress Committee issued a statement 
reaffirming its decision to accept the Mission’s Plan in its entirety. Jinnah, however, was not 
prepared to accept the Congress’s position and held that Nehru’s statement revealed the real 
intentions of the Congress.355 He said that if the Congress could change its mind frequently while 
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the British were still there, what guarantee was there that they would not do so again when the 
British left India?356 
 Thus the last attempt at bringing about a united free India collapsed. Out of the three 
major players (the British, the Congress, and the Muslim League) in the game, the side that was 
the least responsible for the failure of the Mission was the British. Churchill’s War Cabinet had 
been replaced by a Labor Government. The new Labor Government was ideologically more 
inclined to grant independence to India and was increasingly anxious to get out of India as soon 
as possible.357 The British economy was in dire straits and India represented a drain on scarce 
and precious resources.358 Public opinion in Britain was against retaining India, and last but not 
the least, the international public opinion, particularly from the United States, was urging Britain 
to give up India.359  
 The British had a long record of encouraging the separatist stance of Jinnah and the 
Muslim League as an effective way to counter the forces of growing nationalism in India, in 
order to prolong their rule over the country. But once they decided to leave India, they were not 
particularly interested in partitioning India. They favored a transfer of power to a united India 
that would keep the army undivided. After a close examination of the subject, they came to the 
conclusion that a united India would be more helpful to the Commonwealth defense than a 
divided one.360 A divided India would destroy the homogeneity and effectiveness of Indian army. 
Pakistan was expected to be a weak State militarily which would likely to remain continuously 
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embroiled in conflicts with India.361 Lacking depth in defense, Pakistan would not be an effective 
buffer to Russian advance to the Middle East. Hence the Cabinet Mission’s first choice was to 
keep India undivided through a suitable constitutional arrangement devised through agreements 
between the two major parties in India. The Cabinet Mission did not want to transfer power to 
the Congress and abandon the Muslims in India, who had been staunchly loyal to them over the 
years. They also did not just want to quit India abruptly leaving her in chaos and confusion. That 
would have damaged Britain’s prestige and reputation in the world. Hence they did their utmost 
to bring the two parties to an agreement to break the political deadlock. They came up with one 
of the most ingenious and brilliant scheme (the three-tier structure) ever devised in the annals of 
constitutional history of the world and worked diligently to get it accepted by the two warring 
parties but failed despite their best efforts. 
 The failure of the Cabinet Mission was due to many causes. The most important reason 
perhaps was the deep suspicion between the Congress and the League.362 At every stage and at 
every level the distrust between the two parties stood in the way of compromise. Even at the 
personal level, there was deep animosity between the leaders of the two parties. For example, 
Jinnah even refused to shake hands with Azad at the conference in Simla. It was a failure of 
leadership, statesmanship, and unwillingness by the leaders to compromise for the greater good 
of the country. As a result, India lost a golden opportunity to avoid the partition that was soon to 
follow. 
 The Congress gave much emphasize on inessential points such as insisting on the right to 
nominate a Muslim to the Interim Government, instead of focusing on the crux of the matter 
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which was a united India.363 The Congress was the bigger and stronger party of the two and 
hence had a greater responsibility to make concessions for the sake of keeping the country 
united. Instead it acted in the most irresponsible fashion by bickering over insignificant issues. 
Even when it was offered six seats in the Interim Government, a virtual denial of parity to 
Jinnah, it still went ahead and rejected the 16 June statement, thus derailing the whole process. In 
the opinion of the Cabinet Delegation, the Congress was playing hardball despite getting several 
concessions from Jinnah. Jinnah had supported the Cabinet Mission Scheme, virtually 
abandoning his demand for a sovereign Pakistan, instead settling for the grouping of provinces 
with residuary powers.364 Nehru’s assertions at the 10 July press conference killed any glimmer 
of hope of an agreement that might have been still alive at that point. Jinnah became even more 
suspicious of Congress’s real intentions and became more obstinate in his opposition to any 
efforts for cooperation with the Congress.365 
 The Congress goal was to establish a strong and organic center with its own Executive 
and Legislature.366 The Congress, at a minimum, wanted the Center to have the power to raise 
taxes apart from the responsibility of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Communications. It wanted 
to rapidly industrialize India in the Soviet model. Industrialists like Birla (the major backers of 
the Congress Party) were hopeful for a powerful Central Government in free India, footing the 
bill for capital-intensive projects like building roads, bridges, power plants and other 
infrastructures that India desperately lacked. 367  The Cabinet Mission Plan seemed a cruel 
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watering down of all that expectation.368  The grouping scheme and the compulsion for the 
provinces to join their respective groups seemed to Congress a virtual invitation to Pakistan. 
When Congress rejected the June 16 Statement, Jinnah took it as a clear indication that he would 
be invited to form the Interim Government. However, the Congress decided on 24 June to have 
their cake and eat it by issuing a retroactive and heavily qualified acceptance of the 16 May 
statement, which allowed them to be brought back into the proceedings.369 Wavell acknowledged 
in a secret memorandum that the Congress move was a ‘dishonest one’ and questioned whether it 
should be accepted.370 Cripps and Pethick-Lawrence, who were sympathetic to the Congress 
position, intervened in favor of the Congress. 
 Although the Muslim League had accepted the grouping of provinces under a weak 
federation, a reading of its June 6 resolution makes it clear that it had not at all jettisoned its 
cherished objective of establishing a sovereign Pakistan.371 The June 6 resolution of the Muslim 
League declared: 
In order that there may be no manner of doubt in any quarter, the Council of the 
All India Muslim League reiterates that the attainment of the goal of a complete 
sovereign Pakistan still remains the unalterable objective of the Muslims in India, 
for the achievement of which they will, if necessary, employ every means in their 
power, and consider no sacrifice or suffering too great.372      
 In his Presidential remarks on 6 June, Jinnah declared amidst loud cheers: ‘Let me tell 
you that Muslim India would not rest content until we have established a full, complete, and 
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sovereign Pakistan.’373 Jinnah’s observation and the Muslim League resolution of 6 June make it 
clear that the League decided to participate in the Cabinet Mission Plan considering it as a 
stepping stone for achieving its ultimate goal of Pakistan. Despite Jinnah’s real intentions, the 
fact remains that the Cabinet Mission presented the last best chance for keeping India united and 
the blame must be placed on the Congress for its failure to utilize the opportunity.               
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Chapter Six 
Direct Action, Interim Government, and Constituent Assembly 
 At the meeting of the Council of the All India Muslim League in Bombay on 27 July, 
1946 Jinnah accused the Cabinet Mission of breach of faith with the Muslims of India and 
having ‘played into the hands of the Congress’.374 He said that the League had given many 
concessions but the Congress had shown no appreciation of the sacrifices it had made.375 Instead, 
the Congress was bent upon setting up a Caste Hindu Raj in India with the connivance of the 
British. Therefore, the League had no alternative but to adhere once more to the national goal of 
Pakistan. On 29 July, the Muslim League Council passed the following resolution authorizing 
the Working Committee to draw up a plan of ‘Direct Action’ to achieve Pakistan: 
…the Council of the All India Muslim League is convinced that now the time has 
come for the Muslim nation to resort to direct action to achieve Pakistan and 
assert their just rights and to vindicate their honor and to get rid of the present 
slavery under the British and contemplated future caste-Hindu domination. This 
Council calls upon the Muslim nation to stand to a man behind their sole 
representative organization, the All India Muslim League, and be ready for any 
sacrifice. This Council directs the Working Committee to prepare forthwith a 
programme of direct action to carry out the policy initiated above and to organize 
the Muslims for the coming struggle to be launched as and when necessary.376         
The Muslim League Working Committee soon followed up the Council’s resolution by 
calling upon the Muslims throughout India to observe 16 August as ‘Direct Action Day’, when 
meetings would be held over the country to explain the resolution. On that day, Jinnah thundered 
‘We bid goodbye to constitutional methods.’377 While the celebrations of ‘Direct Action day’ 
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passed off peacefully in most parts of India, Calcutta witnessed the most horrific events. Hindu-
Muslim clashes began on that day and carnage of an unprecedented scale continued for the next 
four or five days. It came to be known as the ‘Great Calcutta Killings’ that left over 4,000 dead, 
10,000 injured, and 100,000 homeless. It started when Members of Muslim League in 
processions on the streets of Calcutta celebrating ‘Direct Action Day’ started attacking and 
looting Hindu shops. Soon the acts of vandalism spread throughout the city and Calcutta burst 
into flames. Many Hindus were butchered, their women were raped, and their houses and shops 
were looted and in some cases burnt.378 The Hindus were taken completely unawares.379 But, 
they soon organized and retaliated. Calcutta was soon in the grip of a communal orgy of violence 
and the situation descended into an open civil war between the Hindus and the Muslims. The 
Muslims started the provocations but, in the end, they were the ones who suffered more 
casualties. The Hindustan Times on August 18 and 19 described the events: 
The whole city of Calcutta is in the grip of terror. Rioting and looting which 
started yesterday continued throughout the night and the situation grew worse in 
the morning…Reports of stabbing, assaults on women, burning of houses and 
looting of shops on a big scale are being received from different parts of the 
city…Two leading hospitals of Calcutta are so full with riot victims that they are 
unable to take any more…Bus and tram services in the city are paralyzed…Most 
pitiful sights were women and children and injured men being evacuated from the 
north side of the city, which is predominantly Muslim, to Hindu areas in the 
south. In babbling tearchoked phrases, they told of women being attacked, 
children being hacked and their menfolk killed before their eyes…380               
Anita Inder Singh writes in her book The Origins of Partition of India: ‘there is no doubt 
of the complicity of Suhrawardy and the Provincial League in the incidents in Calcutta’. Azad, in 
an interview with the Viceroy, severely criticized the Bengal Ministry and its Premier 
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Suhrawardy for not taking sufficient precautions even if they had apprehended trouble.381 He 
wrote that throughout Calcutta the military and the police were standing by but remained inactive 
while innocent men and women were being killed.382 Indecisive action by the British Governor 
of Bengal province, Sir Fredrick Burrows, was also blamed for the situation getting out of hand. 
Under 1935 Act, it was the responsibility of the Governor to maintain law and order in his 
province. It has been alleged that Burrows sat inactive during the initial hours of the riots 
allowing the situation to deteriorate. A prompt action in bringing in the army to contain the 
situation would have averted the unprecedented holocaust in Calcutta. However, it was a no-win 
situation for the British. If the Governor had called the military and used excessive force to 
stamp out the disturbances, the British would have been accused of heavy-handed imperialism 
and militarism. 
Considering the worsening communal situation in the country, the Viceroy decided to 
make another attempt to form a coalition Government. A letter containing a proposal for an 
Interim Government which would include six members from the Congress, five members from 
the League, and three representatives from minorities chosen by the Viceroy, was sent to Nehru 
and Jinnah. As expected, Jinnah rejected the proposal. In the face of Jinnah’s intransigent 
attitude, the Secretary of State and the Viceroy felt that the Congress should be given a chance to 
form the Interim Government and they hoped that ultimately Jinnah would relent and the League 
would join the Interim Government. On 6 August, Wavell wrote a letter to Nehru informing him 
the decision to invite the Congress to make proposals for the immediate formation of an Interim 
                                                 
381
 Majumdar, History of the Freedom Movement in India, vol. 3, 644. 
382
 Azad, India Wins Freedom, 109. 
105 
 
Government. The Congress Working Committee meeting at Wardha on 8 August authorized 
Nehru to accept the invitation to form an Interim Government.383            
Nehru met Jinnah in order to persuade him to join the proposed Interim Government. 
Nehru’s proposals were along the same lines as the Viceroy’s and Jinnah was less disposed to 
accept them from the Congress than the British. 384  Jinnah remained as distrustful and 
uncompromising as ever. In a published statement he spoke bitterly of the Congress as a Caste 
Hindu Fascist organization who along with their few individual henchmen of other communities 
wanted to be installed in power and rule over the Muslims, with the aid of British bayonets.385 
Nehru and the Viceroy settled on the composition of the Interim Government after few 
discussions. On 24 August, the names of 12 out of 14 members were announced. The list 
included five Caste Hindus from the Congress (Nehru, Patel, Prasad, Rajagopalachari, and Sarat 
Bose), one Scheduled Caste member from the Congress (Jagjivan Ram), three non-League 
Muslims (Sir Shafaat Ahmed Khan, M. Asaf Ali, and Syed Ali Zaheer), one Sikh (Sardar Baldev 
Singh), one Indian Christian (John Matthai), and one Parsee (C. H. Bhabha).386    
Shortly after making the announcement on the formation of the Interim Government, 
Lord Wavell flew to Calcutta to see firsthand the tragic events that had taken place there as a 
result of the ‘Direct Action Day’ call by the Muslim League.387 What he saw there convinced 
him that if some sort of agreement was not brought about between the two major communities 
soon, other parts of the country could experience the horrors of Calcutta. Nazimuddin, one of the 
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prominent League leaders in Bengal, told the Viceroy that if the Congress would make an 
unequivocal statement that the provinces could not opt out of groups except as laid out in the 
Statement of 16 May, there was a fair chance that the Muslim League might join the Interim 
Government and the Constituent Assembly.388 Wavell met Gandhi and Nehru on 27 August and 
told them what had happened in Calcutta. He gave them the following draft of a formula which 
he thought might satisfy Jinnah: 
The Congress are prepared in the interest of communal harmony to accept the 
intention of the Statement of May 16th that provinces cannot exercise any option 
affecting their membership of the sections or of the groups if formed, until the 
decision contemplated in paragraph 19 (viii) of the Statement of 16th May is taken 
by the new Legislature after the new constitutional arrangements have come into 
operation and the first general elections have been held.389      
Neither Gandhi nor Nehru was prepared to accept the formula, but at the request of the 
Viceroy, Nehru placed the formula before the Working Committee of the Congress. The 
Working Committee stuck to its old view and added that any dispute as to the interpretation of 
the clauses pertaining to grouping in 16 May statement might be referred to the Federal Court 
and that they would abide by it. Nehru wrote a letter to the Viceroy on 20 August informing him 
of the decision of the Working Committee. The Secretary of State sent a cable to the Viceroy 
advising him to on no account do or say anything that might occasion a break with the 
Congress.390 Wavell continued to urge Nehru to make attempts to bring the Muslim League into 
the Government. Wavell thought that the Congress was out to grab all powers for itself. He wrote 
in his journal: 
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I saw Nehru from 3.0 to 4.0 p.m., and Gandhi from 4.0 to 5.0 p.m. No progress, 
quite obviously they do not want Jinnah and the League in, and Gandhi at the end 
exposed Congress policy of domination more nakedly than ever before. The more 
I see of that old man, the more I regard him as an unscrupulous old hypocrite; he 
would shrink from no violence and blood-letting to achieve his ends, though he 
would naturally prefer to do so by chicanery and false show of mildness and 
friendship.391  
The question of the League’s participation in the Interim Government continued to be on 
the top of Wavell’s agenda.392 He held a series of talks with Nehru, Jinnah and other leaders of 
both parties to get the Muslim League in the Government. Wavell tried to impress upon Jinnah 
that in its own interests the League would be well-advised to join the Interim Government. 
Wavell’s persistence finally paid off. On 13 October, the Muslim League decided to come in. In 
his typical fashion Jinnah wrote the following letter to the Viceroy, first rejecting the basis and 
scheme of setting up the Interim Government, and then agreeing to participate in the Interim 
Government: 
The Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League have considered the 
whole matter fully and I am now authorized to state that they do not approve of 
the basis and scheme of setting up the Interim Government…We consider and 
maintain that the imposition of this decision is contrary to the Declaration of 
August 8, 1940, but since, according to your decision we have a right to nominate 
five members of the Executive Council on behalf of the Muslim League, my 
committee have, for various reasons, come to the conclusion that in the interests 
of Mussulmans and other communities it would be fatal to leave the entire field of 
administration of the Central Government in the hands of the Congress. Besides, 
you may be forced to have in your Interim Government Muslims who do not 
command the respect and confidence of Muslim India which would lead to very 
serious consequences; and lastly, for other very weighty grounds and reasons, 
which are obvious and need not be mentioned, we have decided to nominate five 
on behalf of the Muslim League…393 
On 14 October, Jinnah sent the names of 5 nominees of the Muslim League. They were 
Liaquat Ali Khan, I. I. Chundrigar, Abdur Rab Nishtar, Ghazanfar Ali Khan, and Jogendra Nath 
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Mandal.394 Two of the people (Chundrigar, and Khan) were complete unknowns. Azad wrote 
‘They were dark horses about whom even members of the League had little information’.395 
Jinnah deliberately bypassed moderate leaders like Nazimuddin and Ismail Khan who were well-
known nationally and widely expected to be nominated.396 They were discarded in favor of 
Jinnah’s henchmen. Wavell wrote in his journal: 
When I studied it in detail, it was rather a disappointing list. Liaquat Ali Khan and 
Nishtar were certainties, but Chundrigar from Bombay and Ghazanfar Ali Khan 
from Punjab are poor substitutes for Ismail Khan and Nazimuddin.397 
The inclusion of a Scheduled Caste member was an obvious reply to the right claimed by 
the Congress to nominate a Muslim.398 In order to make place for the nominees of the League, 
the Congress decided that Sarat Bose, Sir Shafaat Ahmed Khan, and Syed Ali Zaheer would 
resign from the Interim Government. There followed a tussle between the Congress and the 
League regarding the distribution of portfolios. Finally, it was decided to allot to the Muslim 
League representatives the five portfolios of Finance, Commerce, Communications, Health and 
Law.399  
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There was, however, no Coalition Government in the real sense of the word.400 Instead of 
the Congress and the League working together, the Interim Government became a sad spectacle 
of bitter wrangling between the members of two parties.401 The real intention of the League 
members was to obstruct the Government from within. Before joining the Government, 
Ghazanfar Ali Khan had made clear the intention of the League members in the following way: 
In the Interim Government all our activities shall be guided by two 
considerations: that is, to convince the Congress that no Government in India can 
function smoothly without the cooperation of the Muslim League, and that the 
League is the sole representative organization of the Indian Muslims. The Interim 
Government is one of the fronts of the direct action campaign and we shall most 
scrupulously carry out the orders of Mr. Jinnah on any front that we are called 
upon to serve.402 
Liaquat Ali as Finance Minister had the right to scrutinize every proposal put forward by 
all departments of the Government. He fully utilized his power to make it difficult for any 
Congress member to function effectively. Azad said that the League members were in the 
Government yet against it. Liaquat Ali framed a budget that proposed heavy taxation on the rich 
businessmen and the industrialists. This did not sit well with the Congress as the businessmen 
and the industrialists were mostly Hindus who funded the Congress machinery. Patel and 
Rajagopalachari were vehemently opposed to Liaquat’s budget, which they said was designed to 
destroy the business community and could do permanent damage to commerce and industry.   
The League’s entry into the Interim Government did not bring about the expected lull in 
communal violence.403 The ‘Great Calcutta Killings’ which began on 16 August as a result of the 
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League’s call to ‘direct action’ had spread like prairie fire to other parts of the country. East 
Bengal followed by Bihar witnessed the worst communal violence ever seen in India. A well-
organized programme of ethnic-cleansing had been set in motion in the Noakhali and Tippera 
districts in East Bengal. 404  There were forced conversions of Hindus to Islam in public 
ceremonies where they were made to parade wearing caps inscribed ‘Pakistan’ and Muslim-style 
lungis.405 Hindus were forced to eat beef, their shops and properties were looted and destroyed, 
and their temples and idols were desecrated. Other atrocities included raping of women and 
forcible marriage of Hindu women to Muslim men. A news report in the Hindustan Times on 15 
October, 1946 described the situation as: 
Riotous mobs with deadly weapons are raiding villages, and looting, murder and 
arson are continuing since Thursday, October 10, on a very large scale. Forcible 
mass conversion, abduction of women and desecration of places of worship are 
also reported…Approaches to the affected areas are being guarded by armed 
hooligans…406            
Gandhi was in Delhi when the news from East Bengal came through. He was particularly 
hurt by the crimes committed against women.407 He cancelled all his plans and decided to leave 
for Bengal immediately.408  Friends tried to dissuade him as he was in poor health and the 
ongoing political events unfolding in Delhi required his presence there. ‘All I know is that I 
won’t be at peace with myself unless I go there’, he replied.409 There were mammoth crowds at 
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all big stations on the way to get a glimpse of Mahatma.410 At Calcutta he saw the ravages of 
August riots and confessed to a ‘sinking feeling at the mass madness that can turn a man less 
than a brute.’411 At a prayer meeting in Calcutta he said that he would not leave Bengal until the 
last embers of the trouble were stamped out.412 In the succeeding days, Gandhi, Suhrawardy and 
other prominent leaders of Bengal hammered out a peace formula for bringing back communal 
harmony in Bengal, which became the corner-stone of Gandhi’s peace mission in Noakhali.413 
The signatories to the peace formula constituted themselves into a peace committee, composed 
of an equal number of Hindus and the Muslims for the whole of Bengal with the Chief-Minister 
as the chairman, to bring about communal peace in the province.  
While preparing to go to Noakhali, news came to Gandhi of tragic events that were taking 
place in Bihar. As news of Noakhali spilled over into Bihar, the Hindu-majority province 
witnessed the worst communal violence since the beginning of British rule in India. Hindu 
refugees who fled from East Bengal into Bihar carried tales of atrocities committed by the 
Muslims against the Hindu men, women and children. Their tales of woes excited the Hindus of 
Bihar to murderous attacks on their Muslim neighbours, the scale and savagery of which quite 
eclipsed that in East Bengal. Sensational newspaper headlines whipped the Hindus into hysteria 
and the propaganda by Hindu Mahasabha added fuel to the desire of revenge.414 The carnage 
started in Patna and quickly spread to other parts of Bihar. Thousands poured into the streets 
chanting ‘Blood for Blood’. The killings of Muslims seem to have been committed by gangs 
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organized by local Hindu landlords and financed by the Marwari businessmen of Calcutta.415 The 
official estimate put the death toll at 4,580 (some estimates put the figure at 10,000 or more), and 
most of dead were Muslims. Nehru was outraged at this mindless killing of Muslims and 
threatened to use aerial bombing unless the mayhem stopped immediately. Filled with grief, 
Gandhi said that the Bihari Hindus had disgraced India. As penance for the Bihar madness 
Gandhi announced that he would keep himself ‘on the lowest diet possible’ and that would 
become a ‘fast unto death if the erring Biharis have not turned over a new leaf’.416                    
From Calcutta, Gandhi proceeded to Noakhali where frightened Hindus were fleeing 
before the violence of the Hindu majority.417 Despite his old age and frailty, he plunged into a 
punishing regime of travel and speeches, trying to confront the bitterness and terror, calming and 
comforting those he met. 418 For months, Gandhi worked 16 to 18 hours a day, going from one 
village to another on foot spreading his message of non-violence to induce the two communities 
to live in peace and harmony again. He urged the Hindus to return home, and to fear none but 
God. In a prayer meeting at Srirampur on 26 November, Gandhi said even if a solitary refugee 
had to return to his village populated by Muslims, he would unhesitatingly advise his return. He 
further added that if they were to become a self-respecting nation and a brave people, this 
courage was indispensable.419 
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Gandhi called for a Hindu and a Muslim in each village to accompany the returning 
refugees and stand surety for their safety. 420  He instructed each member of his entourage, 
including the ladies, to settle down in one affected village and make himself or herself hostage 
for the safety and security of the Hindu minority of that village.421 His idea was that every Hindu 
worker thus sent should be accompanied by a Mussalman worker and both of them together 
should mix with the local people and gradually create an atmosphere in which the refugees 
would shed their fears and be able to come back and live in peace and friendship once more.422 
He himself decided to stay with Muslim families during his tours of villages. He said if the 
Hindus saw him living alone with Muslim families, it would probably induce them to return to 
their homes with confidence.423 The Muslims, too, would be able to examine his life closely and 
they would find out for themselves whether he was their friend or enemy.424 
The restoration of confidence between the two communities was, however, a slow and 
gradual process.425 Nevertheless, Gandhi’s presence acted as a soothing balm on the riot affected 
villages of East Bengal. It assuaged anger, softened tempers, and eased tensions.426 Yet, Muslim 
hostility to his continuing presence was rife and there were sustained propaganda in the Muslim 
press against his stay in East Bengal, suspecting it as a ‘deep political game’.427 Gandhi was not 
dismayed by the opposition; he was determined to stay in Bengal until calm returned to the area 
and it was a ‘do or die’ proposition for him. As the situation in East Bengal improved, Gandhi 
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left Bengal and headed to Bihar in March. Basing himself in Patna, he began the same work of 
reconciliation and restoration of courage.428 While parts of India were in turmoil, arrangements 
for setting up a Constituent Assembly began in New Delhi.  
Differences between the Congress and the League came to a head over the summoning of 
the Constituent Assembly.429 The annual session of the Congress, which met at Meerut during 
the third week of November, demanded that either the League join the Constituent Assembly or 
quit the Interim Government as the League’s entry into the Government was conditional upon its 
acceptance of the long-term plan of the Cabinet Mission Scheme. Jinnah retorted by saying that 
since the Congress had never accepted the compulsory grouping scheme of the Cabinet Mission 
Plan, the Constituent Assembly should not proceed. Meanwhile, Wavell was urging London to 
issue a clear statement to clarify the real intent of the Cabinet Mission Plan as regards to the 
grouping scheme. He admitted that it might anger the Congress and lead to resignation of the 
Congress Governments at the center and the provinces and further escalate violence in the 
country. In that case, he suggested that the British Government should follow his suggestion of 
setting a firm date to quit India and transfer power on a province by province basis in the interim 
period.430 However, London was not yet prepared to scuttle from India without making further 
efforts to bring the two parties together.     
The British Government, realizing that the situation could no longer be allowed to drift 
further, decided to summon two representatives from the Congress and two from the Muslim 
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League, and one from the Sikh Community.431 Nehru rejected the invitation initially, but later 
agreed to come to London at the urging of the Prime Minister Attlee. On 2 December, Nehru, 
Baldev Singh, Jinnah, Liaquat Ali, and the Viceroy arrived in London. The discussions that 
followed failed to bring out an agreement.432 On 6 December, the British Government issued a 
statement that gave a verdict in favor of the League’s interpretation of the grouping scheme of 
the Cabinet Mission Plan.433 The statement also included the right of each party to refer all 
questions of interpretations in dispute to a Federal Court whose decision would be final.434 
However, the statement was accompanied by an assurance to Jinnah that if the Federal Court’s 
decision was contrary to the British Government’s interpretation then they would have to 
consider the position afresh.435 This was unacceptable to the Congress, which was ready to abide 
by the decision of the Federal Court even if it went against its position.436 
The Constituent Assembly met on 9 December. The Muslim League members decided to 
boycott it. The most important and politically significant resolution, known as the ‘Objective 
Resolution’, was moved by Nehru. 437  It envisaged the Indian Union as ‘an Independent 
Sovereign Republic’ comprising of autonomous units with residuary powers, wherein the 
economic, political and social freedom of everyone would be guaranteed with adequate 
safeguards for minorities and backward communities.438 The Constituent Assembly met again on 
20 January and had a six-day session. Nehru’s ‘Objective Resolution’ was passed and some 
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important committees were appointed. The Working Committee of the Muslim League met at 
Karachi on 31 January and passed a lengthy resolution denouncing the composition and 
procedure of the Constituent Assembly.        
When Jinnah called for ‘Direct Action’, he had no idea what was coming. It was for him 
a bargaining move to get more out of the British and the Congress, rather than a call to 
violence.439 He had called for the day of ‘Direct Action’ to be a day of ‘peaceful reflection’, not a 
day of violence. But the call for ‘Direct Action’ unleashed pent-up forces of disorder of such 
magnitude that they brought parts of India close to anarchy. It started with the ‘Great Calcutta 
Killings’ which claimed five thousand lives and left thousands more injured and homeless. The 
violence did not stop there. In a chain reaction it spread to East Bengal where the Muslims 
butchered the Hindus in great numbers and, in retaliation, the Hindus in Bihar slaughtered their 
Muslim neighbors in even greater numbers. The violence then spread to other parts of India such 
as the United Provinces, and Bombay.             
Convinced that a Coalition Government was the only way out of preventing a civil war, 
Wavell made a last-ditch effort to get assurance from the Congress on the grouping scheme so 
that the Muslim League could be induced to participate in the Interim Government. Gandhi and 
Nehru stubbornly stuck to their position of ‘no compromise’ with Jinnah. On 2 September, 1946 
Congress took office in the Interim Government. The Congress was ready to get the Constituent 
Assembly going and it was in no mood to accommodate Jinnah who had been tarred by the spate 
of violence that had engulfed India.440 The Congress’s aim was to consolidate its position in the 
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Government, get rid of the British as soon as possible, and then it could deal with the Muslims 
and the Princes in its own terms. 
By the autumn of 1946, Jinnah had been pushed into a corner. Moreover, there was the 
danger of the British quitting India, leaving the Muslims at the mercy of a Hindu Raj. At this 
point, the only course open to Jinnah was to join the Interim Government and try to prevent the 
Congress from consolidating its position.441 Jinnah made abundantly clear that there could be no 
question of the League members in the Interim Government cooperating with their Congress 
counterparts. As we have seen, the League members, selected by Jinnah, did their master’s 
bidding to obstruct the functioning of the Government in every possible mean at their disposal. 
Thus a great opportunity to work together was again lost by the two warring parties. Wavell tried 
his best to build a truly coalition Government so that the British could transfer power to a 
responsible entity. However, the mistrust and the ill-feeling between Jinnah and the Congress 
had reached such a level that it was impossible to get them to agree on anything. Hence the tug-
of-war between them continued unabated and as a result India had to pay a heavy price in terms 
of a bloody partition.         
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Chapter Seven 
Mountbatten Viceroyalty, Independence, and Partition 
On 20 February, 1947 Prime Minister Attlee announced in the British Parliament the new 
Statement of British Policy for India. It came to be known as the Attlee Declaration. Paragraph 7 
of the declaration said ‘the present state of uncertainty in India is fraught with danger and cannot 
be indefinitely prolonged. Hence His Majesty’s Government wished to make it clear that it is 
their definite intention to take the necessary steps to effect the transfer of power into effective 
Indian hands by a date not later than June 1948’.442 The declaration further added that if the 
Indians had not reached an agreement and formed a constitution by the stated date, then the 
British would transfer power to parties that would seem most expedient at that time, keeping in 
mind the best interests of Indian people.443 Along with this statement it was also announced that 
Rear Admiral Viscount Mountbatten, Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in SE Asia, 
would soon replace Wavell as the Viceroy of India. Mountbatten was given extraordinary 
plenipotentiary power to carry out his mission in India. His mission was clear cut.444 First try to 
unite the warring parties and leave a united India. If unsuccessful, then consider the option of 
division.445 He was also directed to keep India in the Commonwealth.446 
Nehru welcomed the decision of the British Government to transfer power by June 1948. 
Jinnah’s response was, come what may, the Muslim league would not yield an inch in its demand 
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for Pakistan.447 Meanwhile the communal situation in Punjab rapidly deteriorated. From 1920 till 
1942, Punjab operated under coalition governments, mostly under the leadership of Sir Sikander 
Hyat Khan, in which Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs had participated.448 After the death of Sikander 
Hyat Khan, the Unionist Party had weakened, and the Muslim League, with its demand for 
Pakistan, had gained ascendancy in Punjab.449 When the League emerged as the single largest 
party in the elections of 1946 and yet failed to put together a coalition government, it became 
very bitter and resentful. The Muslim League concentrated all its energies on overthrowing the 
coalition government headed by Khizr Hyat Khan, the son of Sikander Hyat Khan.450 Under 
pressure from the League, Khizr resigned. Governor Evan Jenkins called Khan of Mamdot, the 
leader of the Provincial Muslim League, to form a government. Both the Hindus and Sikhs 
refused to cooperate and as a result the Governor was obliged to impose section 93451 in Punjab 
on 5 March.452 Communal rioting broke out on a large scale in Lahore, and from there it spread 
into Multan, Rawalpindi, and Amritsar. 
A new crisis developed in the Interim Government. Liaquat Ali proposed a 25% tax on 
all businesses on profits more than one hundred thousand rupees.  The Congress interpreted it as 
a clever attempt by the League to punish the Hindu capitalists, the major financiers of the 
Congress Party. It was also seen as a maneuver by the League to split the right wing of the 
Congress from its socialist left wing.453 By the time Lord Wavell left the country, the situation 
was pretty bleak. Riots were widespread in Punjab and elsewhere. The prospect of a Congress 
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and League rapprochement looked virtually non-existent. Putting it mildly, the task that faced the 
new Viceroy was an unenviable one. 
The new Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, arrived in India on 22 March, 1947, and two days 
later assumed office. He held a series of interviews with the leaders from both parties. In his first 
meeting with Gandhi on 1 April, he was staggered by the Mahatma’s suggestion that Jinnah 
should be called upon to head the Interim Government as Prime Minister.454 In the next meeting 
with the Viceroy, Gandhi elaborated his proposal and added that Jinnah should be given a free 
hand to choose his ministers, if necessary entirely from the Muslim League, and if Jinnah wanted 
he could always build a coalition with Nehru and the Congress.455 Gandhi pointed out that if 
Jinnah refused the offer, then the offer would have to be made to the Congress, and he hoped that 
the Congress would include all shades of opinion including the Muslim League.456 Mountbatten 
records his conversation with Gandhi as: 
I twitted him that he really desired me to form a Central Government run by the 
Congress, to whom I would turn over power, and that the preliminary offer to 
Jinnah was merely a maneuver. He assured me with burning sincerity that this 
was so far being the case that he then and there volunteered to place the whole 
services at my disposal in trying to get the Jinnah Government through first by 
exercising his influence with the Congress to accept it, and secondly touring the 
length and breadth of the country getting all the peoples of India to accept the 
decision. He convinced me of his sincerity, and I told him so.457         
When Mountbatten met Azad and told him about Gandhi’s proposal, the latter endorsed 
the idea. However, Nehru and Sardar Patel were very much opposed to Gandhi’s proposal as 
being impractical and ultimately the Congress Working Committee rejected the idea. Gandhi 
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wrote a letter to Mountbatten expressing his failure to persuade the Working Committee to 
accept his plan.458  
In his meetings with the League leaders, Mountbatten came to know the deep resentment 
they held towards the Congress. For example, on 3 April, Liaquat Ali Khan met the Viceroy and 
said: ‘Since my dealings with the Congress Members of the Interim Government, I have come to 
realize that they are utterly impossible people to work with, since there is no spirit of 
compromise and fair play in them, and the majority are thinking only of ways and means by 
which they can do down the Muslim League and improve their own position.’459 Jinnah, in his 
discussions with Mountbatten, stood firm as a rock on the demand for partition.460 In his third 
personal report to London, filed on 17 April, Mountbatten wrote: 
I have had six meetings during the past week with Jinnah, averaging between two 
to three hours each…He has made abundantly clear that the Muslim League will 
not under any circumstance reconsider the Cabinet Mission Plan, and he is intent 
on having Pakistan…he said ‘you must carry out a surgical operation; cut India 
and its army firmly in half and give me the half that belongs to the Muslim 
League’. I told him if I accepted his argument on the need for partition of India, 
then I could not resist the arguments that Congress were putting forward for the 
partition of the Punjab and Bengal. He was quite horrified and argued at great 
length to preserve the unity of Punjab and Bengal…461         
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Mountbatten’s impression of Jinnah in his own words: ‘I regard Jinnah as a psychopathic 
case; in fact until I had met him I would not have thought it possible that a man with such a 
complete lack of administrative knowledge or sense of responsibility could achieve or hold down 
so powerful a position.’462 On another occasion, when Mountbatten persisted with his argument 
that if India was divided, by the same logic Punjab and Bengal, too, would have to be divided, 
Jinnah told him: ‘if you persist in chasing me with your ruthless logic we shall get nowhere’.463 
Finally, Mountbatten gave him two choices: (1) the Cabinet Mission Plan which gave him all 
five provinces of Pakistan with complete autonomy within India and only a weak center; and (2) 
a very moth-eaten Pakistan.464 Jinnah replied: ‘I do not care how little you give me as long as 
you give it to me completely’.465 These preliminary decisions with the Indian leaders convinced 
the Viceroy that the deep chasm between the two parties was unbridgeable.466 It became quickly 
apparent to him that there was no alternative to the partition of India. He realized that in the 
present circumstances the Cabinet Mission Plan was unworkable and the partition of India was 
inevitable. 
Meanwhile, the communal tension in the country was going from bad to worse. Some of 
the extremists among the Sikhs were demanding their own separate state, to be called Khalistan. 
The Sikhs made it clear that if Pakistan was forced upon them, then they would fight against it to 
the last man.467 In NWFP, an idea of a separate Pathan state was being mooted.468 Taking their 
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cue from Jinnah, the local bodies of Muslim League in the United Province and Bombay began 
to demand the right of self-determination for Muslims in certain pockets of those provinces.469 
Serious communal outbreaks and incidents of stabbing, arson, and looting were occurring at 
various parts of the country. In the face of progressively deteriorating situation in the country, 
Lord Mountbatten felt that if the procedure for the transfer of power was not finalized quickly, 
then there was a possibility that at least in some parts of the country there would be no authority 
to which power could be transferred.470 
By the end of April 1947, Nehru and Patel had become reconciled to the idea of partition. 
Nehru wrote a letter to Mountbatten on 1 May in which he said: 
In regard to the proposals which, I presume, Lord Ismay is carrying with him to 
London, our committee are prepared to accept the principle of partition based on 
self-determination as applied to definitely ascertained areas. This involves the 
partition of Bengal and Punjab. As you know, we are passionately attached to the 
idea of a United India, but we have accepted the partition of India in order to 
avoid conflict and compulsion. In order to give effect to this partition every effort 
should be made to meet the wishes and the interests of the people affected by it.471        
However, Gandhi had not yet accepted the idea of partition by then. During his meeting 
with Mountbatten on 4 May, he forcefully opposed the partition of India. He was of the view that 
if partition must take place, then it should happen only after the British left India. He did not 
agree with Mountbatten that the idea of partition was according to the wishes of the people of 
India.472 He said that the British were practically imposing partition on the people of India.473 
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When Mountbatten asked for an alternative, Gandhi again mentioned his original plan, which 
was to invite Jinnah to form a government and let him chose his cabinet and if he refused, then 
extend the same offer to the Congress. He also suggested that India should be given Dominion 
Status immediately and Mountbatten should continue as the Governor General until June 
1948.474 Gandhi followed up by writing a letter to the Viceroy on 8 May reiterating what he had 
said on 4 May. Some of the important points from his letter are as follows: 
Whatever may be said to the contrary, it would be a blunder of first magnitude for 
the British to be party in any way whatsoever to the division of India. If it has to 
come, let it come after the British withdrawal, as a result of understanding 
between the parties or an armed conflict which according to Qaid-e-Azam is 
taboo. Protection of minorities can be guaranteed by establishing a court of 
arbitration in the event of difference of opinion among the contending parties…I 
feel sure that partition of Punjab and Bengal is wrong in every case and a needless 
irritant for the League. This as well as all innovations can come after the British 
withdrawal not before…475    
In that letter, Gandhi argued that the British Paramountcy as regards to the Princes of the 
States should pass to the Central Government when the British left India. He said the following: 
The intransmissibility of Paramountcy is a vicious doctrine, if it means that they 
can become sovereign and a menace for independent India. All the power 
wherever exercised by the British in India must automatically descend to the 
successor. Thus the people of the States become as much part of independent 
India as the people of British India. The present Princes are puppets created or 
tolerated for the upkeep and prestige of the British power. The unchecked powers 
exercised by them over their people are probably the worst blot on the British 
Crown…476  
However, Gandhi’s efforts were in vain. The decision regarding partition had been taken 
and approved in principle by the Congress Working Committee on 1 May. In that meeting, 
Gandhi was present and found to his utter disappointment that no one except Khan Abdul 
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Ghaffar Khan supported his point of view. Gandhi’s influence in the Congress had declined 
substantially. It was no longer what it had been in the 1920s and the 1930s. While he continued 
to be revered by the Indian masses, his influence within the Congress Working Committee had 
dwindled in the last few years. 477 The leadership inside the Working Committee had slipped 
from his hands into his political disciples, Nehru and Patel.478 
Although Mountbatten’s mandate from London was to first try his best to preserve the 
unity of India, within a few days of his arrival in India, during which he met with several Indian 
leaders, he came to realize the impossibility of the task. As early as 31 March, he was ready with 
a tentative partition plan, which became ready by the end of April. The main features of the 
Partition Plan which Mountbatten presented at his sixth staff meeting on 31 March are: 
1. The essence of the plan would be a form of partition with a Central authority 
for reserved subjects; this to be an experimental arrangement and to come into 
being in the near future. 
2. The three units which would be the result of this Partition would be: 
 a)  Hindustan, to include predominantly Hindu provinces. 
 b)  Pakistan, to include predominantly Muslim provinces. 
 c)  The States. 
3. Each of these units would be offered a form of Dominion status. In the case of 
the States, the larger would be offered this status by themselves; the smaller 
would have to combine into units of suitable size. 
4. In view of the grant of Pakistan, and on the same principles which justified that 
grant, there would be partition of the Punjab and Bengal. 
5. The plan would be brought into force in about May 1947, and would run 
experimentally until June 1948. 
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6. The Central authority, which might be called ‘Central Government’, would deal 
only with the reserved subjects of Defense, foreign Affairs, Communications, 
Food, and Finance to cover these. 
7. The Central Authority, as well as the Hindustan Government, would be situated 
in Delhi. 
8. Each of the reserved subjects would be dealt with by a Council or Board, 
containing representatives from Hindustan, Pakistan, and the States. 
9. The Viceroy would continue to have the right of veto on these reserved 
subjects. 
10. About three months before June 1948, a decision would be made as to 
whether or not the Central authority would remain in being after that date.479      
In a report sent to London on 17 April, Mountbatten underlined the gravity of the 
political situation in India and the urgent need for the British to make a decision soon one way or 
the other. Mountbatten applied himself to the finalization of the Partition Plan and it was ready 
by the end of April. Nehru and Jinnah were shown the Partition Plan and they did not have any 
major objections to the general tenor of the plan except the usual noise typical of Indian 
politicians. Lord Ismay, Viceroy’s Chief of Staff carried the plan to London on 2 May. 
Meanwhile, Lord Listowel had succeeded Lord Pethick-Lawrence as Secretary of State. 
The Viceroy took a short vacation at Simla and Nehru also went there as a guest of 
Mountbatten. On 10 May, Mountbatten received a telegram from London which included the 
text of the revised plan for transfer of power. The India Committee and the British Cabinet had 
made several modifications to Mountbatten’s original plan for partition. The very same night, 
Mountbatten gave Nehru a copy of the revised draft and asked him to read it and give his honest 
opinion ‘as a friend’ regarding the likelihood of its acceptance by the two parties. Nehru was 
very upset after reading the revised plan and wasted no time in communicating to the Viceroy his 
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strong objections to the plan being proposed. Nehru saw in the document a blueprint for the 
balkanization of India into endless units. He put the following in his letter to Mountbatten: 
I read the draft proposals you gave me with the care they deserved and with every 
desire to absorb them and accept them in so far as I could. But with all the 
goodwill in the world I reacted to them very strongly. Indeed they produced a 
devastating effect upon me. The relatively simple proposals that we had discussed 
now appeared, in the grab that H.M.G. had provided for them, in an entirely new 
context which gave them an ominous meaning. The whole approach was 
completely different from what ours had been and the picture of India that 
emerged frightened me. In fact much that we had done so far was undermined and 
the Cabinet Mission’s scheme and subsequent developments were set aside, and 
an entirely new picture presented – a picture of fragmentation and conflict and 
disorder, and, unhappily also, of a worsening of relations between India and 
Britain…480     
The most worrisome part of the revised plan for Nehru was the provision that each of the 
successor States could conclude independent treaties with His Majesty’s Government. Nehru 
thought that it would create many “Ulsters” in India and they would be looked upon as British 
bases on Indian soil possibly having British garrisons.481 It looked like a direct invitation, at least 
to the major States, to remain as independent kingdoms, presumably as allies or feudatories of 
Britain.482 Nehru said that the Congress had agreed to the partition of the country, with Muslim 
majority provinces going into Pakistan, but not to a balkanization of rest of the country. Nehru’s 
bombshell had a significant effect on Mountbatten. The whole plan was now revised in 
consultation with Nehru and V.P. Menon, the Constitutional Advisor to the Viceroy.      
Menon played a key role in the formulation of the new Plan. In fact, he had outlined the 
Plan even before the arrival of Mountbatten in India, with close consultation with Sardar Patel. 
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The new Plan was not radically different from the Mountbatten Plan. The most important 
difference was the provision for immediate transfer of power to the Governments of both India 
and Pakistan on the basis of Dominion Status.483  In Mountbatten’s Plan, power was to be 
transferred to two or three or even more sovereign independent states.484  This would have 
delayed the transfer of power until the Constituent Assembly of each state framed a constitution. 
Under his Plan, Menon argued, power could be immediately transferred to the two central 
Governments once they accepted the Dominion Status.485 Menon added that by staying within 
the Commonwealth as Dominions, the two states would enjoy all the perks that came with that 
status. 
Mountbatten communicated the new Plan to London. Prime Minister Attlee invited him 
to London for personal consultations. Before he left for London, Mountbatten met with Nehru, 
Jinnah, and Baldev Singh to secure their written acceptance of the Plan. Baldev Singh accepted 
the Plan on behalf of the Sikhs and Nehru on behalf of the Congress, on condition that the 
League accepted the Plan as a final settlement. Jinnah was prepared to accept the general 
principles inherent in the plan, but refused to give his acceptance in writing. He continued to 
voice his opposition to the partition of Bengal and Punjab envisioned in the Plan.486 If Bengal 
was indeed partitioned, he wanted Calcutta to be made a free port.487 Similarly, if Punjab had to 
be partitioned, he demanded that the matter be decided by a referendum.488 He also demanded a 
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corridor through Hindustan to connect the two parts of Pakistan in the North-West and the 
North-East.489 These demands were vehemently opposed by the Congress.  
The Viceroy left for London on 18 May. The Plan was finally approved by the British 
Cabinet by the end of May. The Menon-Mountbatten Plan was presented by the Viceroy to the 
Indian leaders at the historic conference held on 2 June in Delhi.490 Nehru, Patel, and J. B. 
Kripalani accepted the Plan on behalf of the Congress and Baldev Singh accepted the Plan for 
the Sikhs. On 3 June, Jinnah conveyed his approval of the Plan by just a nod of his head. Attlee 
announced the Plan in the House of Commons on 3 June, and hence the Plan came to be known 
as ‘the June 3rd Plan’. During a Press Conference on 4 June, Mountbatten gave the first informal 
indication that 15 August would be the likely date for the actual transfer of power to the two new 
Dominions.491 According to Hodson, the 15 August date suddenly appeared as if by accident.492 
Once mentioned that date seemed to take root and was never questioned. 493  Mountbatten 
believed that the greatest possible speed was needed in order to avoid risk of further riots and 
bloodshed. Menon writes in The Transfer of Power in India that the problem of holding together 
the Interim Government ‘was one of the considerations that prompted Lord Mountbatten to press 
for the transfer of power earlier than the stipulated period.’494        
The June 3rd Plan, outlined province by province, how the question of the partition would 
be settled. For Bengal and Punjab, the Plan suggested the following procedure: 
                                                 
489
 Remarks by Mr. Jinnah on Pakistan made in an interview with Reuters, 21 May, 1947, in 
Mansergh, ed., The Transfer of Power 1942-7: The Mountbatten Viceroyalty, Formulation of a 
Plan, 22 March – 30 May 1947, vol. 10, 929. 
490
 Pandey, The Break-up of British India, 202. 
491
 Alan Campbell-Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten (New York: Atheneum, 1985), 109. 
492
 Hodson, The Great Divide: Britain – India – Pakistan, 319. 
493
 Ibid, 319-320. 
494
 Menon, The Transfer of Power in India, 396. 
130 
 
The Provincial Legislative Assemblies of Bengal and the Punjab will each be 
asked to meet in two parts, one representing the Muslim majority districts and the 
other the rest of the Province. The members of the two parts of each Legislative 
Assembly sitting separately will be empowered to vote whether or not the 
Province should be partitioned. If a simple majority of either part decides in favor 
of partition, division will take place and arrangements will be made accordingly. 
As soon as a decision involving partition has been taken by either Province, a 
Boundary Commission will be set up by the Governor General…It will be 
instructed to demarcate the boundaries of the two parts of the Punjab on the basis 
of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. 
Similar instructions will be given to the Bengal Boundary Commission.495    
For the North West Frontier Province, the Plan stipulated that a referendum would be 
held there to decide whether the province would join India or Pakistan. 496  The procedure 
pertaining to Sind said: ‘The Legislative assembly of Sind will at a special meeting take its own 
decision as to whether its constitution should be framed by the existing or, a new and separate 
Constituent Assembly.’497 The procedure for Assam was little bit different. Though Assam was 
predominantly a non-Muslim Province, the district of Sylhet, contiguous to Bengal, was 
predominantly Muslim. So the Plan outlined that if Bengal decided in favor of partition, then a 
referendum would be held in Sylhet to decide whether the district wanted to remain in Assam or 
be part of East Bengal.498 
 The verdict of the border provinces was secured in less than a month, from 20 June to 17 
July.499 In Bengal, the Provincial Legislative Assembly met on 20 June and decided by a 126 
votes to 90 in favor of joining Pakistan.500 However, the members from the non-Muslim majority 
areas of West Bengal met and decided by 58 votes to 21 that the province should be partitioned 
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and that West Bengal should join India.501 The Punjab Legislative Assembly decided by 91 votes 
to 77 to join Pakistan. However, the non-Muslim majority of the East Punjab decided by 50 votes 
to 22 that the province should be partitioned and East Punjab should join India.502 The Sind 
Legislative Assembly met on 26 June and decided by 30 votes to 20 to join Pakistan.503 A 
referendum was held in Sylhet in which majority of voters, 239,619 to 184,041, were in favor of 
separation and joining East Pakistan.504 In the North-West Frontier Province only 50 percent of 
the electorate voted, of which 289,244 were for Pakistan and 2,874 for India.505 In the absence of 
a legislative assembly in Baluchistan the decision was made by members of Quetta 
municipality.506 Thus in effect East Bengal, West Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and the North-West 
Frontier Province all voted for Pakistan.507 
Attlee, on 4 July, introduced the India Independence Bill in the House of Commons. 508 
On 1 July, Churchill had raised objections to it being called ‘Independence Bill’. He said: ‘The 
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essence of the Mountbatten proposals and the only reason why I gave support to them is because 
they establish the phase of Dominion status. Dominion status is not the same as independence, 
although it may be freely used to establish independence.’509 Churchill, to the very end, remained 
an ardent imperialist at heart. The India Committee decided to retain the title of the Bill as they 
thought that it would be most acceptable to both Dominions and Indian opinion.510 The bill was 
passed within a fortnight on 18 July. 
The question as to who should be the first Governor-General of Pakistan was an 
interesting one. The India Independence Bill advised a common Governor-General for both 
Dominions. Nehru had already requested Mountbatten to continue as the Governor-General of 
India until June 1948. However, Jinnah, on 2 July, told Mountbatten that he wanted to become 
the first Governor-General of Pakistan. Mountbatten pointed out to Jinnah the advantage of 
having a common Governor-General. He told Jinnah that it was the only practicable means of 
safeguarding the division of assets, because as the common Governor-General, he would make 
sure that an equitable distribution of assets took place between the two Dominions. Jinnah 
refused to budge from his position. In his Personal Report No. 11, Mountbatten wrote about 
Jinnah, ‘He is suffering from megalomania in its worst form for when I pointed out to him that if 
he went as a Constitutional Governor General his powers would be restricted but as Prime 
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Minister he really could run Pakistan, he made no bones about the fact that the Prime Minister 
would do what he said.’511 
The Boundary Commissions were set up in accordance with the 3 June Plan; one to deal 
with the partition of Bengal and other to deal with the partition of Punjab. Sir Cyril Radcliffe was 
appointed the Chairman of both commissions. The two commissions, each consisting of two 
Hindu and two Muslim judges, failed to arrive at an agreed solution.512 Hence the Chairman 
Radcliffe took it upon himself to make the final award. He had very limited time to decide on the 
boundaries and could only complete his assignment on 9 August, just a few days before the 
creation of the two Dominions. The whole process was rushed through in the shortest possible 
time. 
For West Bengal, the Congress had claimed fifty-nine percent of total area of Bengal and 
forty-six percent of the population of the province.513 The Radcliffe award gave only thirty-six 
percent of the area and thirty-five percent of the population to West Bengal.514 For East Punjab, 
the Muslim League had demanded not only the three complete divisions of Rawalpindi, Multan, 
and Lahore, but also a number of tehsils in the Jullundur and Ambala divisions.515 The Radcliffe 
award, however, allocated the whole of Jullundur and Ambala divisions, Amritsar district of the 
Lahore division, and certain tehsils of Gurdaspur and Lahore districts to East Punjab. About 
thirty-eight percent of the area and forty-five percent of the population were assigned to East 
Punjab. The Muslim League bitterly resented the loss of those areas from West Punjab. The non-
Muslims of the Punjab, especially the Sikhs, were sorely disappointed at the loss of Lahore and 
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the canal colonies of Sheikhupura, Lyallpur and Montgomery.516 As expected, the Radcliffe 
award satisfied none of the parties. The Hindus and Muslims both claimed that the award was 
unjust, arbitrary, and each side claimed that it had been cheated in an act of shameful partiality. 
Mountbatten rightly assumed that the award would not be satisfactory to either party, so he 
didn’t make the award public until 17 August in order to avoid any last minute troubles getting in 
the way of Independence Day celebrations in the two countries.              
One of the consequences of partition was the division of the Indian Armed Forces. It was 
decided that the heads of the armed services of the two Dominions should at once be chosen and 
start setting up their headquarters, so as to be ready to take over command by 15 August.517 A 
Joint Defense Council was set up to divide the armed forces. Lord Mountbatten served as its 
Chairman with Defense Ministers of India and Pakistan, and Commander-in-Chief Auchinleck as 
its members.518 Of all the institutions in India, the army was the least communal. The great 
majority of battalions and regiments were mixed units, containing Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs.519 
Of the twenty-three regiments in pre-partition India, only seven consisted exclusively of Hindus, 
or Muslims, or Sikhs.520  The division of the army along religious lines, which Auchinleck 
(Commander-in-Chief) had predicted would take between 5 to 10 years, had to be completed in a 
matter of months.521 In the midst of the most appalling killings, which were ripping through 
North India, and just when a united and neutral army was needed to contain the situation, the 
regiments of the Indian army were dismembered.522 Soldiers were divided according to religious 
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hue; Muslim soldiers were sent packing from India to Pakistan and non-Muslim soldiers were 
dispatched in the opposite direction.523 After 15 August, Auchinleck served as the Supreme 
Commander in the Joint Defense Council until December 1947, when his post was abolished. 
The Joint Defense Council continued to serve until 1 April 1948.524       
Another big question that remained to be settled before 15 August was the future of the 
Indian States. Under the India Independence Bill of 1947, Paramountcy was to lapse on 15 
August. The States were allowed to either remain independent or join either India or Pakistan. 
There were roughly 600 States which constituted two-fifths of the land of the country. 
Approximately, one hundred million people lived in those States. Most of these States were 
inhabited by Hindus and situated within or adjoining Indian territory.525 The Congress naturally 
expected most of them to accede to India Union. The matter was complicated by Sir Conrad 
Corfield, the political advisor to the Viceroy, who began advising the Princes to declare them 
independent.526 With this encouragement, the rulers of Travancore, Hyderabad, Bhopal and few 
others signaled their intention to become sovereign States after 15 August.527 
The Congress was alarmed at the prospect of the balkanization of India. On 25 June, 
Nehru’s Interim Government created a State Department to deal with the situation.528 Two days 
later, Sardar Patel was put in charge of the department. Patel appointed V. P. Menon as secretary 
of the department. Menon evolved a scheme for the integration of the States into the India Union. 
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According to that scheme, the rulers were to be asked to accede to India only on three subjects – 
External Affairs, Defense, and Communications. 
On 25 July, Mountbatten called a Conference of rulers and representatives of the States. 
He exhorted them to accede to India Union because of geographical compulsions and common 
economic and administrative concerns. He said that under the British rule, the sub-continent had 
come under one administration.529 Once the British left, that link would be broken.530 If nothing 
could be put in its place, then chaos would follow and the States would be the first to suffer. He 
urged the rulers to accede on those three subjects only, which would leave them practically 
independent.531 Lord Mountbatten brought his considerable powers of persuasion to bear upon 
the Princes.532 Sardar Patel likewise directed his energies to that end. The combined efforts of 
Mountbatten, Patel, and Menon paid off handsomely. One by one the Princes signed on the 
dotted line, and the only States that had not acceded to either of the Dominions by Independence 
Day were Hyderabad, Junagadh, and Kashmir.533 
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Communal frenzy gripped the people on both sides of the border immediately in the 
aftermath of partition. The migration of people from east to west and vice versa across the border 
was unprecedented, the likes of which had never been known before in history.534 There were 
millions uprooted from their homes under conditions of indescribable horror and misery.535 
Many had to flee their homes in fear of their lives. They had witnessed their near and dear ones 
hacked to pieces in front of their own eyes and their homes looted and destroyed. They had no 
choice but to seek safety in flight.536 For most of them the future was bleak and uncertain. Durga 
Das describes, ‘Both in India and Pakistan, power-hungry politicians were hatching diabolical 
plots in their self-interest which involved the disruption of the lives of millions of people on the 
greatest and most tragic movement of refugees in history’.537 The fact that Mountbatten chose 
not to make the boundary award public until 17 August, two days after the independence and the 
partition of India made the situation worse by creating confusion among the people (those in the 
border regions) as they still did not know which state they belonged to  
When the British decided that India should remain united, they didn’t rule out other 
options. British policy towards communalism was ambivalent; it had no clarity. 538  Positive 
intervention was needed to preserve the unity of India, including putting down firmly the forces 
bent upon dividing the country, which the British chose not to do. They took the easy way out.539 
They did not believe that unity could be preserved through force. So, they concentrated most of 
their efforts in trying to bring the two parties together, a hopeless endeavor as long as Jinnah 
stood firm on his demand for Pakistan. The British were much more concerned about their 
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appearance of impartiality than trying to keep India united. It was more important for them to 
look good in the eyes of the world than do the right thing. A serious attempt at keeping India 
united would have involved identifying with the forces that wanted unity and countering those 
who opposed it.540  
In an effort to find the quickest and surest way to transfer power and get out of India, the 
British were willing to divide the country whether the demand for Pakistan was just or not. 
Mountbatten defended his decision to advance the date of transfer of power on the grounds that 
unless he did so, the country would descend into chaos. From the British point of view, a hasty 
retreat was perhaps the most suitable action, but it proved catastrophic for India. The speed with 
which power was transferred has been criticized by many historians. Jalal described it as an 
ignominious scuttle. The 72-day timetable, from 3-June to 15-August, for both transfer of power 
and division of the country, was to prove disastrous.541 The abdication of responsibility with such 
haste was sheer callousness on the part of the British Government. There was a lack of concern 
as to what would happen if they left precipitously. The massacre that happened in Punjab was the 
final indictment of Mountbatten.542 By delaying to make public the decision of the Boundary 
Commission, Mountbatten exacerbated an already tense situation. People in both sides of the 
partition were under the illusion that they were in the right side. When truth was known, 
pandemonium broke out. 
The appointment of Cyril Radcliffe as Chairman of the Boundary Commission was not a 
wise choice. He was a total stranger to India.543 He was a man of integrity, legal reputation, and 
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wide experience. But for him India was an alien land.544 He had never visited India before and 
had no knowledge of its complex sociology, geography of the land, and any of its many 
languages. He did not have a rudimentary understanding of the social spread, intermix, and the 
realities of the vast land.545 Yet, he was assigned the very complex task of partitioning the land 
and that within the shortest possible time imaginable. Nehru and Mountbatten were in a hurry to 
get the transfer of power done as soon as possible. Jaswant Singh writes ‘To them, people did not 
matter, only speed and power’.546    
The main failure of the Congress was its inability to devise a successful plan to integrate 
its strategy of anti-imperialism with a strategy to combat communalism.547 Such a combined 
strategy would have brought complete success i.e. freedom of India with unity. But the Congress 
devoted little attention to this task in the belief that the communal question could wait or would 
get resolved in the course of its anti-imperialism struggle.548 There was little intellectual effort to 
combat communalism in order to combat it. The policy of the Congress was that of Gandhi’s i.e. 
once the British got out of the way, the communal differences would disappear and the Muslim 
League would cooperate with the Congress in the governance of the country. When the Congress 
finally realized the seriousness of the problem in 1946 it was too late. The overwhelming success 
of the Muslim League in the elections and the subsequent disturbances in Calcutta, Noakhali, and 
Bihar convinced the Congress of the destructive powers of communalism. They started to have 
doubts about keeping India united in the face of this strident communalism. They realized that no 
amount of concessions would satisfy Jinnah short of agreeing to his demand for Pakistan. As 
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Sucheta Mahajan writes ‘Assertive communalism marching towards nationhood was hardly 
likely to be satisfied by concessions such as provincial autonomy and constitutional procedures 
like grouping’.549 
The first leader in the Congress camp to jump in the bandwagon of partition was Sardar 
Patel. He was extremely annoyed and irritated by Jinnah’s constant demand for Pakistan. The 
confrontationist posture of the League Members in the Interim Government further convinced 
him that it was impossible for the two parties to work together. He found himself frustrated at 
every step by the veto put on his proposals by the Finance Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan.550 In 
sheer anger he decided that there was no other alternative but partition.551 Once Mountbatten 
realized that Patel was ready to accept partition, he turned his attention to Nehru.552 Azad writes 
‘within a month of Lord Mountbatten’s arrival in India, Jawaharlal, the firm opponent of 
partition, had become, if not a supporter, at least acquiescent to the idea.553 Azad suggests that 
perhaps Jawaharlal was greatly impressed by Lord Mountbatten, and even greater by the 
attractive and friendly temperament of Lady Mountbatten.554 Leonard Mosley held the similar 
view that the Viceroy in persuading Nehru had performed the confidence trick of the century. 
Nehru and Patel firmly believed that India needed a strong central government in order to 
modernize the country, and it would be only possible when the Muslim League was out of the 
way. They were willing to give a few small pieces in the north-west and the north-east to 
Pakistan in order to have an India with a strong center. So they used the two-nation theory 
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propounded by Jinnah against him to cut his dream down to size. Jaswant Singh in his book 
suggests that Nehru and Patel picked a day to pass the Partition Resolution in the Congress 
Working Committee when two principal opponents of partition, Gandhi and Azad, were absent. 
Gandhi was in Bihar in his great healing mission and Azad was away.555 
In his first meeting with Mountbatten on 1 April, 1947, Gandhi made his startling 
proposal of letting Jinnah be the Prime Minister and form a Government of United India. Gandhi 
assumed that his two chief lieutenants in the Congress, Nehru and Patel, would go along with his 
proposal. But they rejected Gandhi’s proposal saying that it was impracticable and would never 
work. Gandhi thought that by offering the post of Prime Minister to Jinnah, he would forgo his 
demand for Pakistan. However, Nehru and Patel had different take on the matter. They feared 
that Jinnah would use his new powers to carve out a Pakistan of his liking. So, they disagreed 
with their mentor and India lost perhaps the last opportunity to avoid partition. Nehru and Patel 
hoped that their strategy to push for the partition of Punjab and Bengal would scare Jinnah into 
giving up his demand for Pakistan when he realized that how moth-eaten and unviable the 
resulting Pakistan would be. They thought that the new Pakistan would collapse soon and the 
provinces which seceded from India would be forced to return to India. However, Jinnah 
remained as relentless as ever in his demand for Pakistan, even if it meant a truncated one. 
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Conclusion        
The case by case study of major events of the decades preceding the partition of India 
presented in this thesis demonstrates that the causes of partition were varied and complex. It 
shows that there is no one theory or argument that can fully explain the root cause of India’s 
partition. The discussions presented in preceding chapters make it amply clear that the blame for 
the partition of India cannot be assigned to any one of the players among the three (the British, 
the Congress, and the Muslim League) that participated in the drama of India’s partition. The 
study proves that the blame for the division of India has to be shared jointly by the three parties 
involved. Perhaps, by picking and choosing select events, one could promote a theory or an 
argument to assign blame for the partition exclusively to one party or the other. This is exactly 
what most historians writing on the subject have done in the past several decades. The current 
study takes an objective and non-partisan approach at looking at the issue afresh by examining 
all the major events in the ten year period prior to the partition to reach its conclusion. 
The 1937 elections raised expectations that the Congress and the Muslim League would 
form coalition governments in the provinces. It presented an excellent opportunity for both the 
parties to come together and govern the provinces jointly and thereby promote communal amity. 
Instead, the Congress decided to go it alone and spurned the League’s proposal to form coalition 
governments at the provinces. Success at the elections blinded the Congress leaders to the 
dangers of pushing aside the League. The Congress overestimated its own strength and 
underestimated the League’s capacity to create trouble. The decision to form single party 
cabinets was a serious error in judgment on the part of the Congress which directly contributed to 
alienation of the Muslim leaders, even the moderate leaders who were sympathetic to the 
nationalist cause. 
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In Bihar and Bombay, the behavior of the Congress in the selection of leaders belied its 
claim of being a secular organization. The Congress also blundered in its Muslim Mass Contact 
Programme in 1937-8. By trying to reach the rank and file Muslim voters over the heads of 
Muslim politicians, it alarmed the Muslim League into action. The Congress Mass Contact 
Programme was seen as an attempt to deprive the Muslim politicians of their constituents. 
Hence, the League and the village ulema joined hands to repulse it. The pro-Hindu policies of the 
Congress governments jarred on Muslim sensibilities. The Wardha Scheme of education, which 
glorified Hindu heroes, emphasized Hindi learning, and obliged Muslim students to worship the 
portrait of Gandhi, and other such measures, was perceived by the Muslims as an attempt by the 
Congress to convert the Muslim children to Hinduism. The hoisting of the Congress flag over 
office buildings and the singing of the ‘Bande Mataram’ song in the legislatures deepened the 
Muslim suspicion of Congress’s real motives. 
The period of the Congress ministries saw intense factional strife and bickering within 
the Congress ranks. There was a scramble for jobs and positions of personal advantage.556 
Opportunists and self-seekers began to join the Congress drawn by the lure of association with 
the party in power.557  Gandhi repeatedly lashed out in the columns of Harijan against the 
growing misuse of office and creeping corruption in Congress ranks.558 Jinnah saw an excellent 
opportunity in the misrule of the Congress ministries. He set out to create an atmosphere of 
hatred against the Congress by carrying out intense propaganda. The Muslim League tried its 
best to fan the flames of Muslim discontent by publicizing the alleged insolent behavior of the 
Congress ministries. The Pirpur and Sharif Reports, published by the League, charged the 
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Congress ministries of forcing cow-protection upon Muslims, pushing the use of Hindi over 
Urdu, interfering with Muslim worship, and efforts to prevent the Muslims from being elected to 
local bodies. Whether or not these allegations were justified, they played into the Muslim fears 
of Hindu domination in a Congress raj. Every incident of communal violence was used by the 
League as a propaganda weapon against the Congress. Perhaps a coalition government would not 
have eliminated communal riots, but at least it would have saddled the Muslim League with 
responsibility and prevented it from playing the communal card. 
Instead of assuaging the Muslim fears of Hindu domination, Nehru, Prasad and other 
Congress leaders acted in a completely nonchalant manner. Rajendra Prasad wrote in India 
Divided: ‘The so called atrocities have remained mere allegations which have never been tested 
and put to the proof. They have, nevertheless, been a principal plank of the League’s program 
and utilized for propaganda purposes.’559 Nehru dismissed the Muslim League as a small upper 
class organization with no hold over the Muslim masses. He said he had greater touch with the 
Muslim masses than the members of the Muslim League. Nehru failed to grasp the strength of 
Muslim unity when provoked by an outside threat. 560  The cry of ‘Islam in danger’ was a 
uniquely potent force. 
Jinnah realized that he had to strengthen the League in order to avoid political extinction. 
During 1937-39 he set out to follow the lead of Gandhi and create a mass party. His efforts at 
reorganizing and revitalizing the party paid off handsomely. Within a few months of the 
Lucknow Session in 1937, 100,000 new members were recruited in the United Provinces alone. 
Powerful provincial leaders like Fazlul Huq and Sikander Hyat Khan agreed to follow the 
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League’s policy on all-India questions.561 This was a significant step towards establishing the 
League as a ‘third force’.562 
The outbreak of war in September 1939 rapidly raised the status of Jinnah and the 
Muslim League. Linlithgow saw the growing rift between the two parties as an effective weapon 
that the British could use for their advantage. The British wanted India’s cooperation in the war 
without conceding too much in return. They viewed the martial Muslim race as more worthwhile 
for the war purpose than the party workers and politicians of the Congress. So, Linlithgow 
encouraged the League as a useful counterweight to the Congress. When Linlithgow declared 
India’s entry into the war without consulting the Indian leaders, the Congress ministries in the 
provinces resigned en masse in protest. By resigning from power, the Congress committed a 
serious blunder. Linlithgow could now ignore the Congress as it was no more in power. The 
Congress lost the power to bargain. The Viceroy now turned to Jinnah for support and 
encouraged the League to become a rival to the Congress at all-India level. Jinnah thus 
emboldened passed the Pakistan Resolution at the League’s Lahore session in 1940. At this 
session, Jinnah propounded the two-nation theory and demanded separate homeland for the 
Muslims of India. Interestingly, Linlithgow did not rush to condemn the Lahore Resolution.563 
Looking at the three year period from 1937 to 1940, it is obvious that none of the three 
players acted in a way that was conducive to promoting cooperation and unity among the Hindus 
and Muslims. The Congress as the senior partner had greater responsibility towards building a 
coalition with the League. It should have been more accommodating and sensitive towards the 
Muslim fears of Hindu domination. Instead it decided to go it alone and followed policies that 
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were perceived by the Muslims as detrimental to their interests. Jinnah, for his part, played the 
communal card to fan the flames of Muslim discontent. The Pakistan resolution of 1940 was the 
most explicit demand for Pakistan by the League. The revisionist historians like Ayesha Jalal 
have tried to discount it by asserting that it was just a mere slogan by Jinnah and the Muslim 
League to get more power for the Muslims. But it is hard to dismiss a major resolution by the 
second most important party in India as a mere slogan. The British, for their part, played the 
game of divide and rule as they had done since their arrival in India. Linlithgow saw advantage 
in encouraging the separatist tendencies of the Muslim League as a counterpoise to the 
nationalism of the Congress. He saw the martial Muslims as more valuable to war efforts than 
the Gandhian pacifists. 
The British response to Gandhi’s call of ‘Quit India’ was one of severest repression. All 
the major leaders of the Congress were arrested and put in jail for a period of three years. By 
confining the leaders of the Congress for such a long period, the British Government left the 
field wide open for the League to consolidate its position. The reorganization of the League 
which had started in 1937 now went ahead with full pace. League’s missionaries went from 
village to village canvassing support for the League and promoting the idea of Pakistan. They 
promised an economic utopia for the Muslims in the new State. In 1940, the idea of Pakistan was 
mere rhetoric, but by 1944, it seemed achievable. The death of Sikander Hyat Khan made it 
possible for the League to consolidate its position in Punjab. 
The Cripps Mission was another opportunity that the Congress blew up by its all-or-
nothing attitude. Cripps Proposal was a significant step towards granting India its freedom. It 
promised an expanded executive in which all the members would be Indians except the Viceroy 
and the War Member. This was almost like a National Government which the Congress had 
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demanded. It presented another excellent opportunity for the two parties to come together and 
govern the country jointly. The Congress stuck to its demand that the War Member must be an 
Indian and rejected the proposal when its demand was not met. The British, in order to appease 
the Muslim League, put the opt-out provision for the provinces in the Cripps proposal. By 
allowing the provinces to opt-out of Indian union after a certain number of years, the British 
conceded the partition of India for the first time. And, this was another reason why the Congress 
rejected the Cripps formula. Cripps tried sincerely to accommodate the Congress’s demand, but 
his efforts were hindered at every step by hardcore conservatives like Churchill, Amery, and 
Linlithgow, who really did not want a labor leader to succeed. For them, the Cripps Mission was 
just a propaganda effort to demonstrate to the world that Britain was sincere in her desire to give 
India self-governance. The Congress did not believe that Britain and her allies could win the war 
against Hitler. It wanted to take advantage of Britain’s weakening position. So, the failure of the 
Cripps Mission was due to Congress’s intransigence and Churchill government’s non-committal 
approach to it. 
As to the failure of Wavell’s Simla Conference, the conclusion is clear cut. Jinnah 
insisted that the League was the sole organization representing all the Muslims of India, and 
hence, it should have the exclusive right to nominate the Muslim members to the Viceroy’s 
Council. This was anathema to the Congress as it would have meant that the Congress had to 
forfeit its claim of being a secular party representing all sections of the Indian life. It would have 
reduced the stature of the Congress to a purely Hindu body. Moreover, the president of the 
Congress Party, Maulana Azad, was himself a highly reputable Muslim scholar. It was 
unacceptable to the Congress that it would not be allowed to nominate its president to the 
Viceroy’s Council. However, Jinnah did not budge an inch from his demand. Wavell abruptly 
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ended the Conference despite the advice he received from his Governors to proceed with his plan 
without the League because Jinnah would eventually cave in. The failure of Simla Conference 
enhanced Jinnah’s position. By ending the Conference abruptly, Wavell conceded that Jinnah 
could dictate his own terms and get away with it too. It gave the League an equal status to the 
Congress. 
The end of the war saw a change in Britain’s attitude towards India. Britain was no 
longer interested in retaining India. World opinion had turned decisively against empire building 
and colonialism. Moreover, India had become a burden on the British Empire. The Labor 
Government of Clement Attlee was pro-Congress in its outlook. It wanted to transfer power to a 
united India as soon as possible. Thus the Cabinet Mission came to India in March 1946 and 
stayed there for three months trying to find an agreement on the basis of which power could be 
transferred to a united India. The main reason for the failure of the Cabinet Mission was due to 
the lack of trust between the Congress and the League. Deep suspicion and mutual hatred of each 
other stood in the way of compromise at every stage of the Cabinet Mission negotiations. It was 
a clear case of failure of leadership and statesmanship by the leaders of both parties. 
The Congress gave too much emphasis on inessential points such as the right to nominate 
a Muslim to the Interim Government instead of the larger issue of unity of the country. Even 
when it was offered six seats in the Interim Government as opposed to five for the Muslim 
League, it rejected the June 16 Statement. The elections held in the winter of 1945-46 had proved 
beyond doubt that the Muslim League now commanded the support of overwhelming majority of 
Muslims of India. The Congress’s demand to nominate a Muslim member to the Interim 
Government was unjustifiable at this point. During the Simla Conference of 1945, the Congress 
had put forward a similar demand and it was legitimate at that time. The success of the League 
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among the Muslim electorate in 1946 changed the equation. It could now legitimately claim 
being the sole representative of the Muslims of India. 
Jinnah had compromised on his Pakistan demand by accepting the grouping scheme in 
the Cabinet Mission Plan. However, the Congress rejected it objecting to the compulsion clause 
in it which forced the provinces to remain within their respective groups. The Congress feared 
that if the two groups, one in the north-west and the other in the north-east, decided to secede 
from India into a new State of Pakistan, then the entire Punjab in the north-west and whole of 
Assam and Bengal in the north-east would be forced into Pakistan. So the Congress never 
accepted the May 16 Statement unequivocally. Nehru’s press statement on 10 July, 1946 
exacerbated the whole situation. It made Jinnah more suspicious of Congress’s real intentions i.e. 
the Congress could do whatever it wanted once the British left India. 
The Congress’s real objective was to establish a strong center with its own legislature and 
power to raise revenues. In contrast, Jinnah wanted a very weak center with no power to impose 
taxes and most powers devolved to the provinces. Basically, Jinnah wanted a center with no 
teeth. In his presidential address to the League on 6 June, 1946 Jinnah said that Muslim India 
would not rest content until it had established a full, complete and sovereign Pakistan. Jinnah 
saw the Cabinet Mission Plan as a stepping stone for achieving his dream of Pakistan. The 
Congress was deeply suspicious of Jinnah’s real motives in insisting the compulsion in the 
grouping scheme. Jinnah too never trusted the Congress that it would fair play once the British 
quit India. In the end, the Cabinet Mission failed because of the deep distrust and mutual 
suspicion that existed between the two parties. The leaders of the two parties failed to rise to the 
occasion and take the last opportunity to keep India united. 
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Jinnah had expected that since the League had accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan in its 
entirety and the Congress had not done so, the Viceroy would invite him to form the Interim 
Government. However, the Labor Government decided that since the Congress had not rejected 
the plan totally, both the parties should jointly form the Interim Government. Jinnah rejected the 
offer and Wavell invited Nehru to form the Government. Jinnah was very upset over the whole 
affair. When he called for ‘Direct Action’ in retaliation, he had no idea that it would lead to so 
much violence resulting in so many deaths and destructions. The Congress took office in 
September of 1946 and soon after the League decided to come in. The League joined the Interim 
Government with the sole purpose of obstructing it in every possible way from functioning. 
Instead of working together to govern the country, the members from the two parties started 
wrangling with each other. Thus yet another opportunity was lost at preserving the unity of the 
country. 
Within a few weeks of his arrival in India, Mountbatten realized that there was little 
chance of bringing the two parties together. The ill-feeling and distrust between them had 
reached its fever pitch. The communal situation in Punjab and elsewhere in the country was 
rapidly deteriorating and was reaching a point where an outbreak of civil war looked like a real 
possibility. The British did not want to transfer power to the Congress in order to keep their 
appearance of impartiality. In order to transfer power the quickest and surest way, they were 
willing to divide the country. Mountbatten justified his decision to partition the country in the 
shortest possible time imaginable by saying that unless he did that, the country was likely to 
descend into chaos. The 72-day timetable from 3 June to 15 August for carrying out the transfer 
of power and partition of a country of India’s size and with a population of 400 million proved 
disastrous. Wolpert has argued that Mountbatten was in a hurry to get back to his naval career in 
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London and hence rushed the partition through without adequate planning and preparation. 
Wolpert’s argument is questionable given the fact that Mountbatten stayed in India as Governor-
General for one more year after the partition. If he was in such a hurry to get back to London to 
resume his naval career, he would not have continued as the Governor-General for another year. 
The reason why Mountbatten rushed the partition was because he believed that unless he did so 
the situation in the country would soon develop into a full-scale civil war between the two 
warring communities.  
The failure of the Congress to prevent partition stemmed from its inability to understand 
the threat and danger of communal forces. It devoted little attention to develop a strategy to 
combat the communal forces. The Congress leaders, including Gandhi, believed that the 
communal rift between the Hindus and the Muslims was a direct result of British presence in 
India. Once the British quit India, the communal differences would disappear on its own accord. 
When they finally realized the destructive power of communalism in 1946, it was too late. By 
that time, Jinnah was in no mood for compromise. The Congress slowly came to realization that 
no amount of concessions would satisfy Jinnah except the partition of the country. The first 
Congress leader to jump in the bandwagon of partition was Sardar Patel. Nehru was reluctant to 
the idea of partition. But Mountbatten was able to change his mind. Leonard Mosley said that by 
persuading Nehru to accept partition, Mountbatten had performed the confidence trick of the 
century. Mosley has also argued that a little more patience and a refusal to rush into partition 
could have prevented partition as Pakistan was one-man achievement of Jinnah, and Jinnah was 
dead within a year of Pakistan’s foundation.564 Moseley is mostly right. However, I disagree with 
such assessments that hold Jinnah or Mountbatten or the Congress solely responsible for the 
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partition of India. As I have argued in this thesis, the partition of India was the product-mix of 
actions taken by the three parties involved – the British, the Congress, and Jinnah - over a long 
period of time.  
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